On 4 December 2015, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted its Opinion No. 54/2015 concerning a communication made on behalf of Julian Assange. The Assange case poses challenging questions regarding human rights in the context of criminal prosecution of individuals and their detention. In this regard, Opinion No. 54/2015 extensively discusses the legal arguments of both Assange’s lawyers and the states involved, however the legal and factual reasoning of the Working Group itself is rather cursory. In large parts, the Working Group followed the arguments made by Assange’s lawyers and found that he was subject to arbitrary detention. The Working Group’s findings have been met with both praise and criticism by scholars. Most notably the question whether Assange’s stay in the Ecuadorian Embassy can be deemed as (arbitrary) detention has attracted debate. This article sets out to provide a critical examination of the legal reasoning contained in the Working Group’s Opinion by comparing it with the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and, where appropriate, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The article will conclude with observations on possible ramifications of the Working Group’s approach, not only with regard to the unsurprising lack of voluntary compliance in the present case, but also its potential to bear detrimental effects for international human rights mechanisms in general.    «

On 4 December 2015, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted its Opinion No. 54/2015 concerning a communication made on behalf of Julian Assange. The Assange case poses challenging questions regarding human rights in the context of criminal prosecution of individuals and their detention. In this regard, Opinion No. 54/2015 extensively discusses the legal arguments of both Assange’s lawyers and the states involved, however the legal and factual reasoning of the Working Group itself is...    »