

Reconsidering the sociology of Emile Durkheim in the study of IR: Anomie theory and the society of states

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Abstract

This doctoral dissertation investigates the sociology of Emile Durkheim in the study of International Relations (IR). It identifies the problem that IR has interpreted Durkheimian sociology erroneously, exemplified particularly by Kenneth Waltz's application of Durkheimian sociology in his theory of structural realism. As a result, this dissertation wonders what benefit IR can acquire from a thorough and proper engagement with Durkheimian sociology. The answer to this question is an appropriated version of Durkheimian anomie theory. On behalf of a historic case study of inter-state relations from 1814 to the mid-1820s this dissertation shows that an appropriated version of anomie theory perfectly complements IRs, and notably English School (ES), conceptualisation of international society. Thereby, ES's conceptualisation of international society is not considered erroneous but incomplete. This dissertation's appropriated version of Durkheimian anomie theory fills this lacuna and thus provides IR, notably ES theory, with a fitting explanation of why a society of states develops. Furthermore, presuming ES theory's tenet that an international system is antecedent to an international society, this dissertation's version of anomie theory provides IR and ES theory with an explanation of why a society of states can atavistically regress from a society back into a system of states. Anomie theory thereby embraces the emergence and regression of a society of states in the study of IR.

Abstrakt

Diese Dissertation untersucht den Mehrwert der Soziologie von Emile Durkheim für die Wissenschaft der Internationalen Beziehungen (IB). Am Ausgangspunkt dieser Dissertation steht das Problem, dass in der Wissenschaft der Internationalen Beziehungen die Soziologie von Durkheim unbefriedigend und teils fehlerhaft bedacht wurde, insbesondere durch Kenneth Waltz in der Theorie des strukturellen Realismus. Demnach liegt dieser Dissertation die Frage zugrunde, welchen Mehrwert die Wissenschaft der IB von der Soziologie Durkheims erlangen kann. Die Antwort verweist auf die Theorie der Anomie wie sie von Emile Durkheim begründet, und von Soziologen und Kriminologen im 20. Jahrhundert weiterentwickelt wurde. In einer historischen Fallstudie der internationalen Beziehungen von 1814/1815 bis in die 1820er zeigt diese Dissertation, dass die Theorie der Anomie angemessen das Verständnis einer internationalen Gesellschaft (international society) der Englischen Schule (ES) komplettiert. Die Konzeptualisierung einer internationalen Gesellschaft durch die ES wird hierbei nicht infrage gestellt, sondern als unvollständig betrachtet. Mit Hilfe der Theorie der Anomie gelangen der ES und den IB-Wissenschaften ein tieferes Verständnis einer internationalen Gesellschaft, insbesondere warum Regeln in einer internationalen Gesellschaft wichtig sind, warum diese von Staaten befolgt werden, warum Regeln ggf. missachtet werden und welche Auswirkungen dies auf eine internationale Gesellschaft haben kann. Dadurch ermöglicht die Theorie der Anomie den IB-Wissenschaften auch Erkenntnis über die atavistische Regression einer internationalen Gesellschaft zurück in ein internationales System.

*Zeus, whose will has marked for man
The sole way where wisdom lies;
Ordered one eternal plan:
Man must suffer to be wise
Head-winds heavy with past ill
Stray his course and cloud his heart:
Sorrow takes the blind soul's part –
Man grows wise against his will.
For powers who rule from thrones above
By ruthlessness command their love.*

The twelve elders of Argos, in “Agamemnon”¹

¹ Aeschylus (1959) *The Oresteian Trilogy*, Penguin Classics, p. 48, emphasis in the original

Danksagung

Internationale Beziehungen sind ein faszinierendes Forschungsfeld. Die Interdisziplinarität, gerade die Verschmelzung von philosophischen, politischen, geschichtlichen und ökonomischen Aspekten in globalem Umfang ermöglichen eine unbegrenzte Vielfalt intellektueller Reflexionen. Für mich wurde diese Neugierde für internationale Beziehungen während meiner Tätigkeit beim Bundesnachrichtendienst vor vielen Jahren geweckt, und hat mich auf eine Reise gebracht, die zu dieser Dissertation führte.

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1: The sociology of Durkheim in the study of IR: Anomie theory and the society of states

1.1 Problem, research questions and solution

This doctoral dissertation is about the sociology of Emile Durkheim, how his sociology has been worked with in the study of International Relations (IR) and what benefit we can gain from Durkheimian sociology, particularly the theory of anomie, for how a society of states works.

Emile Durkheim (1858 - 1917) was a French sociologist, considered to be one of the founding fathers of sociology and social science. According to Snell (2010), his “effort to create the field of sociology as a respectable pursuit in its own right, with its own department of study, is the primary root of the modern conception of sociology” (52).² Beyond being a founding father of sociology, Emile Durkheim was keenly interested in society and its diagnosis (Müller 2006). In fact, throughout his life, he seemed particularly interested in the cohesion of society, especially during turbulent times of industrial and economic development. Interestingly, this is exactly what he experienced in his own life time. The early decades of Durkheim’s academic achievements were a period of considerable upheaval. France was shaken from top to toe. In other words, the twilight of the nineteenth century witnessed societal and political events that accompanied and without doubt influenced Durkheim and his sociology. For example, in Durkheim’s early adulthood one might think that the Revolution from 1789/99 still haunted France: between 1789 and 1880, “France had experienced fourteen different constitutions” (Allen and O’Boyle 2017: 15). France had held “the record with fifty-two cabinets in less than thirty-nine years between 1875 and the outbreak of war [in 1914]” (Hobsbawm 1994: 96). In the early 1890s, the time when Durkheim began his career at the University of Bordeaux and when he finished his doctoral dissertation, societal unease was widespread across France (Lukes 1973: 299).

² For more on the timeless relevance of Durkheimian sociology (of “the new Durkheim”) see the introduction in Smith and Alexander (2005).

Sennett (2006) highlighted that “the growth of urban capitalism, the diminishing hold of Catholicism on the population, and modern art” (xiii) were part of Durkheim’s adolescence. In fact, his whole lifespan fell within a period of rapid social and cultural change: industrialization fundamentally changed the way people inhabited the world, the state became much more powerful and took over a greater role in economics, politics and education, the patriarchal family system was undone and the supremacy of the Church weakened (Riley 2014).³ Unsurprisingly, then, some practitioners of the new subject of sociology between 1875 and 1914 (the Age of Empire) “concentrated on what they thought held societies together against the forces of disruption by the conflict of classes and groups within them, and the tendency of liberal society to reduce humanity to a scattering of disoriented and rootless individuals (“*anomie*”)” (Hobsbawm 1994: 274, my emphasis). Emile Durkheim was one of these practitioners of the new subject of sociology in this tumultuous time. Given these formidable transformations which Durkheim witnessed and experienced, it is understandable that his major interest in the fledgling field of sociology concerned the cohesion of society.

What exactly interested Emile Durkheim in the cohesion of society?⁴ What approach to this subject did he favour? For Durkheim, cohesion was about social bonds. He was curious about how social bonds could be maintained and reinforced (Coser 1984). What Durkheim (2013) referred to as social solidarity played an important role in this context. Although he differentiated between two types of social solidarity, one of the weaknesses with Durkheim’s writing (in general) is that sometimes definitions are missing. This challenge can, however, be overcome if a broader engagement with his oeuvre takes place. In the case of social solidarity such an engagement reveals that social solidarity is closely associated with dynamic density - and in both cases morality plays

³ In France in 1882 religious education was banned from schools, in 1886 priests were banned from schools and in 1905 “the formal separation of the church and state was declared in France” (Allen and O’Boyle 2017: 16).

⁴ Durkheim was influenced by Emmanuel Kant’s “theory of social cohesion based on the individual’s sense of unity with and dependence on others” (Lukes 1973: 55). Charles Renouvier, a neo-Kantian philosopher, also had a strong intellectual impact on Durkheim in this context (ibid.).

a pivotal role (cf. e.g. Delitz 2013).⁵ This means that neither the division of labour nor dynamic density were to be thought of as functional, material and hyper-rational mechanisms; they were moral tools for cohesion first and foremost. This is an important point I will highlight in this dissertation. It is an aspect which has been overlooked in adaptations of Durkheim in IR.

Beyond the cohesion of society Durkheim was also greatly interested in the effects of change on the individual within society.⁶ For example, in *On Suicide* Durkheim (2006 [1897]) achieved ground-breaking progress in how mankind can apprehend acts of suicide. Until the late nineteenth century (and perhaps beyond) most people believed that other people committed suicide because it was virtuous, for example to keep their honour, like Socrates and Roman aristocrats did. A second explanation was madness and a third one emotional weakness, i.e. people commit suicide because they were too weak and sentimental (Sennett 2006).⁷

Emile Durkheim tossed aboard these explanations and approached the subject scientifically. He consciously developed a definition of suicide and collected data from different regions and countries (France and Italy) to construct a comparative analysis. In the end, he concluded that suicide is not necessarily due to the personal characteristics of the victim (e.g. feeling dishonoured, being insane or too emotional) but a result of forces beyond the individual, forces rooted within society itself. This sober, scientific approach to suicide was erected on the foundation of scientific, sociological methodology established in *The Rules of Sociological Method* where Durkheim designed the idea that social facts occupy an externality to the individual. In other words, there exists an autonomous reality (like religion or law) external to the individual (Delitz 2013). For

⁵ Definitions of dynamic density will be discussed in chapter 2, 2.2.1 *Kenneth Waltz and Durkheimian sociology*.

⁶ Zhao and Cao (2010) investigated what effects socio-political change at the macro level has on anomie within a society. They hypothesise that “rapid socio-political change, such as democratic transition, is the structural factor that exerts a powerful influence on anomie of individuals” (1210). For Zhao and Cao, anomie is a byproduct of rapid change.

⁷ For many this explanation seemed particularly credible after numerous men and women killed themselves after having read Goethe’s *Sorrows of Young Werther* (Sennett 2006).

Durkheim, acts of suicide were the prime empiric evidence for this methodological perspective: suicides “vindicated social realism [...] proving the existence of realities external to the individual” (Lukes 1973: 192-193).

1.1.1 PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This methodological perspective, Durkheim’s interests in the cohesion of societies as well as his sober sociological approach, particularly his quest for finding explanations for social phenomena beyond the individual, not attributing such explanations to a fixed, pre-determined character of manhood, gained Emile Durkheim recognition in the study of International Relations (IR). Given that the Study of IR as an academic discipline is - at least historically speaking - a still rather novel field of inquiry, Durkheimian sociology became introduced to it quite early.⁸ Particularly noteworthy is that Kenneth Waltz in the late 1950s in his doctoral dissertation drew on Durkheim in *Man, the State and War*. He seemed particularly curious about Emile Durkheim’s before-mentioned methodological approach, an approach which substantiated Waltz’s (2001 [1959]: 28; 44) own idea that international relations (or politics) are not explained by a fixed character of mankind (e.g. the inherent evilness of particular states or man’s insatiability for power) or even psychological reasoning - like suicides are not explained by madness or emotions alone. The fact that Waltz referred to Durkheim so early on in his career perhaps suggests that Durkheimian sociology had an important influence on his thoughts on international relations. As a matter of fact, Waltz himself in 2008 mentioned that Emile Durkheim was the thinker most influential on his conception of international relations (Rosenberg 2013: 189).

This also comes to the fore in his critically much acclaimed and very influential book *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979. This time, however, Waltz relied upon Durkheimian

⁸ “The modern discipline of International Relations (IR) is nearly 100 years old. Its first Chair was established in 1919 at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth [...]” (Rosenberg 2016: 1).

sociology too selectively and erroneously.⁹ His argument that Durkheim's concept of the mechanical society can serve as an analogy to the international realm and thereby support his idea that there are two distinct realms of investigation (the international and the domestic) in IR theory is flawed, particularly because he misinterpreted the role egoism played for Durkheim in the mechanical as well as the organic forms of society. Waltz, however, equated his understanding of egoism (borrowed from microeconomic theories) with the role of egoism in Durkheimian sociology. This misunderstanding could have been avoided had Kenneth Waltz considered Durkheimian sociology comprehensively instead of focusing merely on one of the many concepts in his sociological oeuvre.

IR theory has not managed to correct this problematic, i.e. selective and erroneous, treatment of Durkheimian sociology. Several scholars have responded to Waltz's interpretation of Durkheimian sociology. Their alternative usages, however, have not revealed a substantial gain for IR neither. The problem remains that throughout major strands of IR theory Durkheimian sociology and Durkheim's ideas or concepts have been relied upon too selectively, disregarding the broader themes of his sociology. The concept of the mechanical society and the concomitant misinterpretation of the role of egoism by Waltz is only one example. Another case in point is the concept of dynamic density from which some scholars derived ideas of functional differentiation, disregarding a vital moral nexus. In order to alleviate this problematic treatment of the sociology of Emile Durkheim in the study of IR, this dissertation pursues the question of *what* benefit the study of IR can acquire from the sociology of Emile Durkheim beyond earlier engagements with his scholarship? The answer to this question is that the version of Durkheimian anomie theory developed in this dissertation can benefit the study of IR beyond previous encounters with Emile

⁹ Levine and Barder (2018): "Waltz appropriated Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity in order to reconceptualize (albeit in problematic ways) the distinction between international anarchy and domestic hierarchy" (300).

Durkheim's sociology. Sequenced from this what-question and the answer "anomie theory" naturally follows an inquiry into *why* I believe that anomie theory is to be of benefit for the study of IR.¹⁰ As a result, this doctoral research is guided by two sequenced research questions: First, *what* benefit can the study of IR acquire from the sociology of Emile Durkheim? Second, *why* is anomie theory of benefit for the study of IR?

1.1.2 SOLUTION

An answer to the first question should, of course, avoid the mistakes identified by IR scholarship above. That is, what could be acquired from the sociology of Emile Durkheim for the benefit of the study of IR should not be an isolated idea or concept and should not be inaccurately interpreted. As a result, I approach this question wondering if there is a central theme that has been at the bottom of Emile Durkheim's scholarship? In other words, is there a permeating issue that can benefit IR? The answer relevant for this dissertation, however, comes back to what I have outlined above regarding Durkheim's major sociological interest: the cohesion of society. Ideas and concepts like dynamic density or the mechanical society are part of an investigation into the cohesion of society, but they are far from encompassing Durkheim's inquiry into this subject matter. What does, however, frame Durkheim's major interest in the cohesion of society more comprehensively is anomie.

Anomie depicts quite the contrary to the cohesion of society and there are many definitions for it (cf. Mawson 1970: 301). In this dissertation, however, anomie is understood as normlessness and a breakdown of social standards in a society. It is a contrast to the cohesion of society in so far that it impairs cohesion. Anomie was first mentioned by Durkheim (2013) in *The Division of Labour*

¹⁰ I have been inspired to contemplate sequenced research questions of *what* and *why* by Blaikie (1993) in *Approaches to social inquiry*.

(in its first edition of 1893) in which he discusses an anomic division of labour, understood as one of three pathological forms of divisions of labour. An anomic division of labour arises if there is a lack of rules governing relations between social functions (cf. Lukes 1973: 172). Anomie became more refined in *On Suicide* where Durkheim discussed anomic suicide. Egoistic suicide, another version of suicide, comes close to the idea of anomie as a pathological form of a division of labour, too. Beyond these two cases the term anomie itself does not feature prominently in Durkheim's oeuvre, no more prominently than perhaps dynamic density itself. However, there are two reasons why anomie is closely associated with his major interest in the cohesion of society and thus nonetheless constitutes a permeating theme at the bottom of Durkheimian sociology.

First, anomie draws in many aspects Durkheim considered crucial for the cohesion of society. Social solidarity, for example, is eroded by anomie. Social solidarity itself represents a morality specific to a society. A segmentary (mechanical) society is characterised by a different morality than a functional (organic) society. This is to say that different societies identify themselves through different moralities. As a result, if social solidarity erodes so does morality and so does a particular kind of society. Anomie theory thereby dials back the reasons that safeguard cohesion of a society. This dissertation (by building and elaborating upon Durkheim) argues that it causes an atavism, a retrogression into a previous form. Social solidarity itself, the importance of rules or law within context of social solidarity, morality and atavistic developments are the exact antithesis to the cohesion of society because they turn Durkheim's explanation of what provides cohesion upside down. As a result, anomie is not an isolated concept within Durkheimian sociology because it is impossible to think anomie without considering Durkheim's positions on morality, egoism, solidarity, rules and so on.

Second, Durkheim's work on anomie also reflects his methodological stance appropriately. Anomie reflects Durkheim's emancipation from anthropocentric preconceptions, ritual explanations and sectarian beliefs. This is important because in the late nineteenth century this was certainly not the norm, not even for Emile Durkheim himself.¹¹ Durkheim did not shy away from racial prejudices in constructing a difference between mechanical and organic societies (yet another aspect Kenneth Waltz had overlooked). Durkheim did, however, adhere to a strictly modern(ish) social science approach in his work on anomie. This does not only come to the fore in his explanations of anomie, which are clear of any anthropocentric, ritual, racist or sectarian reasoning. This comes also to the fore in the repercussions anomie induces on a society. This is to say that anomie is not a state-of-mind of an individual, it is a social condition affecting society (cf. Merton 1964).¹²

These two reasons avoid the mistakes IR has committed in its engagement with Durkheimian sociology so far.¹³ They show that anomie is a permeating feature of Durkheimian sociology, containing some of his most important core themes like social solidarity and morality but at the same time epitomising his epistemological stance as one of the founders of modern-day sociology and social science.

It is also noteworthy that this dissertation builds on Durkheimian anomie, but at the same time considers scholarship on anomie beyond Durkheim. This is a logical, natural necessity for this dissertation because Emile Durkheim's thoughts on anomie were considerably developed after he had passed away in 1917. It would be negligent to disregard the serious progress that has been

¹¹ Cf. Allen and O'Boyle (2017). They also argue that for example blatant racist conceptions in sociology have lost credibility only since the end of World War Two.

¹² *Anomia*, however, is understood as an anomic state of an individual, but has nothing to do with anomie in this dissertation.

¹³ For a critical engagement with IR and its use of Durkheimian sociology see chapter 2, *Reviewing Emile Durkheim and anomie theory in IR*.

made on anomie beyond Durkheim. Crucial for the development of anomie were the contributions by sociologists and criminologists from the 1930s onwards. They forged anomie into an explanatory framework for modern-day societies, locating explanations for deviant (e.g. criminal) behaviour of individuals not within personal, psychological factors but trans-societal, sociological attributes instead. Considering these valuable refinements of Durkheimian anomie, this dissertation constructs a theory of anomie, an appropriated version as it were, for application in the study of IR.

This solves the before-mentioned problematic treatment of Durkheimian sociology in IR and proposes the following hypothetical answer to the first research question (the what-question): the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation, firmly grounded in Durkheimian sociology, is of benefit for the study of IR. This hypothetical answer is an argumentative one, developed by discourse. It is grounded in the arguments that Durkheim's scholarship on society, solidarity and moral are regarded appropriately within this dissertation's constructed version of anomie theory. Out of this correct interpretation of Durkheimian sociology a version of Durkheimian anomie theory is developed which mirrors a nuanced blend of Durkheimian sociology. Thereby, it does not constitute an isolated idea or concept of Durkheim's sociology. It is not an extract applied irrespectively of his pivotal sociological themes, broader issues and ensuing scholarly developments. The appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation is quite the contrary to this.

The hypothetical answer begs the second research question, the why-question: Why is the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation of benefit for the study of IR? This second research question is answered by a two-pronged approach: by an argumentative, theoretical methodology and an empiricist methodology.

First, the theoretical methodology shows that the version of anomie theory in this dissertation complements English School (ES) theory's conceptualisation of international society (or society of states).¹⁴ This approach is grounded in shortfalls I recognised while investigating if ES has, and if yes how, engaged with the sociology of Emile Durkheim. I became aware that ES has defined and conceptualised its flagship-topic, the idea of an international society, correctly in many regards. It has rightly asserted that rules are very important building blocks of international society. It struck me, however, that ES has taken for granted the simple fact that rules must be obeyed, too, and what such a compliance with rules actually means for our understanding of an international society. Furthermore, ES has neglected the idea what might happen if states in an international society violate rules. Would this harm the construct of international society? If yes, what might be the ramifications? Contrary to the version of anomie theory in this dissertation, ES has no answers to such questions. I will explain on behalf of this example why the version of anomie theory in this dissertation can be of benefit for IR theory.

In addition to this, ES can convincingly explain how a development from an international system to an international society occurs. However, ES does not consider a regressive development of this kind. It does not contemplate or even explain the development of an international society back into an international system.¹⁵ This matters greatly in so far that the genesis of an international society does not mean that this societal texture of inter-state relations remains cut in stone. What if war breaks out among members of a society of states? Such a condition of hostility among states would hardly vindicate ES's definition of a society of states. War might be an extreme example. More subliminal dynamics that change how states perceive each other and behave towards each other may instigate a regression of a society of states, as it is defined by ES, too. Unfortunately, ES is

¹⁴ For an introduction of ES theory and a critical analysis see 3.2 *ES theory and anomie theory in context of international society*.

¹⁵ See 3.2 *ES and anomie theory in context of international society*.

silent on this topic. Fortunately, in this case, too, this dissertation's version of anomie can provide an answer.

Second, the empiricist methodology answers the why-question by focussing on a corroboration of the before-mentioned hypothesis, i.e. "the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation, firmly grounded in Durkheimian sociology, is of benefit for the study of IR". This is to say that the application of the version of anomie theory in this dissertation on post-1815 inter-state relations fills important gaps of knowledge. An analysis of how IR has explained important phenomena in post-1815 inter-state relations reveals that IR literature cannot explain why the era of concert diplomacy experienced diminution in the 1820s and why this diminution had portentous effects on the relationship of particularly the front-rank powers. I attempt in this dissertation to answer these issues with an existing theory of IR, the English School (ES) theory. Unfortunately, traditional application of ES has not systematically looked at this decisive period for the emergence of the modern society of states. At the same time, the weaknesses of ES mentioned above prevent ES from offering convincing answers. In contrast, anomie theory developed in this dissertation offers novel insight through new perspectives on this period of post-1815 inter-state relations. It will be seen that mirroring this case study in both ES and anomie theory was a helpful method to come full circle with the criticism of ES developed throughout this dissertation as well as the alternative complement anomie theory can offer.

1.2 Theoretical argument and empirical applicability

1.2.1 Theoretical argument

The main argument in this doctoral study is that the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation is of benefit for the study of IR because A) it explains the emergence and regression of an inter-state society and (thereby) B) completes ESs conceptualisation of a society of states. In both cases

this appropriated version of anomie theory fills important gaps in IR theory, particularly pertaining to IR's understanding of international society.

There are three important, rules-related aspects to this theory of anomie. First, why it is important that rules are respected by states in an inter-state society; Second, why states usually do respect rules in an inter-state society; Third, the repercussions of states violating rules in an inter-state society. These three rules-based factors come, of course, not out of thin air but are, instead, firmly rooted in Durkheimian sociology and scholarship on anomie. They are an analytical construct that enable the operability of the theory of anomie in real-life inter-state relations. The first two aspects intrinsic to this dissertation's version of anomie theory are crucial in explaining the emergence of a society of states, the third aspect is crucial explaining regression.

Rules play an important role in Durkheim's sociology. One of the major contributions the division of labour offers to the cohesion of society is the idea that the division of labour facilitates the emergence of rules.¹⁶ But rules are no empty commitments. They serve a purpose that is not only functional in nature, task-related or production-related; instead, rules signify principles of right and wrong. They thereby set standards in a society claiming moral (i.e., rightful, legitimate) behaviour.¹⁷ If rules are respected a certain morality unfurls among members of a society.¹⁸ With "certain morality" I stress the fact that different rules in different societies in different periods of mankind represent different rightful, legitimate or right-and-wrong behaviour. This is brought to the fore by Durkheim himself who explained that morality in an organic society is different to

¹⁶ Most of the statements I make in this section are referenced as well as explained and developed in depth in chapter 2.

¹⁷ I use "moral" as an adjective denoting to principles of right and wrong in behaviour. Definition available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral>, accessed on 12/06/2022.

¹⁸ I consider morality as principles relating to right and wrong or good and bad behaviour. Definition available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morality>, accessed on 12/06/2022.

morality in a mechanic society and vice versa.¹⁹ In *The Division of Labour* he exemplified this on behalf of different types of legal rules.

If rules are respected and abided by, the moral rightfulness they represent is internalised by members of a society as a moral conscience. Members of a society become conscious of what behaviour is deemed right or wrong. They furthermore judge each other's behaviour according to their shared moral conscience. The moral conscience thus turns into a force or controlling agent that most members of a society adhere to. This is the reason why Durkheim referred to such rules as practical imperatives guiding rationally the ideas and sentiments of the moral conscience. When rules that epitomise particular moral expectations are respected, according to Durkheimian sociology, they not only assume the role of a controlling force but they are at the same time perceived objectively, factually by members of a society.²⁰ At the same time, different rules at different times can epitomise different moral expectations. This comes back to one of the roots of Durkheimian sociology in *The Division of Labour* where he distinguishes between organic and mechanic societies, both characterised by different moralities, both moralities epitomised by different kinds of (legal) rules.

Therefore, the answer to the question of why it is important that rules in a society are respected is that the respect for rules enables the emergence of a society in the first place. Respect for rules enables a moral conscience to develop which is perceived by members of a society objectively. Because it is peculiar to the rules that exist, this moral conscience can vary from society to society. At the same time, it thus characterises one particular, specific society, demarcated from others (like a Durkheimian organic society is not a mechanical society).

¹⁹ In accepting such a variability of morality (or moralities) I have also been inspired by Reus-Smit (1997; 1999).

²⁰ For a detailed explanation on Durkheimian understanding of the roles of rules in society see 2.3 *The Theory of Anomie and IR*.

This leads to the next question of why states usually do respect rules? In a realm of anarchy, it might be believed that no state would want to restrict its freedoms voluntarily.²¹ Yet, the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation explains that states embark on such a voluntary restriction because A) they share a goal with other states and B) they believe that concerted behaviour among their fellow states can help them achieve this goal. This theorem is at the heart of anomie theory and was developed beyond Durkheim. It is firmly rooted in the work of sociologist and criminologist Robert Merton. In a sense, this theorem presents a social contract between individuals of a society and society at large whereby society promises the individual the fulfilment of a goal as long as the individual abides by the rules. Robert Merton developed and applied this theorem in context of North-American society and the pressure for pecuniary success.²² He explained that pecuniary success is a society-wide goal in the United States, a goal that individuals want to achieve and attempt to achieve while abiding by certain rules. Therefore, following the rules promises the achievement of a goal (e.g. becoming rich). In anomie terminology behaving in accordance with rules is deemed legitimate or conformist behaviour. According to the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation, the same assumption holds for international relations: states agree voluntarily to follow rules because they think that abiding by the rules promises the achievement of a beneficiary goal.

This answer to the second question above complements the first one and adds to our understanding of the emergence of a society of states. The answer to the first question was that it is important that members of a society respect rules because the respect for rules enables a moral conscience to develop which is perceived by members of a society objectively. Respecting rules enables members of a society to realise and perceive that they are part of a like-minded group. This

²¹ Anarchy does not mean chaos. Anarchy means that there is no overarching authority for states. In theory, states enjoy boundless freedoms.

²² See also Messner S. and Rosenfeld R. (2013).

argument is now in so far complemented that states abide by the rules because it promises the achievement of a (shared) goal.

Could the second question not have been posed before the first one? Yes, that could have been an alternative. Yet, it did not turn out this way because these questions in that order developed out of criticism of how English School (ES) theory conceptualised the idea of a society of states. In a nutshell, this is explained as follows: According to Bull (2002 [1977]), “[a] society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another [...]” (13). I accept this definition and consider it applicable in context of the empiric case of the early nineteenth century below, especially because it epitomises anomie theory’s claim aptly. However, I see a significant weakness with this and similar conceptualisations of a society of states in ES. Bull’s definition echoes standard features of a society of states in ES, especially regarding common interests and values as well as an obligation to a common set of rules. However, the significant weakness is that ES does not explain why it is important that rules are respected. This is not just the case with Bull but I show in this dissertation that this criticism pertains to other ES scholars and ideas, too. Above all, ES seems to take it for granted that states respect rules off-handedly.

However, I am not countering this weakness with for example power-related themes, drawing on realist arguments from outside ES paradigms. Such an approach would not be for the benefit of ES, it would not offer additional insight within the paradigm of ES. Instead, anomie theory, with its intellectual proximity to ES, explains perfectly why states respect rules in the first place and why this matters (cf. above).²³ And because of anomie theory’s intellectual proximity to ES theory,

²³ What this intellectual proximity means is that the version of anomie theory in this dissertation naturally prioritises some factors like shared goals, rules-based behaviour and constructive cooperation among states stronger than other

for example illustrated by Bull's definition of society above, its explanation in this regard thus constitutes not an alternative or rivalry but a supplement to ES theory definitions of a society of states that is on par with ESs paradigms.

The idea of why members of a society respect rules is pivotal for the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation. It bears on anomie theory even more considerably if the contrary of rule-compliance is considered. In other words, why do members of a society might not follow the rules? At what stage do they depart from conformist behaviour? This is actually the main issue on which Merton and other criminologists like Albert Cohen and Richard Cloward focused on.²⁴ Anomie theory in this dissertation makes this issue a central theme, too. Members of a society may violate rules if they consider the goal (e.g. pecuniary success) to be unattainable through conformist behaviour. In anomie terminology such rule-breaking is referred to as non-conformist, illegitimate or deviant behaviour. It is important to stress, however, that deviant behaviour is not considered wicked or evil. It is not associated with a spiteful character of the individual who engages in it. Instead, deviant behaviour is an expedient action to achieve the pursued goal simply by other means. It is evoked by a means-ends breakdown whereby the deviant individual estimates that through conformist behaviour society has promised something (e.g. becoming rich) which it, however, denies in reality. According to Robert Merton's example of American society and the pursuit of monetary fortune such deviant behaviour could be bribery, insider trading, and worse.

Criminologists in sociology have spent much energy on the exact reasons that seem to compel individuals to engage in deviant behaviour. One of the issues is, for example, why and at what

factors, factors that may be more closely associated with, for example, realist theories (like power, competition and conflicting state interests).

²⁴ Merton's scholarship on anomie established the strain theory in criminology/sociology. According to strain theory, one of the leading theories of crime, pressures like strain or stress from society can cause crime (or deviant behaviour).

point an individual feels that goals like pecuniary success cannot be achieved by conformist behaviour anymore. What role do unequal opportunities in such a context play? An individual who comes from a wealthy background and who developed intellectual abilities to a certain standard from early on in his/her life can attend business school and therefore enjoy greater opportunities for achieving the goal of pecuniary success than many other individuals in a society. This is, for instance, one topic criminologists dwelled on in context of anomie theory. In this dissertation this topic plays a role but is nevertheless of secondary importance. The focus I put on the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation pertains to the repercussions deviant behaviour can have on a society of states. In short, such repercussions are anomie: normlessness and a breakdown of social standards.

Merton's example of white-collar crime in the United States can continue as an analogy in this regard, and is described in more detail in chapter 2.²⁵ If members of a society (firms or individuals) engage in deviant behaviour in order to pursue the goal of pecuniary success, this can have far reaching consequences. Insider trading, for example, violates one of the principle ethics of a liberal economy, that is to say open competition.²⁶ So does the violation of contracts which disregards the principle of sanctity of agreements. Where would a liberal economy or a free market society be without open competition and sanctity of agreements? This rhetorical question provokes the idea that a violation of rules is not a merely technical issue. The violation of rules entails the violation of the morality they epitomise. Society deems such violations crimes for a good reason, that is, because such violations are no negligent incidents; on the contrary, Emile Durkheim explained that they offend sentiments of a society, particularly moral ones. Hence, society attempts to repress such immoral behaviour with punishment. In *The Division of Labour* Emile Durkheim (2013: 57

²⁵ See also Bernburg (2002) and his discussion of institutional anomie theory in context of (economic) crime.

²⁶ According to *Merriam Webster Dictionary*, insider trading is described as the “illegal use of information available only to insiders in order to make a profit in financial trading”. Available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insider%20trading>, accessed on 12/06/2022.

ff.) put a great deal of effort into the issue of punishment of crimes in different types of societies. However, what different types of societies have in common when punishing crime is the fact that punishment is not inflicted to gain satisfaction but to protect society. This again illustrates the far-reaching consequences deviant behaviour and thus anomie can have on a society according to Durkheimian sociology.

Therefore, the violation of rules implies the violation of morality and the impairment of practical imperatives or value judgements that guide the moral conscience of a society. The violation of rules, referred to as deviant or illegitimate behaviour, damages the normative essence of what a society is made of. In its worst case, this can lead to anomie, that is, normlessness and a breakdown of social standards.

I have so far outlined the main theoretical argument of the version of anomie theory in this dissertation. To be sure, the reader will have many questions at this point. Therefore, this theoretical argument of anomie theory is explained in more depth and detail in chapter 2. Next, I will outline the empirical applicability of the main theoretical argument in this dissertation, through which some sociological and theoretical points become more tangible.

1.2.2 Empirical applicability

Scholars in IR have written plentiful on inter-state relations ensuing the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1814/15.²⁷ The early nineteenth century was, after all, a momentous milestone in the history of mankind. Whereas the French revolution in 1789/99 introduced the liberation of men

²⁷ References and detailed explanations of post-1815 inter-state relations are contained in chapter 3-5. There is also a timeline of events (1813 – 1823) in the appendices of this dissertation for a concise chronological overview of historic events and details.

from despotism, the same might be argued for European inter-state relations after the defeat of the *Grand Armée*. Napoleon's campaign subjugated militarily and politically previously independent and sovereign people of Europe. Central Germany, particularly Prussia, is a case in point.²⁸ After the allies' final victory at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815, Europe could breathe again. Lasting peace had grown into an ardent necessity, it forged an equilibrium of interests among states. This came firmly to the fore in inter-state diplomacy even before the final victory over Napoleon in 1815. And indeed, lasting peace was achieved.

It is unclear how long this lasting peace ensued. Different scholars make different arguments. Some argue it lasted until the outbreak of the revolutions in 1848, the Crimean War in 1854, the unification of Germany in 1871 or even the First World War in 1914. However, what most scholarship shares is an investigation into the reasons why post-1815 inter-state relations had become peaceful, friendly and characterised by remarkably constructive relations among states that were formerly juxtaposed in opposition to each other as geopolitical foes for centuries. The concept of the balance of power was, of course, one explanatory device, just like the personalities of individual statesmen and ideas about pacifist sentiments of states traumatised by war.

Anomie theory takes a slightly different approach. It is intrigued most about the successful transposition of the goal of lasting peace into successful policy. The baseline for this analysis for anomie theory is that it depicts post-1815 inter-state relations as a society of states. This is no negligent ascertainment because most scholars have failed to contemplate the shape and form of the supra-national level of European politics at this period. In other words, it matters if post-1815 inter-state relations are to be characterised as a system or a society because an answer to this issue

²⁸ Napoleon Bonaparte had a well-known contempt for everything Prussian and once even contemplated abolishing Prussia all-together (Zamoyski 2007: 24-5). Furthermore, in 1806 Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire (ibid.). As a result, Prussia suffered severely under Napoleon and loathed everything French (Zamoyski 2018: 556).

is clearly contingent on how analytical concepts, like for instance the balance of power, are to be understood and interpreted.

The appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation is inevitably a theory of a society of states because it stresses some factors like shared goals, rules-based behaviour and constructive cooperation more than other factors like power, competition and conflicting state interests. This is illustrated by anomie theory's framing of post-1815 inter-state relations, particularly considering the two factors of 1) "shared goal" and 2) "rules-based behaviour". While still fighting Napoleon, states in the early nineteenth century have agreed among each other to pursue the goal of lasting peace in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. This commitment had been firmly enshrined in important legal documents, like the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). It had been re-stated in the Treaty of Paris (1814), at the Congress of Vienna (1815) and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818). At the same time, and also before the final victory over Napoleon, states agreed upon regulated conduct in pursuing this goal of lasting peace. This regulated conduct was concert diplomacy. Concert diplomacy consisted of three rules: (1) inter-state communication for the coordination of policies, (2) refrainment from unilateral action and (3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. In the course of time, these three rules have emerged from the above-mentioned legal documents, too (cf. chapter 4).

From 1815 to 1818 states abided by these rules while pursuing the goal of lasting peace. In accordance with the theory of anomie, respect of these rules in pursuit of the shared goal of lasting peace enabled a moral conscience to arise among states (cf. theoretical explanation above). From 1818 onwards, however, the United Kingdom became increasingly obstinate towards the rules of concert diplomacy.²⁹ This is an intriguing aspect of post-1815 inter-state relations that has been

²⁹ Throughout this dissertation I use the term "United Kingdom", referring to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The reason for this exact denotation is historically justified. In 1800 William Pitt the Younger

recognised by many scholars, although it has not been explained. In this dissertation, the empirical analysis in chapter 5 reveals that the United Kingdom's alienation with the rules of concert diplomacy is not substantiated by, for example, power-related causes. In other words, there is no evidence that the United Kingdom became disenchanted with concert diplomacy and the rules associated with it because she considered her power constrained. Instead, primary sources indicate, and sometimes explicitly show, that, from roughly 1818 onwards, the United Kingdom did not consider concert diplomacy and the rules it implied as a guarantor for the achievement of the goal of lasting peace anymore. In context of anomie theory, this indicates an impending means-ends breakdown (cf. above). According to anomie theory, the logical consequence of such a (perceived) means-ends breakdown is deviant behaviour.

The United Kingdom did indeed display deviant behaviour in the early 1820s, i.e., she violated the rules of concert diplomacy. However, this process from alienation towards deviant behaviour was an ongoing one which escalated in severity over time. This might be judged as another indicator that deviant behaviour was not grounded in a conscious decision to wield power beyond the validity of the rules of concert diplomacy. Had this been the case, it is likely that no gradual process towards rule-breaking had had unfolded beforehand.

The ramifications deviant behaviour of the United Kingdom had on the post-1815 society of states were considerable. This became obvious during the Russo-Greek crisis in the late 1820s when the rules of concert diplomacy played no considerable role anymore. The United Kingdom refused attending a conference in St Petersburg, primarily because she was concerned that conference diplomacy, at this stage, would pave a road to war and not any longer safeguard the goal of lasting peace in Europe. Furthermore, the United Kingdom engaged in unilateral policies and wooed

introduced the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland which merged both parliaments – hence, the “United Kingdom...” (cf. Simms 2014: 157).

Russia to disengage from concert diplomacy as well. Thereby, the contrast to the early 1820s was considerable: whereas a Russo-Greek crisis in the early 1820s could be solved constructively within the framework of concert diplomacy, a very similar crisis at the end of the 1820s escalated (cf. chapter 5 and the three examples and repercussions of deviant behaviour).

By the late 1820s deviant behaviour had thus introduced the decline of concert diplomacy and the regression of the society of states it characterised. What followed was an increasing confrontational inter-state dynamic of *Realpolitik* that dismantled what characterised the post-1815 society of states. Constructive cooperation among the front-rank powers of Europe had ceased and moral, behavioural restraints had disappeared. In other words, a breakdown of social standards occurred. In this dissertation I describe this repercussion of anomie as regression, defined as an atavism in international relations. Atavism denotes to the retrogression of the post-1815 inter-state society into a previous form of an inter-state system (cf. chapter 6, *Society to system: Regression and atavism of an inter-state society*).

1.3 Definitions and concepts

I regularly define terms throughout this dissertation right away, particularly terms that do not warrant a considerable discussion in context of the study of IR and can be understood through relatively straightforward definitions. In such cases I often rely on dictionaries, usually the *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary* and *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*. However, this dissertation also employs concepts that cannot be understood straightforwardly in context of social sciences, particularly the study of IR and therefore warrant more attention. One example is the term “international relations” itself, as well as “international society”. How these concepts are understood bears considerably on the broader ontological and epistemological framing of this dissertation, as well as the theoretical-analytical placement of this dissertation’s version of anomie theory in IR theory.

1.3.1 INTER-STATE RELATIONS

To begin with, I refrain from using the term international relations because in the early nineteenth century I consider the term *inter-state* relations more appropriate. In my opinion, a nation is a rather homogeneous group of people inhabiting territory historically considered as native. The Habsburg monarchy is a case in point why I find it difficult to consider the front-rank powers of the early nineteenth century as such nations. Since 1699 the Habsburgs owned Hungary and Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands, Milan and Naples (Simms 2014), all of which are independent nations today (except Transylvania which is a part of Romania). These regal possessions naturally spilled over into the political domain of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was comprised in the early nineteenth century largely by the same territories, but also including today's Czech Republic, parts of Poland, Hungary of course, parts of Northern Italy, Slovenia, and parts of Croatia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire in early nineteenth century (and beyond) was in my view therefore not a nation state but an ethnically and politically heterogeneous conglomerate ruled (more or less effectively) by a power centre. A similar description pertains to Russia as well as the United Kingdom.

A possible avoidance of this nation-trap is simply the conceptualisation of these actors as states: a political organisation that is delineated from other political organisations by territory. This is a simplification because it ignores all the internal political and ethnical complexities that actually existed in what we know as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the United Kingdom and Russia.³⁰

³⁰ France and Prussia are noteworthy examples; France only after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and the territorial re-formation in France's ancient borders of 1792 (cf. Zamoyski 2007). France's ancient borders are to be distinguished from her natural borders, a difference that played an important role at that time. Whereas her ancient borders are her borders of 1792, her natural borders comprise the English Channel, the Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean Sea, the Alps and the Rhine. These borders case territories that do not belong to France according to her ancient borders. The thesis of the natural borders was proposed by Georges Danton (Zamoyski 2018: 365).

However, this simplification is not considered impossible or unacceptable in the study of IR. Working with templates of nations or states has been a crucial aspect of the study of IR.³¹

At the same time, this template-grounded approach does not necessarily consider states as blackboxes or billiard-ball-like entities (cf. Burton 1972). Anomie theory in this dissertation does, at least implicitly, ascribe some social attributes to states that might be considered anthropocentric. This is to say that in order to recognise and perceive a shared morality, for instance, percipient abilities are ascribed to states which are conventionally only associated with human beings. This cracks open the billiard-ball model of states and reveals a plethora of concomitant deliberations, for example the issue if externally perceived morals are mirrored by internal compositions of moral understandings. Such intermingling of internal and external dimensions of states also plays no role in the research of this dissertation. In fact, it is quite impossible to allow this because anomie theory as well as Durkheimian sociology refuse this altogether. Anomie is a property of a social system, it is not anomia, understood as an individual or personal condition. Above all, Durkheimian epistemology holds that social phenomena are explained by societal causes and not by psychological or individual ones. To briefly summarise: This dissertation applies the term of inter-state relations. States are considered political organisations delineated from other political organisations by territory. They do have sensuous abilities considered anthropocentric in nature. Their internal, domestic characteristics are disregarded.

1.3.2 INTER-STATE SOCIETY, SOCIETY OF STATES

Similar deliberations are relevant concerning the idea of an international society. I avoid this term, too, preferring inter-state society or society of states for the reasons outlined above.³² However,

³¹ Working with such templates is also usually taken for granted and not discussed. To my knowledge, ES theory, for example, engages in no noteworthy discussion of this kind.

³² When I discuss international society in reference to ES I stick to this term to remain true to ES terminology. This is particularly relevant in chapter 3.

concerning the understanding of inter-state society or society of states I accept the definition from Hedley Bull, already mentioned above.³³ This definition comes close to anomie theory's explanation for the emergence of a society of states, an argument I develop in more detail throughout this dissertation, particularly in chapters 3, 4 and 6. Bull's definition of a society (of states) also resonates with Durkheimian sociology in so far that his definition of a society (of states) is essentially purpose-oriented in nature: the understanding of society is vested in an order which fulfils the purpose of sustaining the elementary, primary and universal goals (human needs) of life, truth and property (cf. Bull 2002 [1977]: 3-6). This seems, however, nothing new. Bauman (2005) explained that definitions of society from the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1553, 1588 and 1639 all seem to confirm an understanding of society as purpose-oriented. Furthermore, Bauman argued that "an image or presentiment of proximity, closeness, togetherness and mutual engagement" (361) is implicit in such a purpose-oriented conceptualisation of society. In other words: "a certain number of people sharing a place, coming in and out of each other's presence and view, interacting in at least some of their activities and occasionally engaging in conversation" (361).

It seems that these aspects of purpose-orientedness and proximity and interaction of members of a society seem to be historically essential to our understanding of a society of states. They are also mirrored in Durkheim's ideas of the role rules play (developing and sustaining a moral conscience) and in his concept of dynamic density. Furthermore, this matters because it depicts a compatibility between ES understanding of a society (of states) and the one by Durkheimian sociology. If it is argued, as it is in this dissertation, that the theory of anomie developed in this research complements ES's understanding of a society of states in important ways, then this compatibility between both understandings of society (of states) is necessary.

³³ Bull, too, uses "international society" and "society of states" interchangeably.

The idea of society in Durkheimian sociology was also developed by Emile Durkheim in contrast to Ferdinand Tönnies' ideas of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Although Durkheim disagreed with Tönnies in fundamental aspects (cf. Lukes 1973), Durkheim's own understanding of society might have been closer to Tönnies' ideas of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* than he would have liked to admit. For example, Tönnies (2020: 5) set great store by the idea that social relationships are created by human will. This is an essential, perhaps ontological, presumption underlying the understanding of society in context of anomie theory in this dissertation. The development of rules towards the achievement of a shared goal by members of a society presupposes this (human) will. It is not a supranational force like anarchy that cajoles states to act, but their free will for the benefit of a goal (e.g. lasting peace), instead. Tönnies (2020) also endorsed the idea that only regularity of behaviour can sustain group life. This, too, comes to the fore in the version of Durkheimian anomie theory in this dissertation: the group life of concert diplomacy was only possible as long as states met regularly to discuss and modulate their policies. As soon as regular meetings were rejected by the United Kingdom, concert diplomacy became considerably marginalised, at least to such an extent that the post-1815 society of states commenced its regression.

1.4 Approach to research and structure

I have quoted the elders of Argos on the page preceding the table of contents. These lines of “man suffering to be wise” are not pitched primarily in context of authoring a PhD-dissertation. More than that, this tragedy befalls the international relations of man. “Man must suffer to be wise” must be a thought that has occurred to many survivors of major conflicts, from the legendary Trojan war to the aftermath of the war between Ukraine and the West on one side and Russia on the other side - an aftermath that is, in the year of 2022, still destined to fate.

Yet, in international relations, the twelve elders' utterance does not quite stand the test of time. Man never progressively learns, never does in fact turn wise, at least not lastingly. Yes, head-

winds are heavy with past ills. Vivid recollections of annihilating world wars that are, in history's temporal sequence, merely seconds away from man, do not forestall further violence. Therefore no, man does not grow wise against his will.

What these lines from Aeschylus' "Agamemnon" thus reflect, or not reflect (?), is a perennial factor of mankind or humanness in international relations. Thucydides' "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" resonates timelessly with man. It resonates with man not plainly in the recurrence of violence, but much more in characteristic traits like aggression, peacefulness, intransigence, forbearance, vengefulness, forgiveness and so on. Why is that? Why might be factors of mankind entrenched indelibly in international relations? Homeric philosophy would perhaps explain that, despite the uniqueness of mankind, man nonetheless must obey unalterable laws of life, of the gods – a passionate tension with a spirit of tragedy (Kito 1991: 61). The same might be said regarding international relations. There is the uniqueness of mankind with its characteristic traits, some for the better, some for the worse, and there is an indelible regulatory reality (a world of anarchy?) in which mankind conducts international relations.

For me, in the study of IR this unalterable and perennial factor of mankind is a philosophical guiding post of first order and I enlarge upon this because it reflects the researcher's philosophical position on inter-state affairs. It contradicts an idealist perspective on IR that crosses the reader's mind later on, not just implicitly when I disagree (in context of Durkheimian sociology) with hyper-rational ideas of functional differentiation, but also explicitly when I claim that altruism for a greater good has not (yet) found traction in IR. Yet, this philosophical perspective also echoes in this dissertation's theoretical framework and thus a general presumption of anomie theory itself: the presumption that states do not agree upon shared rules, do not, in a realm of anarchy, submit their freedoms altruistically to shared rules; they do so out of self-interest, because rules-based behaviour promises a goal they aspire, even if that may be "just" peace.

From Troy to the Congress of Vienna, from Agamemnon to Napoleon Bonaparte: inter-state relations are profoundly human activities that are most precisely and most realistically captured by sociological, humanist frameworks of analysis. This positioning necessitates some pragmatic epistemological compromises which I will engage with hereinafter.

1.4.1 APPROACH TO RESEARCH

At the beginning of this chapter I explained that the research in this doctoral dissertation developed out of interest in structural realism by Kenneth Waltz. Particularly his remark that Emile Durkheim was the thinker most influential on his conception of international relations stirred my curiosity. However, a closer look at how he had relied upon Durkheimian sociology became a cause for concerns. An investigation of IR theory beyond Waltz did not dispel these concerns but increasingly suggested that IR theory has relied erroneously and superficially on Durkheimian sociology.

In order to make this issue researchable I turned it into the research question of: *What* benefit can the study of IR acquire from the sociology of Emile Durkheim? This what-question requires a descriptive answer (Blaikie 1993). This descriptive answer is: the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation, firmly grounded comprehensively in Durkheimian sociology. However, this logically begs the question of *why* this version of anomie theory can be of benefit for the study of IR, particularly beyond theoretical and argumentative descriptions, and thus turns my answer of “anomie theory” to this what-question into a merely hypothetical one. In order to investigate this hypothesis, I pose a second research question: *Why* is anomie theory of benefit for the study of IR? Unlike the previous what-question, this why-question demands a different research approach. Consequently, this dissertation builds on a two-prong epistemology. Epistemology is understood as theory of knowledge that tells the scientist of how he/she knows what he/she knows (Blaikie 1993: 18).

Identifying the research problem and developing it into a what-question is rooted in a primarily inductive epistemology: I analyse (observe) IR literature and recognise a particular pattern/problem. This follows an inductive epistemological logic in so far that I observe an issue from which I generalise across IR theory: IR theory has relied upon Durkheimian sociology erroneously and superficially. I turn this problem into a what-question, the first research question, which I answer descriptively with “anomie theory”. The answer of “anomie theory” is nonetheless a hypothetical one. It is my best intelligent guess after a thorough investigation of Durkheimian sociology myself. My next step then is to turn this hypothesis into a why-question, the second research question: Why is anomie theory of benefit for the study of IR? The research in this dissertation has by now tilted from an inductive epistemology to a deductive one. I have developed a hypothesis and made this hypothesis amenable to research by turning it into a why-question. Thenceforward a confirmation or falsification of the hypothesis is pending. Since I endeavour a positive case to the answer of what and why of Durkheimian sociology could be for the benefit of the study of IR, I engage in a corroboration of this hypothesis (or the research question derived from it) through a deductive strategy. This means that I have formulated or described a possible explanation to a previously identified problem which has to be tested. This deductive logic is an appropriated way to tackle why-research questions (Blaikie 1993).

The epistemological backbone of this approach is contained in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* by Karl Popper (2002). Popper’s scholarship of deductivism shows that hypotheses do not always, and not only, have to be tested empirically.³⁴ Popper (2002: 9) mentions four ways a hypothesis can be tested; the third way is by another theory and the fourth by empiric measures. In this

³⁴ For an attractive criticism of Popper’s logic see Lakatos (1980). He argued that through falsifiability criteria we do not distinguish a scientific theory from a pseudoscientific theory but merely scientific methods from pseudoscientific methods.

research I engage in both these ways. I test the hypothesis that the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation is of benefit for the study of IR through a comparison with (3rd way) another theory (ES; chapters 3 and 6) and (4th way) through empirical application (post-1815 inter-state relations; chapters 4-6).

An important aspect of Popper's logic of scientific discovery is falsifiability. Popper (2002) explained that scientific statements must be confirmable or falsifiable. Falsifiable means that they have to be refutable by experience (ibid.: 18).³⁵ Does my hypothesis stand up to this test? It does in so far that the hypothesis is operationalised by three questions, intrinsic to the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation: first, why do rules have to be respected by states in a society of states? Second, why do states usually respect rules? Third, what happens if states ignore rules? Each of these questions can be answered affirmatively or negatively, depending on what case study the researcher investigates. As a result, the hypothesis in this dissertation is conclusively decidable, meaning it is verifiable as well as falsifiable (ibid.: 18).

To tackle this topic from a different angle: breaking the hypothesis down into three interrogative fragments is quite in line with Popper's logic of scientific discovery in so far that each of these fragments is deduced from the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation (the hypothesis) and constitutes thus, in Popper's terminology, a statement (or question) of lesser universality (ibid.: 22-6). This is to say that they apply only to the particular case study itself. However, Popper also stressed that such derived statements of lesser universality have to be conclusively decidable, too. As previously mentioned, this is the case since each interrogative fragment can be affirmed or denied empirically.

³⁵ Cf. Blaikie (1993: 21) on falsification.

It is one of the conspicuous curiosities of Karl Popper's logic of scientific discovery that he allows for a conclusive decidability *ad infinitum*. In other words, what matters is that this conclusive decidability is possible, not that a final verdict is reached, because as long as the hypothesis is conclusively decidable in the before-mentioned fashion, it can be considered inter-subjectively testable and hence considered scientific or objective (ibid.: 22-6). Critics may bemoan that this epistemological approach limits the scientific value of this dissertation in so far that it will not yield absolute knowledge but merely tentative knowledge, instead (cf. Blaikie 1993: 24). It will only yield tentative knowledge in so far that, following Popper's logic of scientific discovery, this study does not conclusively say that the appropriated version of anomie theory developed herein matches reality to such a perfect degree that it can be considered universal. This is true. It is not determined by the outcomes of this research if this study's version of anomie theory is applicable to any other case study in international history. Yet, the investigation conducted in this dissertation shows that this study's appropriated version of anomie theory can be of benefit for the study of IR within a particular context, and, beyond this, it can yield some interesting advice for contemporary politics (cf. conclusion).

An additional issue which warrants mention concerns this research's apparent acceptance of an autopoietic character of a social system or society that is implicit in Durkheimian sociology.³⁶ Autopoiesis refers to the property of a living system (such as a cell or organism) that allows it to maintain and renew itself.³⁷ Based on Maturana and Poersken (2007: 70-2), autopoiesis was introduced into sociology by Niklas Luhmann (in *Soziale Systeme* 1984). It has since become a synonym for an autonomous form of reality production (ibid.: 68). According to Mingers (2002), the theory of autopoiesis says that such systems are self-producing or self-constructing. They are

³⁶ I am grateful to my supervisor for hinting at the idea of autopoiesis.

³⁷ Cf. definition available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autopoiesis>, accessed on 20/06/2022.

characterised by a circular process of production that makes them highly autonomous, continual in existence and not depending on exogenous factors. Yet, autopoietic systems or societies can change in some ways while remaining unaltered in others. This may be exemplified on behalf of the game *Nomic*. The game *Nomic* “was created to demonstrate the reflexivity of law – that is, the idea that only laws can create laws” (ibid.: 283). All the while, individual laws can change but the legal system or the rule of law perpetuate.

Congruities between such ideas of autopoiesis with Durkheimian conceptualisations of society are obvious: for Emile Durkheim, rule-based behaviour constitutes an unending phenomenon by which morality is shaped. Morality itself is the epicentre of society – no morality, no society. At the same time, however, rules can change and morality adjusts accordingly. Hence, society remains society while its rules and moral core are in alteration. This comes to the fore in Durkheimian sociology, particularly *The Division of Labour*, when Durkheim investigates the transition taking place from organic to mechanic forms of societies. Since this development from one form of society to another one is such a crucial aspect of Durkheimian sociology, autopoiesis is, arguably, too, an elementary feature of Emile Durkheim’s sociology. Whereas for Luhmann autopoiesis of a society was characterised by (binary) communication, autopoiesis in Durkheim’s societies is characterised by rules-based behaviour.³⁸

The autopoietic character of societies in Durkheimian sociology matters for this research in so far that it depicts a conceptual viewpoint on a society of states as idiosyncratic, with a peculiar constitution of closeness, but yet an amenability to change and fluctuation. Both traits, closeness

³⁸ For more on Luhmann and autopoiesis see Mingers (2002: 284-5) and Albert (2016: 55). For a difference between emergentism and autopoiesis see Elder-Vass (2007).

and amenability to change, thus distinguish a society of states from other societies of states. Durkheimian sociology, particularly the theory of anomie, thereby allows for different types of societies of states across the globe, while at the same time all different societies are still conceptually identically (meaning that rules-based behaviour is not only elementary but universal). I will (implicitly) take up this point in chapter 1 when I discuss the variability of morality in Durkheimian sociology, as well as in chapter 3 when I capture an idea from Reus-Smit who argued that different meta-values characterise different societies of states across centuries and around the globe – but at its core a society of states remains a society of states. Finally, autopoiesis will also feature implicitly in the final chapter when I discuss future perspectives on research on the theory of anomie, especially how variables that are neglected in this research can enrich our understanding of anomie theory in the study of IR.

Finally, a rather contentious positioning is the idea of states as persons in this research. This comes full circle with the lines from the elders of Argos in Aeschylus' "Agamemnon" and my previous statement that I consider inter-state relations as profoundly human activities. More than that, however, this personification of states is implicit in autopoiesis, because autopoiesis arguably requires cognisant actors. It is furthermore explicit in Durkheimian sociology, since Durkheim investigated societies consisting of (human) persons. However, in this dissertation, I extract this anthropomorphic sociology into a realm of states and inter-state relations, none of which, unlike human beings, exist in a physical, materialist ontology.

This is a blessing and a curse at the same time. It is a blessing in so far that anthropomorphising states has (somewhat always) been a feature of IR. Wendt (2004) explains that scholars from all theoretical camps in the study of IR attribute properties of human beings to states: they consider

states as actors, bestow upon state-actors traits like rationality, interests or beliefs. States are also credited with emotional characteristics like fear, pride, anger. The emotion of fear, for instance, plays a major role in the concept of the security dilemma. Does this mean that states can be considered persons? This is the curse with anthropomorphising states: it is not that easy.

The problems begin with defining persons (Wendt 2004: 295) and understanding collective intentions as well as group intentions (ibid.: 297). The problems continue with issues like states as organisms, superorganisms (ibid.: 309) or conscious subjects (ibid.: 311). Wendt's discussion clearly shows what a sprawling topic this is, encompassing ontological and epistemological philosophy as much as life sciences. In my view, however, states as superorganisms seem most amenable to Durkheimian sociology and hence coinciding with this dissertation's topic.³⁹ In fact, Wendt himself has been referred to as a "Durkheimian" in regard to his positioning of states as persons (Neumann 2004: 260). A state as a superorganism comes close to a collection of individuals which are functionally organised to the extent that they fulfil the characteristics of an organism: individuality, organisation, homeostasis, autonomy and genetic reproduction (Wendt 2004: 306-11). All five characteristics apply to states except for genetic reproduction. States surely replicate, but not by genetic reproduction but more by cloning (ibid.: 309).

More importantly, I ascribe to states as superorganisms cognisant traits. This means that states are conscious, intentional and purposive actors. This comes to the fore in the understanding of group

³⁹ This is a controversial standpoint. Wendt himself stresses that states as organisms has been misused *ab absurdum* by fascists and their authoritarianism. Alas, he himself is not convinced by it (and neither is Neumann 2004) and I am not sure if I am entirely convinced by this stance, neither. However, it is, what I referred to in the introduction to this chapter, a pragmatic compromise because it coincides with Durkheimian sociology and my other ontological and epistemological viewpoints. My definition of states as superorganisms is also a blend of states as organisms and states as superorganisms.

intentions. Group intentions involve collective agency, meaning that they involve persons striving for a shared goal. Persons with collective agency are referred to as plural subjects (by Margaret Gilbert). “Plural subjects exist whenever people see themselves as part of a group in pursuit of a shared goal, but make collective choices in a decentralised fashion, so that their intentionality is plural rather than unitary” (Wendt 2004: 297). This is vital for this dissertation’s research because one of the central arguments is that states consciously, purportedly strive for shared goals.⁴⁰

1.4.2 STRUCTURE

This dissertation is composed of seven chapters, including this introduction. In chapter 2 I review how the study of IR has worked with the sociology of Emile Durkheim so far. I begin with Kenneth Waltz and conclude that he relied on Durkheim’s sociology too selectively and erroneously. Too selectively means that he used only an individual idea of Durkheim, the idea of the mechanical society, in his *Theory of International Politics* but disregarded the broader themes and contents of Durkheimian sociology. Therefore, he misjudged the role played by egoism in Durkheimian sociology, including the mechanical society. This Durkheimian role of egoism stands in stark contradistinction to how Waltz analytically applies the role of egoism in the realm of international politics. Waltz does, above all, use an understanding of egoism from utilitarian, microeconomic fields which Durkheim himself always rejected. I explain in chapter 2 that this discrepancy can rock Waltzian structural realism altogether.

However, other scholars in IR have committed similar blunders. An interest in Durkheimian sociology among scholars in IR had developed after Kenneth Waltz had had applied Durkheimian sociology in his work and his reliance on Durkheim was rightly criticised. But alternative

⁴⁰ Apropos, the idea of states as purposive actors comes also to the fore with Hedley Bull. If we consider states’ purposive agency towards the goals of life, truth and property as universal and elementary aspect of ES theory’s conceptualisation of international society, the topic of “states as persons” seems to be a pivotal one. Yet, to my knowledge ES theory has not engaged in a discussion of what this means. Does ES theory see states as persons?

interpretations of Durkheimian sociology often committed the same mistakes: individual concepts and ideas like dynamic density, the division of labour and functional differentiation were employed without considering Durkheim's sociology through a broader and deeper engagement. Such concepts were misunderstood, just like Waltz misunderstood the idea of the mechanical society. I conclude that IR has failed to engage with Durkheimian sociology comprehensively.

Therefore, in chapter 2 I offer anomie as a solution which is grounded in a thorough study of the sociology of Emile Durkheim. For this solution I did not rely only on one of his major works, like *The Division of Labour*. It seems that this had been the problem which caused erroneous and selective engagement with Durkheim in IR all along. Instead, for this dissertation I studied Emile Durkheim's major scholarly achievements, including *The Division of Labour*, *On Suicide*, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, and *Professional Ethics and Civic Moral*. I also engaged with secondary literature, including the acclaimed biography about Durkheim from Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, a composition of some of Durkheim's essays from Anthony Giddens *Emile Durkheim: Selected Writing*, a similar composition by William Pickering *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education*, Heike Delitz's *Emile Durkheim: Zur Einführung* as well as several essays from scholars writing on social cohesion, the division of labour and Durkheim and international relations (from Frederic Ramel). These secondary sources are drawn from various cultural or national scholarship, which means that I have not only relied on English sources but German and French writings, too. This matters because the work of Emile Durkheim was sometimes dealt with scholarly prejudices in, for example, France or with neglect in, for example, Germany, which seems to bestow more attention on figures like Karl Marx and Max Weber (cf. Müller 2006: 165).⁴¹

⁴¹ In Paris, the *Place de la Sorbonne* is adorned with a monument of Auguste Comte. Why not Emile Durkheim? (Müller 2006: 181). Furthermore, I researched references to Marx, Weber and Durkheim in leading IR journals since the 1940s. They can be found in the appendices of this dissertation.

Whereas these sources introduced Emile Durkheim's sociology in a comprehensive way, I had to rely on more specific writings for anomie. These specific writings are located in fields of sociology and criminology that developed in the early to mid-twentieth century. They are discussed in chapter 2 but too numerous to list here.

Based on these sources I argue in chapter 2 that the theory of anomie that I develop in this dissertation can further IR's understanding in so far that it complements English School (ES) theory's conceptualisation of international society by explaining why it is important that rules in a society of states have to be respected and what effect this has on a society of states. Anomie theory in this dissertation furthermore shows that an atavistic development from an international society to an international system is possible, whereas ES has so far only showed that an international system can develop into an international society.

In chapter 3 I go into more detail on ES and international society. I offer a detailed investigation of international society in context of ES writing and argue that early writings, from for example Charles Manning, have emphasised the role of rules and morality already. However, successive scholarship, including from Barry Buzan, did not capture or consider a duality of rules and morality, they neglected the possibility of a nexus between morality and rules, a nexus that can throw into sharp relief the necessity of rule-compliance. Perhaps as a result of this, ES does not offer a conclusive conceptualisation of international society by omitting an explanation of why states should respect rules and what the respect or the disrespect of rules means for our understanding of international society.

In chapter 3 I explain that anomie theory developed in this dissertation can fill this gap. However, in chapter 3 already I do this not only in a theoretical context but also discuss this insight anomie

theory offers on behalf of a concrete historic example: post-1815 inter-state relations. I thereby, and from early on, introduce the reader to the case study that constitutes the empiric bedrock of this doctoral study. I consider the time from the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814, and the Congress of Vienna 1814/1815 onwards pivotal for this dissertation. However, the historic outline of the case study begins slightly earlier, in late 1813, in order to offer the reader appropriate historic context. I also composed a time-line of events in the appendices of this dissertation for the reader to keep track of important and relevant events. In chapter 3 I also highlight that IR literature has correctly identified that the United Kingdom played an ominous role in post-1815 inter-state relations. IR literature correctly suspects that the role of the United Kingdom somehow correlated with the demise of concert diplomacy in the 1820s. However, I criticise that IR literature cannot explain this correlation. An answer to this issue will follow suit in chapters 5 and 6.

In this case study of post-1815 inter-state relations geopolitical, geostrategic and military contemplations are of negligible relevance. Instead, I bestow a particular importance on concert diplomacy. Concert diplomacy plays an important role because in context of anomie theory and Durkheimian sociology I show that the respect for rules and regulations of concert diplomacy made possible the emergence of the post-1815 inter-state society in the early nineteenth century. Respecting rules and regulations of concert diplomacy created objective social facts and practical imperatives that constituted a trans-societal moral conscience perceived as ontologically real by states.

Whereas chapters 2 and 3 have prepared the theoretical and historic outline, chapter 4 engages in empiric research regarding the emergence of the post-1815 society of states in context of this dissertation's theory of anomie. The empiric investigation in this chapter is grounded in primary sources and guided by the question of why it is important that rules and regulations are respected

in an inter-state society. As previously explained in this introductory chapter, I operationalise anomie theory through three questions, of which the question of the importance of respecting rules is the first one. Chapter 4 begins discussing this question with a brief outline of smaller and great powers. This is important because until this point I have not dealt explicitly with the fact that the post-1815 society of states was largely considered a society of great powers, or front-rank powers. I briefly investigate the unevenness of power-relations at this period in time and explain that, despite a stark contrast between front-rank powers and minor state actors, the great powers could not and did not do as they pleased vis-à-vis minor states. The behaviour of the major powers was characterised to a large degree by self-restraint. I argue that concert diplomacy played an important role in this self-restraint.

From this explanation I go on investigating seminal treaties and legal documents between 1814 and 1818 which show that concert diplomacy consisted of rules that have been, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, enshrined in such documents. In other words, states pledged allegiance to abiding by the rules of concert diplomacy. These rules of concert diplomacy were: (#1) the coordination of policies, (#2) refraining from unilateral action and (#3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. What comes also to the fore in this examination of documents is the fact that lasting peace was a goal shared by all signatory powers. Both points, the obligation to rules and the shared goal of peace, are sketched within context of the theory of anomie. Finally, in chapter 4 I also show the effect the rules of concert diplomacy had on the emergence of the post-1815 inter-state society. To straighten out my argument I discuss a counter-example of inter-state relations during and after the Treaty of Utrecht, almost exactly 100 years before the Congress of Vienna.

In chapter 5 I continue the empirical analysis of the case study. The analysis in this chapter unfolds alongside the remaining two questions of why states might violate rules (in the example of the case study the rules of concert diplomacy) and what effect this can have on a society of states according to this dissertation's appropriated version of anomie theory. The first aspect of rule-violation is discussed with a particular focus on the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom receives this special attention not without cause, but because IR literature itself has been confounded about the role the United Kingdom had played in post-1815 inter-state relations (cf. chapter 3). A detailed study of primary sources confirms what some scholars in IR have already argued: that the United Kingdom had strong concerns for the balance of power in Europe. However, what will also come to light is that primary sources also reveal that the United Kingdom nonetheless comported with the rules of concert diplomacy - at least until the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Beyond this congress the United Kingdom became increasingly alienated from concert diplomacy. The reason for this is that abidance by the rules of concert diplomacy no longer seemed to promise the achievement of the goal of lasting peace. As a result, the United Kingdom violated the rules of concert diplomacy and displayed so-called deviant or non-conformist behaviour. More than that, the United Kingdom was successful wooing Russia to do the same, she successfully separated Russia from concert diplomacy. In the end, the concert of Europe commenced its regression, evidenced by the fact that as of 1827/1828 the rules of concert diplomacy played no considerable role anymore, *Realpolitik* beyond the spirit of the post-1815 inter-state society established itself again.

In chapter 6 I discuss the insights the analysis within context of the case study in chapter 4 and 5 can have for the study of IR. I briefly highlight what I consider critical with IR's previous engagement with Emile Durkheim's sociology, primarily in reference to chapter 2, and explain in detail why the version of anomie theory in this dissertation avoids these shortcomings. I also summarise shortly the problems I have previously stressed concerning ES's understanding of

international society in chapters 2 and 3 and explain in more detail, and in reference to the case study discussed in chapter 4 and 5, why this appropriated version of anomie theory can complement ES in this regard.

Next, I go beyond purely theoretical discussions and engage with IR literature's analysis of post-1815 inter-state relations. IR has discussed many aspects of this period pertinently, but left some questions unanswered. One of these questions concerns the role of the United Kingdom, another topic is about an explanation for the end of concert diplomacy and the post-1815 inter-state society. Concerning both issues anomie theory brings light into darkness and illuminates IR's understanding of post-1815 inter-state relations considerably.

In the final section of chapter 6 I engage with the argument that this dissertation's version of anomie theory explains the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. I explain that "regression" does not mean death or disappearance of the post-1815 inter-state society; instead, I refer to it as atavism, as regression, a development from a society of states (ES: international society) to a system of states (ES: international system). I highlight that this is once again an important insight that complements ES conceptualisations of international society.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion and final chapter of this dissertation and takes up again the research questions of this dissertation. In chapter 7 I offer a brief summary of the dissertation, briefly outlining the roots and core of the arguments. I will discuss key findings, contemporary implications and outline how IR in theory and history benefits from this research. I will stress the core feature that anomie theory is particularly fitted for complementing IR's understanding of international society in context of ES and also furthers IR knowledge on international society in

particular terms. I will also briefly discuss some limits implicit to this research on Durkheimian anomie theory.

2: Reviewing Emile Durkheim and anomie theory in IR

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I argue that the study of IR has relied erroneously and superficially on the sociology of Emile Durkheim. This treatment of Durkheim in IR is a problem because it caused misinterpretations of his sociology which prevent IR from appreciating the true insights Durkheimian sociology can offer to the study of IR. I begin this critique of the erroneous engagement with Durkheim by investigating the scholarship of Kenneth Waltz. Waltz, a key figure in IR, once named Emile Durkheim the scholar most influential on his conception of international relations (Rosenberg 2013: 189). However, I will argue that Waltz relied on Durkheimian sociology only selectively not taking Durkheim's broader intellectual themes into account. This limited engagement with Durkheimian sociology was not recognised by any of Waltz's critics who proposed alternative interpretations of Durkheimian sociology. In fact, not only did scholars like Ruggie (1986), Cerny (1993), Barkdull (1995), Buzan and Albert (2010) and Albert, Buzan and Zürn (2013) overlook Waltz's wrongful understanding of Durkheimian sociology, but they themselves embarked on an equally restricted, selective engagement with Durkheim's work, particularly pertaining to ideas and concepts like dynamic density, the division of labour and functional differentiation. By refraining from a comprehensive engagement with Durkheim's sociology, Waltz himself as well as his critics failed to make Durkheim's sociology applicable for the study of IR because their narrow application of Durkheimian sociology proved erroneous and misunderstood.

I will rectify this problematic engagement with Durkheimian sociology by searching for one guiding curiosity in his sociology as well as one pervasive theme recognisable throughout his scholarship. I will show that his one guiding curiosity concerns the integration and disintegration of societies, pivoting around moral and normative regulation. Intimately associated with this main interest of the integration and disintegration of societies were ideas about anomie, broadly defined

as a state of normlessness or lack of normative regulation signifying little social cohesion and social order in a society. In fact, anomie was the pervasive theme that concerned Durkheim throughout his scholarship. It became analytically transformed into *anomie theory* by sociologists and criminologist in the late 1930s, 1960s and 1980s. I will investigate this development of anomie into anomie theory and show that anomie theory can explain the emergence and regression of a society. Such explanatory power of anomie theory is vested in its ability to provide answers to the following three questions: Why is it important that members in a society follow rules? Why do members of a society follow rules or sometimes violate them? What happens if members of a society violate rules? An engagement with anomie theory, framed by these three questions, will offer IR a comprehensive and competent engagement with the sociology of Emile Durkheim in context of its understanding of international society.

In the final part of this chapter I will show how this comprehensive and competent engagement with Durkheimian sociology, particularly anomie theory, can benefit IR. I will be asking: How can my understanding of Durkheimian anomie theory be useful for IR? I will approach this question within context of IR's understanding of international society, criticising that IR has so far developed only insufficient explanations of the idea of international society. This is to say that especially the English school (ES) theory, IR's most authoritative theory on the subject of international society, can offer a merely dissatisfying explanation for an international society. Arguing, as the ES does, that an international society exists if states develop shared rules, regulations and norms, is simply not enough. Rules and regulations have to be respected, too. But why states respect or disrespect rules in an international society and what the repercussions of the disrespect of rules and regulations on international society can be is omitted by ES's explanations. This prevents IR from explaining the emergence and the potential demise or disintegration of an international society. Anomie theory, however, can further our understanding of such a complete life-cycle of international society considerably. Therefore, in the final part of this chapter I will

briefly exemplify this explanatory power of the theory of anomie by introducing the reader to the emergence and demise of the post-1815 international society. This example of international society after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte will serve as the empirical case study in this dissertation.

2.2 Emile Durkheim and IR

At a conference in 2008 Kenneth Waltz was asked about the thinker most influential on his conception of international relations. Waltz named Emile Durkheim straight away (Rosenberg 2013: 189). However, during his career as one of the most influential scholars in the study of IR Waltz hardly mentioned Durkheim or, if he did, misinterpreted his sociology. Scholars like Ruggie (1986) have used Waltz's interpretation of Durkheimian sociology to forward their own ideas. However, they overlooked that Waltz misunderstood Durkheim and themselves engaged in erroneous interpretations of Emile Durkheim's sociology.

2.2.1 Kenneth Waltz and Durkheimian sociology

In his first critically much acclaimed publication of *Man, State, War* Kenneth Waltz (2001 [1959]) mentions Durkheim only marginally, without engaging with his sociology at all. *Man, State, War* is a study about the reasons for war. Waltz conducts his investigation within three so-called images of international politics: causes for war within man, causes for war within the structure of separate states and causes for war within the states-system. Waltz refers to Durkheim while discussing the first image, i.e. that war is simply occurring due to human nature. He uses Durkheim to disagree with this anthropocentric epistemological belief (ibid.: 28-31). In a second reference to Durkheim Waltz quotes Durkheim regarding the role of the statesman (ibid.: 44). Waltz does so within context of various ideas about the role of behavioural sciences in the study of war but does not investigate Durkheim closer in any regard.

In *Theory of International Politics* (1979) Durkheimian sociology had a much stronger impact on Waltz's conception of international relations. He (1979) refers to Durkheim the first time in chapter six, page 104, where he explains that specialisation of units in interdependent societies with a formal order (i.e. domestic societies) is conducive to the cohesion of such societies. Waltz uses this example of Durkheim's ideas about a division of labour (specialisation of units) to bring across his important point that there are (domestic) societies with a formal order and (international) societies with no formal order but anarchy. In a footnote eleven pages later, Waltz stresses that Durkheim has managed the best explanation for those two different types of societies by conceptualising them into a mechanical and solidary society.

This highlights the considerable relevance of Durkheimian sociology for structural realism: Waltz applied Durkheim's ideas of the mechanical and solidary societies not only to show that two differently structured realms of analysis exist for students of international politics, i.e. the domestic (i.e. Durkheim's solidary society) and the international realm (i.e. Durkheim's mechanical society). He first and foremost used this analogy to argue that order is of different nature in those two realms. A domestic realm is ordered hierarchically and an international realm is a realm of anarchy in which states have to rely on themselves only. For Waltz (1979: 88), the realm of anarchy is a realm of self-help. In such a realm of self-help states constantly seek to survive and security is the ultimate aim of every state (cf. Waltz 1988, 1997: 915). States therefore strive for as much independence from each other as possible because "the more a state specializes, the more it relies on others to supply the materials and goods that it is not producing" (1979: 106).⁴²

⁴² According to Durkheim, members of an organic (i.e. modern, industrial) society are highly specialised, they perform specialised functions "like different organs of a body" (hence: organic society). Members of a mechanical (i.e. archaic, agrarian) society are not specialised.

According to Waltz (1986), such an understanding of the international realm corresponds perfectly with Durkheim's idea of the mechanical society, because in a mechanical society units

“have their own needs and interests, but they do not interact through their special characteristics in such a way as to become entangled in one another's affairs and dependent on one another's efforts. Each unit does for itself roughly what all of the others are doing. Their lives are characterized by a duplication of efforts rather than by a division of labour that would produce their integration” (323-324).

This implies that units of a mechanical society are basically egoistic: they mind their own needs and interests, try not to become entangled with each other and certainly strive for independence from one another. This is an important detail since egoistic units – Waltz usually refers to “self-regarding units” (1979: 91) – are the linchpin of his theory of structural realism. He adopts this idea of self-regarding units from classical market economics. According to Waltz, an orderly free market is constituted by egoistic businesses – just like the international realm is constituted by egoistic (“self-regarding”) states. Furthermore, he argues that egoistic units in an anarchic (international) realm form a stable system: “international-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coactions of self-regarding units” (91).

The crux, however, is that Durkheim's sociology implies a very different understanding of the role of egoism within his concept of the mechanical society. In fact, Durkheim's own musing on egoism and selfishness in societies in *The Division of Labour*, the very book Waltz himself referred to in *Theory of International Politics*, shows that Durkheim saw egoism as a rather detrimental force.⁴³ Durkheim (2013) believed that self-interest “is indeed the least constant thing in the world. Today it is useful for me to unite with you; tomorrow the same reason will make me your enemy” (161).

⁴³ Cf. Mawson (1970) on the pathological relationship between egoism and anomie.

Durkheim (2019: 11-2) also emphasised this in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* and furthermore explained that in mechanical societies the private interests, concerns or personalities of members of society “seemed insignificant factors” (60). Instead, “[w]hat was prized by all, were the beliefs held in common, the collective aspirations, the popular traditions and the symbols that were an expression of them” (60). Elsewhere, Durkheim (2013: 141) draws an analogy between the mechanical society and communism. As a result, the detrimental fallout Durkheim associated with egoism and his dismissal of any form of individualism including individual interests in mechanical society seem both very much in opposition with Waltz’s idea of egoistic or self-regarding units in the international realm.⁴⁴

This matters because this paradox leads to an analytical dichotomy where Waltz’s understanding of egoism is incompatible with the very basic concept he applied to conceptualise the international realm as an independent realm for intellectual analysis. Waltz may have believed that for Durkheim, too, in the mechanical society the self-regarding characteristics of units tended to develop an invisible hand that steered the course of actions of its members. Waltz neglected, however, that for Durkheim it was not the invisible hand of egoistic units that sustained a mechanical society. In fact, Durkheim (2019: 12) was deeply critical of what he referred to as anarchic competition and the unleashing of competitive interests. Furthermore, in *On Suicide* Durkheim (2006) [1897] unequivocally explained that a society of only self-regarding members is doomed to fail, at least in so far that no other rules than one’s own private interest, described as egotism by Durkheim, cause increasing numbers of egoistical suicide (ibid.: 225).

In addition to this, Waltz (1979: 90) himself relied also on utilitarian ideas of classical microeconomics, but ignored that Durkheim’s sociology could not exist harmoniously side by side

⁴⁴ Thompson (2002: 35-6) somewhat relativizes the depiction of egoism as detrimental in Durkheimian sociology, although he first and foremost explains that egoism, too, according to Durkheim, is part of human nature in society.

with classical economics.⁴⁵ Durkheim was deeply critical of the utilitarian (egoistic) ideas of, for instance, Herbert Spencer (cf. e.g. Müller 2006: 173; Herzog 2018: 114). Cladis (1993) declared that “Durkheim [...] rejects those varieties of liberalism that, on his account, lead to egoism and threaten the common good by encouraging excessive preoccupation with self-interest” (6). Poggi (2000: 46) explained that Durkheim disagreed with Spencer’s idea that removing moral, juridical and political restraints from individuals is a form of differentiation that will allow every individual to strive without hindrance for his own private advantage (cf. Bowring 2006 who explained Durkheim’s concern with egoism, primarily within context of differentiation processes, the division of labour and atomistic or negative individualism). Lukes (1973), Thompson (2002), Alexander (2005), Steiner (2013) and Allen and O’Boyle (2017: 40) agree.

To briefly summarise, the overarching issue between Waltz and Durkheim seems to be that Waltz saw both microeconomic theory as well as Durkheim’s sociology as the foundation of his conception of international relations. The problem with this is, however, that Durkheim contradicted and rejected the kind of microeconomic theory Waltz relied upon (Lukes 1973: 80), especially the ideas about the role played by egoism.⁴⁶

Besides these misinterpretations it seems that Waltz did not have much interest in a deeper engagement with Durkheim’s sociology. To be fair, however, he tried to catch up with his neglect

⁴⁵ Cf. Dessler (1989): “Waltz’s ontological model of the international system is based on an explicit analogy with [micro]economics” (448).

⁴⁶ There are two additional points of criticism of Waltz’s reliance on Durkheimian sociology. They are not central to the argument but nevertheless deserve attention: First, Durkheim’s work was profoundly vested in an epistemological approach of biological and Darwinian ideas (Lukes 1973: 82ff.; Delitz 2013: 96). He used organic analogies especially in regard to the mechanical society. If Waltz compared the mechanical society with the international realm would he also have agreed with Durkheim’s organic analogies with the international realm? Waltz was quiet on this issue. Second, Durkheim’s differentiation between mechanical and organic societies was rooted in racial prejudices. Although this was “normal” during Durkheim’s time (cf. Allen and O’Boyle 2017), after the Second World War blatant racist conceptions in sociology lost their legitimacy. Had Waltz engaged with Durkheimian sociology more deeply how would he have dealt with the racist prejudices of Durkheim, especially regarding the concept of mechanical society? (See also Stetter and Busse 2018 who highlight that Waltz rooted his understanding of anarchy in racist conceptualisations of the ethnologist S.F. Nagel).

of Durkheim later on, albeit not to an extent that would rectify his previous misinterpretation and not to a degree that would suggest a thorough engagement with Durkheimian sociology. In fact, it had to take John Gerard Ruggie (1986) and his criticism on the nexus between Durkheimian sociology and Waltzian structural realism to decoy Waltz to explain himself regarding Durkheim. Ruggie (1986), who was the first to debunk the nexus between Waltz and Durkheimian sociology (Larkins 1994: 249), argued that the possibility of a characteristic change of units across time should be allowed for in structural realism. For Ruggie this is important because structural realism with its fixed premise of perpetually alike units cannot “account for, or even describe, the most important contextual change in international politics in this *millennium*: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system” (141, italics in the original). According to Ruggie, this shift pivoted around a change in political authority and property rights, explained by the Durkheimian concept of dynamic density. At its core, dynamic density explains that the growth in density of a society can change the character of property rights in a society (ibid.: 148-9; cf. Barkdull 1995: 673).

In *Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics* Waltz (1986) responded to Ruggie’s criticism by starting with a broader engagement with Durkheim’s concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity, i. e. the kinds of solidarities that secure the cohesion of a mechanical and organic society. He described how Durkheim conceptualised a mechanical society, thereby highlighting what seemed relevant for his theory of structural realism. He once again put a particular focus on the idea that a mechanical society is constituted by alike and self-regarding units and thereby repeated his misunderstanding of Durkheimian sociology. He continued rejecting Ruggie’s idea to take into account the concept of dynamic density, arguing that the change elicited by dynamic density is merely unit-level change and should therefore be ignored. The remainder of the paper is dedicated to his own epistemological and structural perspectives on theory in general. After this Waltz never mentioned Durkheim again in any other paper he published.

This applies to *The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory* (1988) as well as to *Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory* (1990). In the latter publication Waltz goes at great lengths to show the difference between orthodox Realism and Neorealism in epistemological terms. Analogies to classical economics, including Adam Smith, feature strongly in this article but there is no engagement with Durkheim. The only subtle connection with Durkheim appears through a back then unpublished essay by Barry Buzan (1993) mentioned by Waltz. In this paper Buzan wonders whether developments like information richness, communication and dynamic density are adequately accounted for in Neorealism.⁴⁷ *The Emerging Structure of International Politics* (1993a) and *The New World Order* (1993b) were yet another opportunity for Waltz to engage with Durkheim again, given that he put a focus on the structure of international politics within his theory. However, a discussion about nuclear weapons and balance of power gained the upper hand in those two papers. The same applies to *Evaluating Theories* (1997), *Globalisation and Governance* (1999) and *Structural Realism after the Cold War* (2000). Writing about globalisation in 1999, for instance, might have presented itself as a perfect opportunity to re-engage with Durkheim, since there are such strong sociological aspects to globalisation. Unfortunately, Waltz only focused on ideas about interdependence and Thomas Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*.⁴⁸

Waltz's neglect of Durkheim in the 1990s is furthermore surprising since a lively debate about Durkheim and IR kicked off in the early to mid-1990s. However, this debate did not rectify Waltz's misinterpretation of Durkheimian sociology. Scholars continued to extract only individual ideas from Durkheimian sociology, divorced from the context of Durkheim's broader sociological

⁴⁷ Buzan (1993) largely agreed with Ruggie (1986) and the idea that the differentiation of units can be analytically accounted for in structural realism. For Ruggie on dynamic density and Waltz see Ruggie (1998: 131-34, 137ff.).

⁴⁸ Inglis and Robertson (2008) offer a discussion about globalisation, international politics and Durkheim.

oeuvre. The usage of the idea of dynamic density and its ostensible causal ramifications is one example. Scholars working with the idea of dynamic density believe that

- it is about the quality, velocity, and diversity of transactions that transforms the functions of states (Ruggie 1986: 148),
- dynamic density causes a cross-cutting international and functional division of labour due to the “attempts by larger societies to maintain themselves in equilibrium but also from the growth in sheer numbers of societies” (Cerny 1993: 29),
- dynamic density is merely about an accelerating traffic of goods, people and messages across borders causing a truly global division of labour (Barkdull 1995: 671, 678) and
- “dynamic density is a materialist theory of the driving forces that push development up the ladder of differentiation” (Buzan and Albert 2010: 323), caused by increasing numbers of people in a society as well as increasing contacts and interactions among them (ibid.: 319) due to which a task-related, materialist and production-centred functional differentiation develops.

For two reasons those are infelicitous understandings of Durkheim’s idea of dynamic density and the effects it supposedly exerts:

First, ideas of dynamic density quoted above are grounded in the acceptance of a certain degree of rationality of actors as well as egoism which Durkheim never factored in or considered as conducive for social integration (Durkheim 2013: 14, 312; cf. Marks 1974). Such an understanding and application of dynamic density in the study of IR also raises doubts about its originality because scholars like Keohane and Nye (2012) anticipated ideas about the repercussions of such

rationality-focused interdependencies already in *Power and Interdependence*.⁴⁹ This applies especially to Cerny who argued that the functional division of labour in international relations is about states accepting interdependencies based on their calculations of gains acquired from interdependencies.

Second, Durkheim himself had a much more nuanced understanding of dynamic density. Dynamic density is not merely about increasing interactions, increasing numbers of individuals and an acceleration in transactions; it is not merely a materialist theory (Buzan and Albert 2010). Instead, dynamic density has a strong moral component which the scholars mentioned above ignored. In *The Division of Labour* Durkheim (2013: 202) talks of dynamic or *moral* density. He explains that increasing interactions, numbers of individuals and acceleration in transactions draw members of a society *morally* together (ibid.). In *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* Durkheim (2019: 8) explained that an increase in the size of population also implies the exchange of ideas and sentiments among members of a society. This process is accompanied by a strengthening of moral rules. In *On Suicide* Durkheim (2006: 217) also clarifies in a footnote that density within a family does not merely denote to an absolute number of individuals within one and the same context. In *The Rules of Sociological Methods* Durkheim (1901) explains that individuals are not merely related by economic but also by moral factors. Finally, moral density is not just about economics but first and foremost about living a common life (cf. Lukes 1973).

Why does this infelicitous understanding of Durkheim's idea of dynamic density matter? It matters because the idea of dynamic density is an interesting and important one, but it is just that: one (of many) interesting ideas of Durkheimian sociology. None of the scholars above engaged Durkheimian sociology in a comprehensive and thorough way. Otherwise, the value of morality

⁴⁹ *Power and Interdependence* was first published in the late 1970s. Therefore, scholars could have been aware of the arguments put forward in this book.

in dynamic density and in the division of labour would have played a much more important role. The division of labour would not have been considered only as rational functional differentiation, but instead as a division of labour in primarily moral aspects. This, at least, was an argument which Durkheim made in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* - a book unfortunately ignored by IR so far.

However, there is more to this. Due to IR's cursory engagement with Durkheim an important discrepancy in Durkheimian sociology was ignored, especially among those focusing on dynamic density and the division of labour. This discrepancy is explained by Rueschemeyer (1982) who emphasised that for Durkheim, dynamic density meant that a large number of individuals with the same interests will be locked into intense competition, an idea grounded in an analogy of the scholarship by Charles Darwin and the origin of species. Rueschemeyer, however, stresses that Durkheim developed his idea of dynamic density primarily in an economic context and argued that dynamic density caused a differentiation of production, i.e. individuals of a society specialise in production due to fierce competition. Darwin, however, spoke of a differentiation of demands due to limited resources.

As a result, Rueschemeyer (ibid.: 582) rightly criticises that an increase in the size of a population or advances in communication and transportation does not automatically intensify competition among producers. He explains that an increase in population would increase the demand for a product and raise the profits of all producers accordingly. An increase in population would not, however, automatically cause more competition and encourage producers to diversify or specialise. It is therefore not obvious why a division of labour (or functional differentiation) should develop due to dynamic density. This important criticism of the nexus between dynamic density and the division of labour was ignored by all IR scholars quoted above who worked with

Durkheimian ideas. And yet they could have been aware of it since Rueschemeyer published this important argument eight years before IR's debate about Durkheim kicked off in the 1990s.

As we can see, the idea of explaining international relations as a realm of functional differentiation due to developments conceptualised by Durkheimian dynamic density is untenable for the study of IR. However, what about further efforts regarding functional differentiation and international relations? Do they aptly draw on Durkheimian sociology?

2.2.2 DURKHEIMIAN SOCIOLOGY IN IR BEYOND WALTZ

Efforts by Albert, Buzan and Zürn (2013), for example, made a foray in this direction of functional differentiation in the study of IR. However, their work is not grounded in Durkheimian sociology. Even their understanding of functional differentiation has little to do with the Durkheimian division of labour and the ostensible effects it exerts. This means that their understanding of the repercussions of functional differentiation on society is purely task-related. They argue, for instance, that non-state actors on the supranational level (like the International Chamber of Commerce) have acquired specific tasks and roles through establishing specific rights and standards. Others (like Human Rights Watch) have acquired a supervising role in monitoring human rights (ibid.: 16-7). Furthermore, they talk of “functionally defined issue areas” (6) like the climate regime or free trade regime which guarantee “functionally defined problem solving” (6). This approach towards functional differentiation is also championed by Buzan (1993) arguing that Waltz in his analogy of microeconomics discounted the economic behaviour of finding market niches, “where differentiation of function provides (temporary) refuge from the full pressure of competition” (40). This may well be an accurate description of some aspects of modern-day international relations, it has, however, little to do with Durkheimian sociology, including Durkheim's division of labour.

The reason for this is that differentiation within Durkheim's division of labour was not functional in a merely task-related way, but it was first and foremost functional in moral aspects (cf. dynamic density above). Stichweh (2013: 51-5) rightly highlights that Durkheim was not the first to work with the idea of a division of labour, that Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson developed explicit ideas of this kind during the Scottish Enlightenment. He also emphasises that George Simmel presented *Über sociale Differenzierung* three years before Durkheim published his work on the division of labour. However, comparing the divisions of labour of those scholars with the division of labour from Durkheim is tantamount to the comparison of apples and oranges. Durkheim was not interested in the productive gains gained due to a division of labour (Coser 1984), instead he wondered what social bonds a division of labour could effectuate (ibid.). This was a vital aspect which Durkheim himself stressed already during the oral defence of his eponymous doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne (Lukes 1973: 297). For Durkheim (2013), the division of labour was not peculiar to economic life but a "general biological phenomenon" (34). He explained that the function of a division of labour is intimately connected with the needs to which it corresponds (ibid.: 41) and this need is the development of social solidarity (ibid.: 50). Within a professional, work-related aspect, Durkheim (2019: 5) explained that in a society with a division of labour different morals apply to entirely different professional groups. Hence, even in a professional, work-related context the division of labour was primarily about moral aspects and the effects it can have on the cohesion of a society and not about productive, task-related gains.

This is an important point to make because IR's scholarship on functional differentiation and the division of labour regularly mentions Durkheim. This does not only apply to Stichweh (2013) in Albert, Buzan and Zürn (2013) but also to the collaboration between Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert in previous years (2010) on differentiation in IR theory, where Durkheim is sometimes either casually mentioned (e.g. regarding his ideas of segmentary or mechanical societies p.324) or, as previously explained, erroneously interpreted through the connection between dynamic

density and the effects of change it purportedly exerts. This neglect of Durkheimian sociology in sociological theorising also comes to the fore in *A Theory of World Politics* in which Albert (2016) considers world society as a functionally differentiated realm. Albert explains that a functionally differentiated realm like world society can be conceptualised in two ways: within a decomposition view and within an emergence view. According to Albert (ibid: 49), the decomposition view of functional differentiation is probably best described by Durkheim and his division of labour. Albert, however, feels more comfortable embedding his arguments in the communicative approach of Niklas Luhmann. He explains that functional differentiation is “the emergence of functionally defined realms of society like politics, law, the economy and so on as relatively autonomous spheres of communication” (ibid.: 46). Niklas Luhmann’s communicative approach can aptly make sense of this description of functional differentiation because he argues that we can only observe communication in society and that society itself is based on and constituted by communication (ibid.: 54). According to Albert, this emergence view of functional differentiation is much better suitable for our understanding in IR theory than Durkheim’s so-called decomposition view (ibid.: 49-50).⁵⁰

It has thus become recognisable that IR scholars have either misinterpreted Durkheim’s sociology, exemplified by their application of the idea of dynamic density above, or shied away from an encompassing engagement with Durkheim’s sociology altogether.⁵¹ In other words, IR scholars have engaged Durkheimian sociology in a merely selective way, ignoring the broader foundation of his sociology. This broader foundation, based within which many of his individual ideas like

⁵⁰ What Albert overlooked is the criticism Mingers (2002) and Maturana and Poersken (2007) have applied to Niklas Luhmann’s exclusive focus on communication. Both stress the issue that Luhmann’s exclusive focus on communication excludes human beings as constitutive parts of a society.

⁵¹ In this dissertation I discuss only scholars in IR who have engaged with Durkheimian sociology comprehensively by applying Durkheimian concepts to IR. It is noteworthy, however, that there are also scholarly works that reference Durkheimian sociology for analytical purposes, without engaging with Durkheimian sociology comprehensively. This applies for instance to McSweeney (1998) who criticised Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School in reference to Durkheim.

dynamic density or the mechanical and organic societies are embedded, is a curiosity about the cohesion of societies and social bonds within societies (Coser 1984).⁵² What goes to the heart of these interests is anomie, an idea which first and foremost explains why societies disintegrate. The theory of anomie was not an atomistic idea unrelated to the broader interests and scholarship of Durkheim, like dynamic density or the division of labour. Anomie played a pivotal role in almost all of Durkheim's important writings. According to Mestrovic and Brown (1985), anomie was the explicit focus of *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* and indicated that anomie "engaged Durkheim's interest for most of his academic career (1890 to 1912)" (88).⁵³ Furthermore, *The Division of Labour* may not have been primarily about the division of labour but about anomie instead (ibid.: 89). In fact, Mestrovic and Brown argue that anomie "is one of the most important ideas in the history of Western thought" (ibid.: 94). Therefore, if I criticise IR for having relied upon Durkheimian sociology only selectively (and erroneously) it is then the idea of anomie I propose as a remedy for this shortcoming.

2.2.3 DURKHEIMIAN SOCIOLOGY AND WENDT'S SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Durkheimian sociology does not seem to play a pivotal role in Wendt's (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*.⁵⁴ In chapter 4, where he focuses on ontological discussions between individualists and holists in IR theory, Wendt criticises Waltz for recognising only one level of structure instead of two. He argues that Waltz recognised only one structure because he divides international politics merely into a unit/systemic level. This dichotomy is represented by his analytical separation into reductionist/systemic theories. Whereas this classification into reductionist and systemic analytical approaches has become widely accepted, Wendt criticizes that

⁵² Durkheim was apparently influenced by Kant's work and his theory of social cohesion early on in his academic career (Lukes 1973: 55). But he was opposed to the moral individualism of Kant (Pickering 2006).

⁵³ They disagree with Besnard (1988) who argued that Durkheim lost his interest in anomie after 1902.

⁵⁴ Iver Neumann (2004) holds a different perspective. In context of an organic view on states he argues that Alexander Wendt is a Durkheimian. As my discussion of Wendt shows I am not necessarily opposed to this view. However, I'd counter that Durkheimian sociology is not explicitly applied by Wendt. It may be an implicit component of his social constructivism, just like, for example, Habermas' communicative theory.

Waltz himself in one of his definitions of reductionism (probably accidentally) hinted towards a further conceptualization of structure which is based on units' interaction.

Wendt (1999) rejects that according to Waltz "there can be only one level of structure in the international system" - which is anarchy. He also rejects that anarchy's autonomy "depends on existing and having effects apart from the properties and interactions of states" (146). Wendt explains that "[i]t cannot be the case. The effects of anarchy are contingent on the desires and beliefs of states have and the policies they pursue. There simply *is* no 'logic of anarchy'" (ibid., italics in the original). Instead, "agents and interactions are essential to the causal powers of structure" (ibid.). Interaction should not just be assigned to the unit level. Wendt therefore believes that "we should treat interaction as a distinct level of analysis between the unit and structural levels, and locate it firmly within the purview of systemic theorizing" (ibid.: 147).

Structures of interaction are micro-structures "because they depict the world from agents' point of view" (ibid.). Macro-structures, however, are Waltzian systemic structures which "depict the world from the standpoint of the system" (ibid.). Wendt suggests to think of such macro-level structures in terms of Durkheim's idea of collective representations or common knowledge (ibid.: 159). What does he mean by that? Common knowledge "has a reality that is *sui generis*" (ibid.). Wendt explains that "[c]ommon knowledge concerns actors' beliefs about each other's rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs, as well as about states of the external world. These beliefs need not be true, just believed to be true" (ibid.). It is also important that common knowledge is not just about everyone having the same beliefs, common knowledge requires interlocking beliefs. Norms, rules, institutions, and so on are made of common knowledge. In Durkheimian fashion Wendt refers to this common knowledge also as collective representations (ibid.: 162). In international politics examples include capitalism, the Westphalian system, the free trade agreement and others.

It appears that this Durkheimian idea of collective representations plays a relevant role in Wendt's social constructivism because he initially criticised that identity and interest formation play no role in Waltzian realism (Wendt 1992). Whereas structural realism is focused on interests, equal security and power (due to the condition of anarchy), Wendt's social constructivism goes one step back arguing that "identities are the basis of interests" (ibid.: 398). Durkheimian ideas of collective representations and knowledge seem to shore up this approach. To use Wendt's own examples: if states in the international arena identify themselves as participants in a capitalist world, in a world of mutual Westphalian recognition, they define their interests accordingly.

Wendt is correct in some aspects of his interpretation of collective representations (*représentations collectives*). For Durkheim, collective representations did indeed have the power to generate at least partially autonomous realities (cf. Lukes 1973, chapter 10). However, there is one major oversight, an oversight that seems chronic in IR: Durkheim's idea of collective representations was primarily about entrenching morality in a society. Collective representations bestowed upon moral rules a peculiar authority (Lukes 1973: 114-5).

The role morality plays in the sociology of Durkheim is a major oversight in the study of IR. The preceding review has shown that individual concepts of Durkheimian sociology have been applied, selectively and isolated. As a result, the pivotal role of morality in Durkheim's sociology has been overseen or neglected. This important role of morality in his sociology can be exemplified by one example: According to Durkheim (2006 [1897]: 272), mankind is insatiable. An individual by himself cannot set limits to his longings nor his passions. Hence, restraining forces in a society must come from above the individual, from society itself. And this restraining force is morality in society:

"What is peculiar to mankind is that the restraint to which we are subjected is not physical, but moral, which is to say social. Man receives his laws not from a material environment

which is brutally imposed on him, but from a conscience which is greater than his and whose superiority he feels” (ibid.: 276).

Thus, an application of Durkheimian sociology in IR should not only draw on selected, isolated ideas like dynamic density and collective representations, but strive for a theory that holistically and correctly mirrors his sociology, including the value Durkheim bestowed upon morality. Anomie theory, or an appropriated version of it, is such a theory.

2.3 The Theory of Anomie and IR

According to Merton (1964: 226), the English historian William Lambarde had already written about “anomy” in the sixteenth century to refer to a condition that brings “disorder, doubt and uncertainty over all”.⁵⁵ Today, the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* defines anomie as “social instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values”.⁵⁶ The *Oxford Learner’s Dictionary* defines anomie (also anomy) as “a lack of social or moral standards” and traces its origins to Greek roots in the word *anomos*, i.e., “lawless” or “without laws” (cf. Olsen 1965; Orrù 1987).⁵⁷ Eric Hobsbawm (1994: 274) defined anomie as the reduction of humanity into a scattering of disoriented and rootless individuals. According to Besnard (1988), it was the French philosopher Jean-Marie Guyau (1854-1888) who coined the term. Guyau referred to anomie as a lack of fixed moral boundaries (Mestrovic and Brown 1985; Mestrovic and Lorenzo 2008). However, most sociologists would probably agree that serious scholarship on anomie started with *The Division of Labour* by Emile Durkheim in 1893 (cf. Clinard 1964).⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Mestrovic and Brown (1985) conducted a detailed investigation of the etymological and historical roots of Durkheimian *anomie* and *anomia*. Unlike many other scholars they understand anomie as *dérèglement*. Mestrovic and Lorenzo (2008: 186) also highlight that anomie in the USA has been defined differently than in Europe due to cultural differences.

⁵⁶ Available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anomie>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

⁵⁷ Available at: <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/anomie?q=anomie>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

⁵⁸ According to Mestrovic and Brown (1985: 89), Durkheim in his initial introduction to the first edition of *The Division of Labour* explained that this work was about defining morality and anomie in the context of Kant and Guyau. However, this introduction was dropped in subsequent editions of the book. If this is true then it is possible that generations of scholars after Durkheim would have interpreted his *magnus opus* very differently, including in

2.3.1 EMILE DURKHEIM ON ANOMIE

In *The Division of Labour* Durkheim (2013) explains that a healthy (i.e. properly functioning) division of labour presupposes regular contact between members of a society. Regular contact does not merely have to be characterised as communication. Cooperation in terms of acting together is equally important. Durkheim (2013: 286) explains that such cooperation develops habits which are transformed into rules. Therefore, under perfect conditions of regular contact within a healthy division of labour “rules emerge automatically from the division of labour” (ibid.) and an allocation of obligatory rights and duties is established (ibid.).⁵⁹ However, if regular contact - especially in form of cooperation - disappears, rights and duties will become (too) vague and general. As a result, individuals of a society become alienated from society (ibid.: 278, 280) and an erosion of solidarity sets in. This is referred to as anomie.

Interestingly, there seems to be a big step from a breakdown of regular contact and the vagueness of rules to the individual’s alienation from society. What did Durkheim understand by this causality? This necessitates a broader engagement with Durkheimian sociology, beyond *The Division of Labour*.

According to Durkheim, rules and regulations in society are no empty commitments. Rules and regulations serve no functional purpose that is merely task-related or production-related. Instead, they are norms and thereby signify certain principles of right or wrong, good or bad in society, setting standards of behaviour. This is the case because norms (or *normal*, rules-based behaviour) are what Durkheim referred to as observable relationships that constitute an “unending number of phenomena in terms of which it [morality] is shaped, and which, in turn, it regulates” (Durkheim

IR, if they had read Durkheim’s original introduction. Furthermore, scholars like Karl Marx used the term *anomie*, too. However, Marx, as an example, applied anomie in context of exploitation and coercion of laborers whereas Durkheim applied anomie as an analytical tool for society (Müller 2006: 174).

⁵⁹ Cf. Olsen (1965) who explained that according to Durkheim agreements between individuals on procedures and rules develop “out of prolonged contact and interaction” (39).

and Giddens 1972: 95, cf. *ibid.*: 101). Hilbert (1986) explained that in Durkheimian sociology such observable relationships constitute social facts, or *things*.⁶⁰ These things make members confront an objective society, something given prior to their birth (cf. Bauman 2005: 362). This is to say that rules and regulations are a set of facts which have an existence and stand outside the individual (Pickering 2006: 38). They are “a set of rules of conduct, or practical imperatives” (Durkheim 2006b: 79) coordinating as rationally as possible the ideas and sentiments of the moral conscience of a particular period (Durkheim 2006a: 72-3; cf. Dohrenwend 1959: 471).⁶¹ This role of morality is important. Generally speaking, morality was of great importance for Durkheim because it exerted major influence within society. Anastasopoulos (2014: 137) highlights that the French meaning of the word morality (*moralité*) implies the meaning of values, norms and rules. He emphasises that, in accordance with such understanding of *moralité*, according to Durkheim morality in society imposes itself upon individuals (*ibid.*). In similar vein, Hilbert (1986: 2) explains that in Durkheimian anomie theory, morality is considered a force and controlling agent so strong that it is often unthinkable to violate it and that most members of society adhere to it without even noticing.⁶² In other words: “When individuals confront moral reality, they are confronting society; society and morality are one” (*ibid.*: 2).⁶³ Therefore, the violation of rules and regulations, representing norms, implies the violation of morality and the impairment of practical imperatives or value judgement that guide the moral conscience of a society (cf. Lukes 1973: 112-8). For Durkheim, the lack of social integration that came along with a weak moral conscience caused members to become alienated (losing their sense of belonging) from society.

⁶⁰ Cf. McSweeney (1998): Social facts don’t make an objective society as an identity but as a narrative. Being Danish or being Irish is not an objective identity but a narrative, a story that is being told. This narrative is a fluid and constraining resource with which individuals identify themselves.

⁶¹ The aim of this rational coordination of ideas and sentiments is the achievement of an equilibrium around shared values in society (Allen and O’Boyle 2017: 8).

⁶² In his investigation on the Durkheimian types of egoism, altruism, anomie and fatalism Dohrenwend (1959: 469) did not speak specifically about morality as a determining force for man but employed the term “social norm” which he closely associated with the Durkheimian term of “social pressure”. Parsons defined this social pressure as value-orientation connoting to normative ideas or regulatory symbols of a culture (*ibid.*).

⁶³ “Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau seems to have realised how contradictory it is to admit that the individual is himself the author of a machine which has for its essential role his domination and constraint” (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 99).

This alienation due to anomie becomes more drastic in Durkheim's research on suicide.⁶⁴ In *On Suicide* anomie kills people (cf. Hilbert 1989). Durkheim (2006: 267-77) explains that some people commit anomic suicide because they are in a state of disorganisation due to a lack of guidance and control by society (ibid.: 262-301; cf. Marks 1974: 332-3).⁶⁵ He furthermore offers such an explanation regarding his idea of egoistic suicide arguing that within the Protestant community suicides are more likely than in the Catholic community (ibid.: 159-60) because Protestantism is less tightly integrated and allows for more individualism than Catholicism (ibid. 165). Therefore, in Durkheim's scholarship on anomie the absence or violation of normative and moral guidance in society plays a conspicuous role.

2.3.2 ANOMIE BEYOND EMILE DURKHEIM

This thrust within anomie theory has become more precisely defined in subsequent developments of anomie theory (after Durkheim had passed away in 1917). According to Besnard (1988: 94), Harvard sociologists revived anomie in the late 1930s to use it as a “weapon” against studies on social disorganisation from the Chicago school of sociology.⁶⁶ One of the most prominent Harvard sociologists on the study of anomie was Robert K. Merton.⁶⁷ His essay *Social Structure and Anomie* triggered a lively debate on anomie among sociologists and criminologists in the USA in the 1950s-60s. Merton (1938) used his research on anomie to offer a non-biological, sociological explanation for deviant behaviour arguing that anomie arises when socially determined goals are

⁶⁴ Scholarship on anomie discussed whether anomie in *The Division of Labour* is different to anomie in *On Suicide*. This discussion pivoted around the idea whether anomie is temporary or chronic in one or the other case (Lukes 1973: 174; Besnard 1988: 92-3; Besnard 2005: 77; Allen and O'Boyle 2017: 33). These scholars, however, do not dispute that anomie threatens society by eroding rules and regulations which govern social life. An exception are Mestrovic and Brown (1985: 86). Furthermore, DiChristina (2016) argues that five different understandings of anomie can be abstracted from Durkheim's writing.

⁶⁵ According to Sennett (2006), the idea of anomic suicide is engaged within a literary context in Stendal's *The Red and the Black* (1830) and Balzac's *Lost Illusions* (1837-43) because “in each novel, as a young man rises in society, he loses his bearings” (xix).

⁶⁶ Cf. Snell (2010) for an analysis of Durkheimian sociology vis-à-vis the Chicago school. He concludes that differences exist but that they are not quite as stark as one might expect.

⁶⁷ There are many versions of anomie theory “out there”. Talcott Parsons, Robert Dubin, Richard Cloward and many other sociologists and criminologists have reformulated Durkheim's and Merton's theory of anomie (Clinard 1964).

unattainable through normatively or morally prescribed behaviour for at least some individuals in a society.⁶⁸ Merton's scholarship thereby continues Durkheim's description of anomie as a result of inadequate moral/normative regulation of social relationships (cf. Clinard 1964: 4).

According to Merton (1938), the goals an individual is trying to achieve in life (e.g. becoming rich and successful or pious and frugal) are culturally or socially defined. In other words, society tells the individual what to strive for. At the same time, there are institutional norms which regulate and define acceptable modes of achieving such goals (not anything goes). If a member of society achieves his goals within the jurisdiction of acceptable behaviour he displays conformist behaviour. However, if the individual considers conformist behaviour for the achievement of his goals futile, deviant means assume a role. This is to say that deviant behaviour is the result of an incompatibility between cultural expectations and social regulation (Hilbert 1989: 244 calls it the means-ends breakdown). Clinard (1964) explained that according to Merton "[t]he distribution of deviant behaviour will depend on the accessibility of legitimate means to secure the goals and the degree of assimilation of goals and norms by the different social strata of society" (13). What Merton (1964) intended to say by this was that society promises individuals what they are denied in reality (ibid.: 218) and individuals are thereby required to accept permanent disadvantages (ibid.: 227). As a result, individuals become estranged from society and deviant behaviour claims a role. Such deviant behaviour causes anomie, defined by Merton as "a breakdown of social standards governing behaviour" (ibid: 226). This breakdown of social standards is at its core an irrelevance of rules signifying little social cohesion and a social order in which no man can confidently put his trust (ibid.).⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Cf. Thompson (2002: 96-7) regarding Robert Merton on anomie and deviance.

⁶⁹ Mestrovic and Brown (1985) as well as Hilbert (1986, 1989) disagree with Merton's understanding of anomie as normlessness, whereas Parsons (1951: 24) substantiates Merton's analysis arguing that anomie is a breakdown of normative order (cf. Dohrenwend 1959: 470).

So far Merton (1964) has been the first and only scholar to make a direct link between anomie and international relations. He argued that anomie and the lack of social integration it causes is notoriously apparent in the international realm (ibid.: 681). In the international realm it leads to the abrogation of international law, “treaties become scraps of paper” (ibid.), undeclared warfare serves as a technical evasion and the bombing of civilians is rationalised. Merton also stressed that anomie is not a state-of-mind of the individual. Instead, anomie is a property of a social system, it is “a condition of the social environment, not of the isolated self” (ibid.: 234-235). Anomie is therefore not to be confused with *anomia*, a term coined by Leo Srole in the early 1950s to “designate an anomic state of the individual” (ibid.: 227; cf. Besnard 1988: 93).

Merton’s ideas about anomie were further developed by scholars like Cloward (1959), Clinard (1964), Olsen (1965), Cohen (1965) and Rose (1966).⁷⁰ These refinements of anomie theory included the idea that deviant behaviour does not always have to be considered non-conformist. Alternatively, retreatism could be an option whereby individuals “withdraw from conventional social relations” (Cloward 1959: 175; cf. Clinard 1964: 21).⁷¹ Furthermore, deviant or non-conformist behaviour does not always have to be intentional. It can also be due to ignorance and a lack of intelligence (Rose 1966: 37-8), a lack of opportunities (Cloward 1959; Merton 1964) as well as an unequal distribution of knowledge in society (Cloward 1959). Furthermore, deviant behaviour does not necessarily unfold in an isolated realm but is usually recognised by others (Cohen 1965: 9-11). This is to say that an interaction process plays an important role in which reactions to deviant behaviour can vary. Varying reactions to deviant behaviour can also be associated with the norms linked to an interaction process. It can thus make a great difference how

⁷⁰ Hilbert (1989) associates those who agree with Merton that anomie equals normlessness with Parsonian functionalism, vested in Parsons’ belief that Durkheim was a theorist of norms, norms which Durkheim understood as a body of rules.

⁷¹ Clinard (1964) mentions five types of possibilities to react to societal pressure, one of which is conformity (i.e. non-deviant behaviour) and the others are deviant possibilities.

for instance a priest, a teacher or a police officer react to deviant behaviour, given the different normative frameworks they are embedded within.⁷²

An investigation of potential remedies for anomie was initiated by Marks (1974) wondering how Durkheim may have considered fighting anomie in a society. Marks thereby addresses the incompatibility problem of societal/cultural expectations and social/normative regulation (cf. Merton above). According to Marks, Durkheim found two different so-called gatekeeper solutions for this incompatibility problem, one of which was a political solution.⁷³ The remedy within the political solution consists of a functioning dialectic relationship between society and so-called state organs (institutions of society) like the national assembly or the government. Marks explains that for Durkheim a properly functioning dialectic relationship would reconcile the divergent consciousnesses (the incompatibility problem) of state organs and members of society.

Such contributions to the scholarship of anomie were important. Not only were aspects of deviant behaviour worked out in more detail (with a focus on interaction and “non-deviant illegitimate behaviour” like retreatism) but the causes for anomie were also developed more precisely. Durkheim initially stated that anomie, understood as a state of weak moral guidance and normlessness, develops due to a breakdown in contact and cooperation among members of a society preventing the development of rules and regulations which reify morality and norms. Merton developed this approach to anomie more precisely explaining that it is the incompatibility between societal expectations on one side and the ability or willingness of members of a society to meet such expectations through so-called conformist behaviour that causes some members of a society to violate normative and moral prescriptions. This is to say that if members of a society

⁷² This was also recognised by Merton (1964) stating that “deviant behaviour [...] affects not only the individuals who first engaged in it but, in some measure, it also affects other individuals with whom they are interrelated in the system” (179-180).

⁷³ The other solution was an educational one.

consider conformist behaviour pointless they may intentionally embark upon non-conformist/deviant behaviour for achieving societal expectations. However, they may also embark upon non-conformist/deviant behaviour due to a lack of knowledge, intelligence or through accident, leading to anomie or a lack or breakdown of social standards, normlessness and little social cohesion in society.

However, what exactly is the relationship between deviant behaviour and anomie? How is a breakdown of social standards, normlessness and little social cohesion possible due to deviant behaviour? To begin with, deviant behaviour is not normal. Individuals usually follow rules and regulations and aspire to the shared goals of society. The rewards this obedience has to offer (belonging to a social group of like-minded individuals, benefits of achieving goals) outdo the strain of life outside society. Life outside society was explained by Michel Foucault during several lectures at the *Collège de France* in 1976. Foucault explained that the new reality of a deviant (he did not use this word) member of society is one of *pilotage*, or piloting: a journey where the individual chooses the destination, has to master the technique of navigation, be aware of risks of the journey and deal with an uncertainty of arrival as well as occasional changes of course (Bauman 2005). Therefore, only few individuals may have the courage to go it alone. Furthermore, Clinard (1964) explained that deviant behaviour is accompanied by a strong, negative societal reaction. In fact, *deviant* as an adjective describes something that is different from what most people consider to be normal and acceptable, frequently associated with odd sexual practices.⁷⁴ The online version of the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* explains that deviant as an adjective is about straying from an accepted norm; deviant as a noun denotes to something or someone who deviates from a norm, in other words a person who differs markedly from what is considered

⁷⁴ Available at: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/deviant_1?q=deviant, accessed on 13/06/2022.

normal or acceptable. Examples include sexual, moral and social deviants.⁷⁵ Such definitions of deviant indicate that deviant behaviour quickly strains the moral nerves or tolerance of members of a society. One may therefore also describe deviant behaviour as an injury to the moral or normative conscience of a society, causing damage of what binds society together at its core, of central values, norms or goals.

One popular example of deviant behaviour and anomie is the pressure of pecuniary success weighing on the shoulders of many members of a society that identifies itself to a large degree by economic affluence and social ascent (cf. Merton 1938: 680). In fact, in such a society like the United States of America (Merton's own example) the pressure for pecuniary success on all can invite exaggerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses and antisocial behaviour (ibid.). Due to a lack of opportunities, ignorance or simple intent deviant behaviour like typical white-collar crime (from bribery, insider trading, extortion to illegal expropriation and the abrogation of the exclusive right and control over one's property) can develop, behaviour which violates the core of what the achievement of pecuniary goals in a free market economy is all about, including a cornucopia of business ethics enshrined in business laws and regulations (like the sanctity of an agreement, voluntary exchange, consumer sovereignty and so on). How much of a free market economy (society) would the United States of America still be if such core regulations like the sanctity of an agreement become meaningless? In this example deviant behaviour as white-collar crime threatens the sheer existence of a free market society. Such effects of anomie are reminiscent of the fatal repercussions Durkheim himself ascribed to anomie. For Durkheim, anomie was a tendency towards social death; in its extreme indicating the death of society (Hilbert 1989: 244). In his own words (Durkheim 2013: 9), anomie was a condition of a society where there were no firm boundaries anymore between the permissible and the prohibited. These boundaries could be shifted by individuals according to their liking. Morality was very vague and inconsistent.

⁷⁵ Available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deviant>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

Durkheim concludes: “The upshot is that this entire sphere of collective life is for the most part removed from the moderating action of any rules” (ibid.: 9). Due to such a state of anomie conflict continually recur. Forces clash with each other, “each warding off and weakening the other” (ibid.: 9). Durkheim continues: “Truces imposed by violence are never anything other than temporary, and pacify no one. [...] If all authority of this kind is lacking, it is the law of the strongest that rules, and a state of warfare, either latent or acute, is necessarily chronic” (ibid.: 9). Furthermore, when discussing the anomic division of labour as a pathological malady of society, he wrote of an alienation between people and an erosion of solidarity in society that causes disintegration (Durkheim 2013: 280).

At this stage the following explanation of the theory of anomie is possible: Anomie can have two causes. It is either caused by an absence of rules and regulations reifying a moral reality of normative behaviour and goals members are expected to achieve; alternatively, it is caused by the violation of existing rules and regulations reifying moral reality. In more detail this means:

First, it is not merely the absence of rules and regulations that causes anomie but the absence of norms which they reify. Normativeness as a force and controlling agent (cf. Hilbert 1986), as a determining force for man (cf. Pickering 2006) can only exist and act as such if it can be perceptible and comprehensible by members of a society. According to Durkheim, this is achieved by rules and regulations turning norms into an objective reality for individuals.⁷⁶ That is, rules and regulations turn norms into social facts, facts which *are* society (Bauman 2005: 362; cf. Hilbert 1986 and the exteriority or *thingness* of an objective, normative reality for the individual; also cf. McSweeney 1998 and the argument that in Durkheimian sociology social facts create ontological reality through a narrative of identity). Such reification of society through norms and regulations

⁷⁶ Cf. Beginning of chapter 2.3.1 *Emile Durkheim on Anomie*, particularly references Durkheim and Giddens (1972: 95) and Durkheim (2006a: 72-3; 2006b: 79).

is possible because rules and regulations stipulate normative boundaries for behaviour (Durkheim 2006b: 79: “rules of conduct and practical imperatives”; Merton 1938: normative regulation of social relations) and because they determine the goals members should achieve in society (Merton 1938 and 1964: cultural expectations).

If such rules and regulations reifying such normative reality do not exist, society does not exist (because no objective social exteriority exists which regulates the life of men).

Second, it is not merely the violation of rules and regulations that constitutes deviant behaviour but the violation of the norms associated with rules and regulations. It is the violation of the “moral conscience of a particular period” (Durkheim 2006a: 72-3) of a society. Deviant behaviour damages the normative essence of what a society is made of. At the same time, deviant actors have turned their back on society. They feel no allegiance or sense of belonging towards society anymore (Durkheim: they become alienated). They are morally unrestricted in their behaviour and either do not aspire to the shared goals of society anymore or, if they still do, not according to prescribed, normative behaviour.

As a result, a condition of anomie can develop, defined as normlessness, as a breakdown of social standards governing behaviour signifying little social cohesion. Such a faltering society is perhaps best to recognise by the fact that former members do not aspire to shared goals anymore and do not consider themselves to be bound by shared rules and regulations directing their behaviour.

Therefore, we can develop the following hypothetical statements from anomie theory:

- First, a society of states comes into existence if states not merely develop rules and regulations but if they respect them. According to anomie theory, it is important to respect rules and regulations because they reify norms stipulating behavioural standards and goals

members of a society should strive for. They constitute a moral guidance that turns society real, i.e. discernible and palpable for its individuals. Society exists for individuals because rules and regulations reify norms that provide moral guidance to individuals.

- Second, to most individuals it comes natural respecting rules and regulations as long as they can aspire to the goals society sets as an objective for them within the scope of acceptable behaviour. It comes natural to them because this give-and-take relationship enables individuals to have a sense of belonging to a social group larger than themselves and at the same time promises rewards through the shared achievement of goals like security or welfare provisions (Bauman 2005). If, however, individuals consider their efforts and behaviour within the scope of acceptable behaviour meaningless for achieving society's goals, they break rules and regulations. This is referred to as deviant behaviour.
- Third, deviant behaviour is a violation of the norms that constitute society at its core. It also carries along a disregard for shared goals every individual of society should attain. Deviant behaviour thereby can lead to anomie, defined as a condition of normlessness, a breakdown of social standards where individuals are alienated from society.

Anomie theory thereby provides answers to the following three questions: Why is it important to respect rules and regulations in a society? Why do individuals respect or disrespect rules and regulations? What happens to society if rules and regulations are not respected?

Having outlined anomie theory, one might wonder why this appropriated theory of anomie is a “better” way of working with Durkheimian sociology in IR compared to previous endeavours of introducing dynamic density or the division of labour into IR? To begin with, the theory of anomie comprises essential themes of Durkheimian sociology, including Durkheim's thinking on morality

and norms in society, but also what constitutes society in an objective way independent from the individual. Furthermore, the theory of anomie, and the Durkheimian sociological aspects it implies, has been thoroughly refined and expanded by numerous scholars after Durkheim. Unlike functional ideas about the division of labour or dynamic density it is not a snapshot of Durkheimian sociology introduced into IR lacking due diligence.

More importantly, however, what insight can the hypothesis of anomie theory outlined above, as well as answers to these three questions, give us for the study of IR? I will answer this question in the following chapter.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I criticised and demonstrated that the study of IR has misinterpreted and neglected the sociology of Emile Durkheim. Kenneth Waltz, his critics and scholars working with functionalism and ideas of the division of labour have not considered Durkheimian sociology comprehensively. Instead, they adopted only individual ideas like the mechanical society, dynamic density or the division of labour trying to show that such ideas could be of added value for our understanding of international relations. This approach, however, was prone to fail. Instead, I proposed a comprehensive engagement with Durkheim's sociology, arguing that ideas pertaining to the cohesion of societies and anomie are at the heart of his intellectual curiosities. Through an investigation of Durkheimian anomie and developments of anomie theory after Durkheim I reached the conclusion that anomie theory can further our understanding of international society, explaining the emergence and regression of an international society.

However, anomie theory is far from perfect or final in its shape developed above. Therefore, some conclusions regarding some limitations of anomie theory seem appropriate. It is, for instance, not *a priori* conclusive that deviant behaviour will result in a condition of anomie. Deviant behaviour

may be temporary and counter-acted by other members of international society. At the same time, it is not evident from anomie theory how much deviant behaviour is necessary until the existence of an international society is threatened, and it is also not evident how long deviant behaviour must last until an international society defuncts.⁷⁷ In other words, anomie theory is difficult to quantify. One may argue that this lack of quantifiable factors in anomie theory sets narrow limitations regarding its applicability in the study of IR, that it limits its explanatory power when it comes to the generalisability of the answers to the three questions of (1) why rules and regulations are important, (2) why they are respected or not and (3) what happens if they are violated. However, one may retort that it is not the claim of the theory of anomie to offer a detailed explanation for the emergence and demise of every kind of international society. Instead, what the theory of anomie can offer is an explanation to why an international society can come into existence, why it can continue to exist and why it can discontinue to exist, similar to structural realism which does not claim to explain why one particular war broke out, but rather why war recurs and what conditions will make it more or less likely (Waltz 1979: 69). The theory of anomie is grounded in the isolation and abstraction of some factors considered vital for our understanding of international society. Those factors concern the relevance of respecting rules and regulations in international society. Anomie theory isolates such factors and bestows meaning upon them, explaining why (1) rules have to be respected, (2) why rules are respected or violated and (3) what happens if rules are violated. The individual behaviour of states as members of an international society takes a backseat in this theory because it is not the simple act of violating rules and regulations that matter but the meaning this has for the condition of international society. This comes full circle back to Merton's approach showing that deviant behaviour (e.g. criminal behaviour) has non-biological causes in society, that deviant behaviour is not down to a malicious character of an actor. Deviant behaviour in international relations has nothing to do with an inherent aggressiveness or obstinacy

⁷⁷ Measurement of anomie has been attempted through factor and correlation analysis (see Clinard 1964; Rose 1966).

of a state. Instead, deviant behaviour has structural causes, resulting from a discrepancy between society's expectations and legitimate means to meet such expectations, the means-ends-breakdown. In this sense, at least, anomie theory might be considered systemic or structural in a similar way to Waltz's structural realism (cf. Waltz 1979, chapter 4) but not grounded in an erroneous interpretation and selective reading of Durkheimian sociology.

3: Anomie theory and the society of states

3.1 Introduction

This chapter complements and refines this dissertation's theoretical and analytical framework of anomie theory through blending theory and the case study and introducing the reader to important arguments that become developed more elaborately in the ensuing chapters.

Therefore, in this chapter I discuss anomie theory in context of English School (ES) theory as well as inter-state relations between 1815 and the 1820s. ES is an important reference for the framework I developed because the sociological, Durkheimian roots of anomie theory are inextricably linked with ideas and definitions of society (of states). Therefore, I process this framework in context of a critical disposition towards English School (ES) theory in IR. Why ES? ES is an authoritative voice in the study of IR when it comes to ideas of (international) society. This is partly the case because international society is its primary object of analysis (Linklater 2009).

Therefore, in the first part of this chapter I develop in more detail what I consider the challenge with ES's definition of international society. I will begin with classic writing in ES to introduce the reader in more detail to the problem I see, arguing that ES merely claims that an international society emerges if states develop rules and regulations. I believe that this is an insufficient conceptualisation and does not explain why an international society emerges. The same applies to modern-day contributions by, for example, Barry Buzan and primary and secondary (derivative) institutions in ES. I will use critique of Buzan's idea of primary and secondary institutions, especially the primary institution of diplomacy/communication and its derivative institutions of conferences, congresses and multilateralism, to proceed to a conceptualisation of the emergence of an international society in line with this dissertation's version of anomie theory. I will argue that anomie theory rooted in Durkheimian sociology shows why it is important to know why rules and regulations have to be respected when discussing the emergence of an inter-state society. The

answer is that the respect for rules and regulations reifies a moral conscience of a particular group of states in a particular period of time. Durkheimian sociology holds that this moral conscience, understood as a sense of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of society's own conduct, becomes one with (inter-state) society and thereby makes international society ontologically real for its member states. Through this moral reification of international society in rules and regulations can we explain the emergence of an international society.

Next, I move from abstract discussions to a concrete example, developing ideas of the emergence of the post-1815 inter-state society of concert diplomacy in connection with Durkheimian sociology. I will explain briefly how concert diplomacy can be understood, how I define it and how it developed before and during the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This is important because in context of anomie theory and Durkheimian sociology I show that the respect for rules and regulations of concert diplomacy made possible the emergence of this unique inter-state society in the early nineteenth century. Respecting rules and regulations of concert diplomacy created objective social facts and practical imperatives that constituted a trans-societal moral conscience perceived as ontologically real by states (cf. previous chapter). This made the post-1815 inter-state society existing and real for its members.

The third section is about the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. An accurate point can be made about the idea that the post-1815 inter-state society never regressed but merely transformed into something of a dormant state, to become resurrected 100 years later as the League of Nations and again some decades later as the United Nations and European Union. I have contemplated this idea thoroughly and decided to not follow this train of thought, mainly because the literature is almost unanimous in agreement that cooperative post-1815 inter-state relations

discontinued in the 1820s, *atavistically* regressing into crude *Realpolitik* until the outbreak of World War One.⁷⁸

This will come to the fore when I briefly discuss the shared understanding among scholars in IR and History regarding the regression of this post-1815 inter-state society. I will highlight mutual understandings and reveal that much that IR literature has contemplated on the post-1815 society of states is valuable. However, I will also throw into sharp relief the fact that scholars in IR and History alike do not explain what exactly caused the dissolution of concert diplomacy and the concomitant regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. I criticise that they furthermore cannot make sense of the United Kingdom's role in the dissolution of concert diplomacy, despite the fact that they do recognise that the United Kingdom must have played an ominous role. I argue that anomie theory can offer answers to these problems. First, anomie theory explains to us what it means to argue that the demise of concert diplomacy entailed the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. Concert diplomacy constituted the moral conscience, the shared moral, of the post-1815 inter-state society. Without concert diplomacy states had no longer an ontological reference reminding them as members of a like-minded group. Second, concert diplomacy consisted of the respect of certain rules and regulations which states jointly agreed upon to achieve shared goals like peace and the maintenance of peace. Concert diplomacy experienced its demise because its rules and regulations were broken by a so-called deviant actor. Third, this deviant actor was the United Kingdom, becoming increasingly unsatisfied and disenchanted with the rules of concert diplomacy. This showed seriously for the first time at the Congress of Verona but reached its peak during the second Russo-Greek crisis in 1825 where the United Kingdom displayed unequivocal acts of deviant behaviour. Finally, such deviant behaviour impaired the moral conscience of the post-1815 inter-state society to such a degree that from the late 1820s onwards inter-state relations

⁷⁸ The idea of regression is elucidated in more detail in chapter 6, *Society to System: Regression and atavism of an inter-state society*.

were characterised by anomie: the absence of moral standards and fixed moral boundaries in inter-state relations, by disoriented and rootless individual states and an irrelevance of rules and little social cohesion.

3.2 ES and anomie theory in context of international society

According to ES, an inter-state society comes into existence if states develop shared rules and regulations through communication and collaboration (cf. e.g. Buzan 1993: 330). This standard-definition of ES suggests that international society is merely a functional edifice sustained by rules. Why rules are respected in the first place and what the respect or disrespect of rules does to our understanding of international society plays no role. Furthermore, this conceptualisation of international society conceals the role morality plays, despite the fact that some scholars in ES theory, including Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, have emphasised the moral component of an international society. ES's standard definition of international society thus reveals the following weakness: the role of rules and morality is not satisfyingly accounted for. The ensuing analysis of ES writing shows this in more detail. It elucidates that morality played an important role in early ES writings on international society and that the role of rules in an international society is not considered beyond a functional purpose. What has been missing is the establishment of a nexus between morality and rules.

Charles Manning's contribution from 1962 in *The Nature of Inter-state Society* was the first attempt to understanding inter-state society in ES literature. Manning contented that inter-state relations, despite its anarchic character, is to a great extent governed by rules (cf. Aalberts 2010: 256), an aspect for which Realism and its preoccupation with polarity did not account for. He obtained this understanding through an ontological approach, wondering how the existence of an inter-state society can be explained. Ideas of how states think and how they should behave play an important role in this context. To elucidate his arguments, Manning (1962: 31-4) offered the reader

a real-life example of interpersonal dynamics: If a guest leaves a hotel, the receptionist or hostess is sorry for the guest to leave. In fact, however, she is probably not really sorry for the guest to leave. Instead, she acts in a certain way she feels compelled to. At the same time the guest knows that she is probably not really sorry for him to leave but he accepts her display of regret and reacts accordingly because he feels compelled to. In inter-state society similar games are played according to similar ideas of social standards. Jean-Paul Satre called this *mauvaise foi*, or play-acting of which we are not aware of (cf. Wilson 2004; Dunne 2005: 162; Linklater and Suganami 2006). Manning associated *mauvaise foi* with “restraints of good feeling among neighbours and friends” (1962: 42), explaining that we human beings ascribe person-like individualism to countries and thereby associate certain moral standards with countries.

In the essay *Society and Anarchy in Inter-State Society* Hedley Bull (1966a) confronts the Realist idea that an inter-state society cannot come into existence under conditions of anarchy. This argument is based on Realist premises which Bull challenges. He also takes issue with the Hobbesian claim that there are no moral or legal rules in a world of anarchy arguing that “the recognition of legal and moral rules by statesmen” (42) as well as the tradition of positive law and morality “have been a continuous feature of inter-state life” (42). In a second essay, Bull (1966b) again draws attention to morality and the respect of rules and regulations. He offers the reader a comparison between a solidarist conception of inter-state society and a pluralist one. The solidarist conception of inter-state society is closely associated with the scholarship of Hugo Grotius and Bull’s later understanding of an inter-state society whereas the pluralist conception is associated with his ideas of an inter-state system and the scholarship of Lassa Oppenheim.⁷⁹ An important distinction between both conceptions concerns the sources of law in inter-state society. According to the solidarist conception, natural law dominates positive law. Natural law is defined by the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries as “a set of moral principles on which human behaviour is based”.

⁷⁹ German lawyer (1858 – 1919), contributed substantially to modern-day understanding of international law.

For the first time, the rules and regulations states develop in the course of an emerging inter-state society seem vested in moral. It seems that moral guidance conditions state behaviour in an inter-state society.

More of this can be found in the scholarship of Martin Wight (1977). Based on Hugo Grotius, he argued that morality played an important role in Medieval Europe, referring to an inner circle of international society, the *Corpus Christianorum*, bound by the law of Christ, and an outer circle of international society “that embraces all mankind, under natural law” (128). Furthermore, Wight highlighted that “the states of Italy and Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not consider themselves as exempt from rules of law” (147). They recognised the existence of inter-state norms, despite the fact that respect for inter-state law fluctuated throughout history. However, all things considered, morality, primarily prescribed by the Papacy and Christian principles, played an important role in a Medieval society of states, too.

It is interesting that scholars like Bull and Wight intuitively ascribe importance to the role played by morality in an inter-state society. However, they failed to take up the thread and develop the nexus between morality and rules any further. Wight (1977), for example, accepts Hugo Grotius’ argument that around the Council of Constance (1414-18) morality radiated from the law of Christ within the inner circle of international society until the Congress of Utrecht (1712). However, he did not explain what effect this had on the emergence or existence of this inner circle. Above all, having established this claim, Wight moved on, in historical terms, to the Congress of Utrecht and, this time in more detail, argued that the states-*system* of Utrecht war characterised by multiple factors. Morality could have been applied in this context as a meta-factor, especially since Wight bestows importance upon a framework of law. But Wight (partly in reference to Bull) merely credits international law with an ordering function without explaining it. He (1977) makes clear that “the states of Italy and Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not consider

themselves exempt from rules of law” (147) and that they recognised the existence of international norms. But why did they not consider themselves exempt from the rules of law? Something surely must have motivated them to accept rules. Furthermore, Wight did not explain what it meant that states recognised the existence of international norms, especially if and how this could have been understood in association with states not considering themselves exempt from rules of law.

This disconnect of rules and morality also came to the fore in Hedley Bull’s later writing, especially the critically much acclaimed *The Anarchical Society* where Bull (2002) [1977] argued that an inter-state society is “a group of states in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (13). These common institutions are shared goals, goals every society strives for: Life (protection from life-threatening violence), truth (promises must be kept) and property (stable possession of things). According to Bull, these goals are achieved through order. Order, however, does not mean rules *per se*. For Bull, order in social life is a purposive conception. In an international context it is a pattern of activity that sustains the goals of international society (ibid.: 8). This reveals an important discrepancy in Bull’s argument: On the one hand, Bull argues that an international society comes into existence if a group of states is bound by rules and work towards shared institutions (society’s goals). This does not, however, mean that states arrive at shared institutions (society’s goals) by or because of being bound by shared rules. Because, and on the other hand, what realises the shared institutions (society’s goals) is a type of order that is vested in a pattern of activity, not rules themselves: “By order in social life I mean a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary and universal goals of social life such as these” (4). It is not easily recognisable how the goals every society strives for (life, truth and property) become recognised as moral; it is furthermore not recognisable how Bull connects rules and goals because his focus is on a purposive pattern of activity that strives towards goals. In fact, if order towards the achievement of goals of an international society is not rules-based but instead

grounded in a pattern of activity it seems unclear why Bull implies in his definition of international society that states ought to conceive themselves to be bound by shared rules at all. What instigates this pattern of activity and how does it lead to rules? Why are rules respected when they are agreed upon and, above all, why do states perhaps disregard rules and what happens then?

Nonetheless, if we go one step back from the emergence of international society to the emergence of order in international society Hedley Bull (2002) [1977] is correct in allowing rules to play an important role. He wrote that rules prescribe behaviour that sustains goals of social life (63), that they have the function to “provide precise guidance as to what behaviour is consistent” (64) with the goals of social life. He argued that there are different kind of rules: First, there are “the fundamental or constitutional normative principle of world politics in the present era” (65). This set of rules pertains to the idea of a society of states, including the rules that states are the “principal bearers of rights and duties in international law” (66) and that states “alone have the right to use force to uphold it” (ibid.). Second, there are “the rules of coexistence” (ibid.) restricting, for example, “the manner in which sovereign states conduct war” (ibid.) and stipulating, according to the idea of *pacta sunt servanda*, that agreements have to be kept in good faith (67).⁸⁰ Another rule of coexistence concerns the equality of all states with equal rights of sovereignty (ibid.). Third, there are rules that regulate cooperation among states. “This includes rules that facilitate co-operation, not merely of a political and strategic, but also of a social and economic nature” (67).

What this dissertation would like to emphasise is that rules by themselves do not form an order let alone an international society. Rules have to be respected and the reason why they are respected plays a major role in our understanding of an international society. It stresses that rules epitomise normative and moral conduct towards a shared goal. And it is this shared normative and moral conduct that *makes* an international society, i.e. that reifies it as real to states that participate. For

⁸⁰ *Pacta sunt servanda* refers to the sanctity of agreements.

Bull, rules and the behaviour they prescribe sustain goals. From this pattern of behaviour an international society emerges. But what exactly is it with this pattern of behaviour that makes an international society?

What about more recent contributions? According to Buzan (2004: 98-121; 2006), rules are key in Bull's (and Wight's) understanding of international society because they are pivotal to appropriate behaviour. Buzan categorises rules into three levels (from more general at the top to more specific at the bottom): at the top are constitutional normative principles "setting out the basic ordering principle or social structure" (2006: 79), at the second level are rules of coexistence stipulating minimum conditions of behaviour for coexistence like property rights (ibid.) and at the bottom are rules to regulate cooperation in for example areas of arms control, finance and environment (ibid.). Buzan seems to manage some connection between rules and morality, at least between rules and ideas of normative principles. However, he does not consider the purpose of rules beyond regulative functions, although he critically highlights this issue with Bull's approach, arguing that Bull's conception of society is highly rational, contractual and rule-based (79). This is to say that purely regulative roles of rules do not explain the emergence or existence of a society of states. Buzan rightly recognises that rules are key to appropriate behaviour (78), but what is it about appropriate behaviour that accounts for the emergence or existence of an international society? Furthermore, Buzan does not explain why states should respect rules in the first place or what effects a disregard for rules has on ES's understanding of international society. Similarly, *The Ten Commandments* do not make a religion by simply being written into tablets of stone; they have to be followed by a group of people for a religion like Judaism to become real for its followers.

Finally, the same problem exists with the ES's idea that rules are developed and maintained through institutions of inter-state society, more specifically what Buzan (2004) refers to as primary

institutions: they embody a mix of norms, rules and principles (181). What exactly those primary institutions are is contested and different scholars recognise different primary institutions. However, Schouenborg (2011) explains that “the ‘communicating and interacting’ category is probably one of the most basic functional categories that can be identified. Nearly all ES scholars see diplomacy, in one form or another, as being a central feature of an inter-state society” (38). This relevance of diplomacy as an institution of inter-state society is also pertinently encapsulated by Hurrell (2007):

“Diplomacy is essential to international society because it underpins the minimal conditions and prerequisites of any cooperative social order: the capacity to communicate, the necessity of shared conventions for communication (linguistic and procedural), and the provision of an institutional framework to allow political negotiation to take place in strained and often very difficult circumstances. It also plays an expressive and symbolic role, especially in terms of upholding the idea of a shared international community, again particularly at times [...] when its very existence is under threat and held in doubt” (37).

Buzan (2004: 183), too, considers diplomacy as a primary institution (next to sovereignty and the balance of power). He further explains that such primary institutions like diplomacy are master institutions with so-called derivative institutions (ibid.). Diplomacy, for example, has the derivative institutions of conferences, congresses and multilateralism.

The question is, however, what role such primary and secondary (derivative) institutions play in ES’s understanding of inter-state society? According to Dunne (2001: 77), they embody rules and regulations. Proceeding from diplomacy/communication as a primary institution, its derivative or secondary institutions and the associated rules and regulations would pertain to the conduct and organisation of conferences, congresses and multilateralism at large (Buzan 2004: 184). But the primary institution of diplomacy with its derivation of congresses and conferences would only

exist in such a structured way if rules and regulations establishing congresses and conferences are actually respected and thereby confer to states that convening in congresses and conferences is a morally-speaking right/good thing to do. Alas, this is not part of ES's scholarship of primary and secondary (derivative) institutions in inter-state society.

3.2.1 ES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE PROBLEM AND WHY IT MATTERS

What is the problem with the ES's understanding of international society? In a nutshell, ES defines an international society arguing that states, through communication (diplomacy) develop rules and regulations which govern state conduct (e.g. Bull 1966a; Bull 1966b; Wight and Bull 1977; Suganami 2001; Dunne 2001: 77-8; Hurrell 2007). Buzan (2004), for instance, explained that according to Hedley Bull and Adam Watson an international society is first and foremost characterised by states' abilities to establish through dialogue and consent "common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements" (98). The institutions Buzan mentions are for example sovereignty, balance of power, diplomacy or international law (cf. Wight and Bull 1977: 6; Clark 2005: 6-7; Buzan and Lawson 2015: 85-6). Buzan (2004: 181; 2006: 85) made a difference between primary and their derivative institutions (cf. Clark 2005: 21; Hurrell 2007: 37; Buzan and Lawson 2015) which embody rules and regulations (Dunne 2001: 77).

Why states develop rules and regulations through communication is explained differently.⁸¹ Charles Manning (1962), for instance, argued that states play a game with each other according to ideas and assumptions in the heads of statesmen (cf. Wilson 2004; Dunne 2005: 162; Linklater

⁸¹ A constructivist's perspective on this can be found with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), although they focus on norms rather than rules. Nevertheless, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms can develop into legal agreements: "Since 1948, emergent norms have increasingly become institutionalized in international law, in the rules of multilateral organizations, and in bilateral foreign policies" (900).

and Suganami 2006).⁸² Hedley Bull (1966a: 42; cf. Dunne 2001: 69, 77) believes that shared interests among states spur a goal-oriented process towards an international order. He thus defines international society as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society” (Bull 2002 [1977]: 8).

As previously mentioned, there are several contentious points raised by various critics regarding these conceptualisations of international society. As I see it, however, the major problem is that these conceptualisations provide no answers to the following three vital questions: Why is it important that rules and regulations are respected? Why do states respect rules and regulations? What happens if rules and regulations are not respected? Arguing that an international society comes into existence if states develop rules and regulations embodied by institutions is simply not enough. In other words, there is no point in developing rules and regulations if they are not respected and if we do not understand why it is important that they are respected. This is to say that there is no point in arguing that international society exists if states develop rules and regulations as long as we do not understand why they respect such rules and regulations and why it is important that they do. Furthermore, ES is almost completely quiet about the reasons that can bring an end to an international society. This is surprising in so far that ES substantially exists due to an analytical distinction between an international society and an international system (cf. Bull 1966b; Bull 2002 [1977]; Wight and Bull 1977). In fact, this distinction can be quite confusing (c.f. Dunne 2001: 70).

For instance, Bull’s (1966b) distinction between pluralist and solidarist international society offers room for speculation whether his pluralist international society is actually an international system. Buzan’s (2004: 107) idea that a solidarist international society is something of a pluralist

⁸² Manning himself used Jean-Paul Satre as an example who called such game-playing *mauvaise-foi* (play-acting of which we are not aware of). Another analogy by game is offered by Dunne (2001: 67).

version in a more advanced stage of development dissolves this difference between an international society and international system altogether and thereby says even less about what an international society is not. In this regard, ES also does not account for the idea of atavism of an international society, i.e. the backwards development of an international society into an international system or from a solidarist to a pluralist international society.⁸³ Anomie theory, and its focus on why rules have to be respected, why they are respected or violated and what happens if they are violated, offers answers to such issues.

I am not aware of any scholar who has identified this exact nebulosity concerning our understanding of international society in ES. It is my impression, however, that some scholars have intuitively pointed in the direction of what I just made explicit. I interpret their contributions as an indication of the insight anomie theory can offer to shake such ambiguities off ES's understanding of international society. Their contributions are also an indication that anomie theory developed in this dissertation can aptly complement ES definitions. In this context, one example is the scholarship of Ian Clark (2005). In his investigation of legitimacy in international society he mentioned that there are two faces of legitimacy (the duality of legitimacy): rightful membership and rightful conduct. Rightful conduct implies a sense of being bound (ibid.: 23). States seem to know, seem to recognise and accept that they are bound by rules, that they are obligated to respect rules (ibid.: 24). According to Clark (2005), this is what defines international society "rather than its expression in any specific institutions or values - all of which are historically variable" (24). Anomie theory in this dissertation would whole-heartedly subscribe to this perspective.

He furthermore explains that rightful membership generates rightful conduct. Rightful membership comes down to who has a right to have a right (ibid.: 27), which is decided by

⁸³ In this context, I reverse-engineer ES definitions in chapter 5 to discuss this issue in more detail.

international society collectively through a formal process (diplomatic recognition) and an informal process. Important is the informal process. Accreditation of rightful membership through the informal process is grounded in informal criteria like the standard of civilization in the nineteenth century, or more recently ideas of good governance and respect of human rights. Such informal criteria are a powerful source of state socialisation and can create a highly exclusive international society. Clark (2005) also highlights that a violation of such informal criteria can have brutal consequences for states. They may be labelled *rogue states* and become subject to humanitarian intervention or even regime change (ibid.: 27). The situation of Iraq around 2003 is one example Clark mentions in his introduction (ibid.: 2).⁸⁴ In his ensuing writing on international legitimacy in world society Clark (2007) furthermore explained that violations of such informal criteria are not uncommon. This is to say that it does happen that states perform so-called illegitimate acts and display “deviancy” (2007: 15).

To my knowledge, Ian Clark is the only scholar within ES who pays attention to not only the fact that rules and regulations have to be respected but he also entertains the possibility of states (dis)respecting the rules when it comes to ideas about international society. Regarding the latter, the vocabulary Clark uses is instructive. States do not merely brake, violate or disregard rules. Clark’s (ibid.: 15) specific vocabulary of “illegitimate act” and “deviancy” bestows judgement upon the violation of rules. This is an important development and reminiscent of scholarship on anomie in the 1960s when the term “deviant” became first introduced denoting to the violation of rules in society (cf. above). The weakness of Clark’s foray is, however, that he does not explain why states violate the club-like informal criteria of international society - if they chose to do so - or why they may not chose to act illegitimately and deviantly. He also leaves it unmentioned what an illegitimate act or deviancy would mean for our understanding of international society.

⁸⁴ Dunne (2001: 75) offers a similar example highlighting the exclusion of China as a legitimate member of international society until 1942.

Another example can be found with Dunne (2001) who entertains the possibility of states' violating rules of international society, too. Dunne explained that rules are derived from norms. He argues that, unlike rules, norms are routinely observed by states. If rules are broken, however, this does usually not undermine the norm. If sovereignty is the norm and diplomatic immunity one of the rules derived from this norm, a violation of the rule of diplomatic immunity does not relinquish the norm of sovereignty. But what about the breaking of norms? Dunne believes that norms are sometimes broken, too. But in such cases the act of violating a norm is simply justified by appealing to another norm (ibid.: 78). Unfortunately, Dunne himself said nothing about why states may choose to comply with rules or norms or why they may choose not to do so. He intuitively recognised that the compliance with rules and/or norms must somehow be an important aspect to our understanding of international society. He did not, however, further investigate this issue or attempt to bestow upon it any kind of meaning or judgement (as Clark did with his interesting choice of vocabulary). Dunne (2001) wondered "[w]hy, then do states follow rules" (79) and offers a quote and reference to Bull as a neat way out: "[s]tates follow rules not purely out of self-interest but because they believe themselves to be bound by them" (ibid.: 79). However, this is not an explanation but merely a claim. More specifically, Bull (2002) [1977] argued that

"A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that *they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another*, and share in the working of common institutions. If states today form an international society [...] this is because, recognising certain common interests and perhaps some common values, *they regard themselves to be bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another*, such as that they should respect one another's claim to independence, that they should honour agreements ..." (13, my emphasis).

Bull did not explain why states follow rules, why they actually conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules, why they regard themselves to be bound by certain rules. Why do they? Why does it matter? And what happens if they don't? Bull's statement is characteristic for the way ES theorising has neglected this important issue of IR's discussion of international society. Even important contributions by Clark and Dunne have not offered satisfying insight.

I have so far highlighted and discussed the problem that ES omitted the three important questions of why rules and regulations have to be respected, why states do or do not choose to do so and what happens if states ignore rules and regulations? I do not take issue with ES's definition of international society, especially the idea that states develop rules and regulations through communication (this, in fact, is argued by anomie theory, too). However, I claim that simply arguing that states develop rules and regulations is not enough. Instead, we have to find answers to the three questions above. But why are answers to these questions important? Why does it matter to know?

Clark's work on legitimacy in international society as well as Dunne's approach of critical theory have both revealed that in some yet unexplained way the respect for rules by states seems important to understanding international society. This seems obvious in so far because the disrespect of rules and regulations makes ES's definition of international society redundant. If states disrespect rules and regulations there is no point in developing rules and regulations in the first place. If rules and regulations do not matter to states why should they, through communication and cooperation, come together and develop rules and regulations at all?

Hence, there must be some value or meaning to rules and regulations *if they are respected*. Vice versa, some value or meaning must be violated or impaired if they are not respected. Furthermore, if we ignore why rules are respected or not, then there is no point working analytically with

institutions representing or managing rules and regulations, for otherwise what would have to be represented or managed, if what is to be represented and managed, does not matter for states and has no meaning in international society. Logically, this vexing issue regarding the respect or disrespect for rules and regulations begs the question if an inter-state society does still exist if rules and regulations are violated, especially considering that their violation makes the development of new rules and regulations through communication pointless? Such reverse logic of ES's explanation of an international society would then explain the non-existence of an international society - but only because this anti-thesis factors in the repercussions of violating rules and regulations. This is to say that complementing ES's definition of international society with an explanation of why it matters that rules are respected, why states do or do not respect rules and what happens if they don't, reveals how an inter-state society can come into existence and what can cause its regression.

3.2.2 ANOMIE THEORY AND THE SOCIETY OF STATES

According to this dissertation's version of anomie theory, inter-state society comes into existence if through contact and communication among states rules and regulations are developed *and respected*. It is essential for the existence of an inter-state society that rules are respected because they reify norms which determine behavioural standards and goals members of an inter-state society should strive for. This reification of norms constitutes social facts which members of an inter-state society confront. They make inter-state society real for its members. Inter-state society, hence, exists as the perception of something real among its members due to normative guidance in the shape of permissible behaviour towards the achievement of shared goals.⁸⁵ The continued existence of an inter-state society can only be guaranteed if members of the inter-state society continue to respect the rules and regulations. States usually do respect regulations because they

⁸⁵ Cf. Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of anomie theory.

benefit from the rewards of shared goals every member of an inter-state society is aspiring to if regulations are respected. However, they respect the rules and regulations as long as such rules and regulations enable states to achieve the goals inter-state society has as an objective. If some states cannot achieve the goals inter-state society expects them to achieve through behaviour considered acceptable, such states will violate rules and regulations, displaying so-called deviant behaviour. Such deviant behaviour can for example be the abrogation of international law, undeclared warfare and even the bombing of civilians (Merton 1938: 681). Deviancy threatens the continued existence of an inter-state society because deviant behaviour is an attack on the normative and moral core of a society, leading to anomie understood as a condition of normlessness, a breakdown of social standards where a heap of states is unrestricted in their behaviour and does not aspire to shared goals anymore.

The regression of an inter-state society due to anomie is not the “fault” of deviant actors. If members of an inter-state society violate rules and regulations, such deviant actors often consider their behaviour as normal. The reason for this is that deviant behaviour is not down to the evil or criminal nature of an individual (or state in context of IR). Instead, it is a property of a social system. The “fault” of deviant behaviour does not lie with the deviant member of society. Deviant behaviour has socio-cultural sources and is due to an incompatibility of societal/cultural expectations and normative regulation whereby legitimate means of behaviour render it impossible for some members of an inter-state society to secure the goals and their rewards they are meant to secure. In other words, deviant actors occur if international society promises some members what they are denied in reality.

This dissertation’s theory of anomie thereby tells us that the emergence and the regression of an inter-state society is not merely down to the development of shared rules and regulations and institutions which administer such rules and regulations; it is also not simply down to shared norms

and ideas about inter-state conduct. Instead, the emergence of an inter-state society is vested in the respect of rules and regulations that should enable all states to achieve shared goals and harvest their rewards. For example, during and after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1814/1815 states came together forging an inter-state society grounded in the shared goals to terminate longstanding agitations and suffering, to achieve lasting peace, to unite their interests to deal constructively with inter-state frictions whenever they arose through the rules and regulations of concert diplomacy. Such rules and regulations of concert diplomacy set boundaries to states' behaviour in so far that unilateral actions were opposed, that problems of inter-state conduct were solved through dense diplomacy in order to achieve the aforementioned shared goals of such a fledgling inter-state society. If, however, at some point some states felt continuously or considerably disadvantaged by following the rules of concert diplomacy, if the fulfilment of their interests took a backseat and legitimate means of state conduct did not seem promising anymore, if, in other words, such an inter-state society promised to some states what it could not deliver, deviant behaviour claimed a role. As a result, such deviant actors relinquished their participation in aspiring to the achievement of shared goals by adhering to the corset of rules and regulations of concert diplomacy. In other words, they chose their own national interests to follow, interests which may have little consensus with those of the inter-state society they used to be a member. They furthermore chose their own means of achieving those national interests, embarking on unilateral actions disregarding the impact of negative externalities such actions can have on other states. Such deviant actors in the post-1815 inter-state society were first and foremost the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Their deviant behaviour, however, was not a result of intrinsic animosities towards the post-Napoleonic inter-state society, selfishness or preponderance in power vis-à-vis the other states; they turned deviant due to the discrepancy described by Merton between society's expectations and legitimate means to meet such expectations, referred to by Hilbert as the means-ends-breakdown (cf. above). Whereas the maintenance of this means-ends-balance enabled the

emergence and continued existence of the post-1815 international society, its breakdown initiated its regression.

3.3 Anomie theory and the post-1815 society of states

Owl Mountains/Eulengebirge, Central Sudetes, June 1813: After numerous humiliating defeats by the *Grand Armée*, the coalition powers soon realised that more than military manoeuvring was needed to defeat Napoleon Bonaparte. As a result, the Treaty of Reichenbach of 8 June 1813, signed at Reichenbach in the Owl Mountains of southwestern Poland, represented a shared recognition by all eastern allies that durable peace after Napoleon could only be achieved through reasonable co-operation.⁸⁶ Further alliance treaties were signed at Teplitz on 9 September 1813 as well as at Ried on 8 October 1813. Through the treaties at Teplitz the Eastern powers reinforced their commitment to stay united beyond the victory over Napoleon (Schroeder 1994), a commitment they reinforced in March 1814 at the Treaty of Chaumont. The Treaty of Ried between Austria and Bavaria demonstrated a “quest for political equilibrium in the absence of balance of power” (ibid.: 482). It was followed by an alliance between Austria and the United Kingdom on 9 October 1813, negotiated by Lord Aberdeen in Vienna (Schroeder 1994). About one week later Napoleon was defeated at the *Battle of the Nations* at Leipzig and retreated at Mainz across the Rhine on 30 October 1813 (Zamoyski 2018). It was during this time that the idea for a congress in Vienna was first put forward by the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia (Lentz 2014: 24). Although a total victory over Napoleon Bonaparte was still far from certain and even fighting Napoleon in France anything but taken for granted, the allies had already laid some important legal groundwork for a post-Napoleonic inter-state society of concert diplomacy.

⁸⁶ Actually, it was a sequence of treaties at Reichenbach, i.e. multiple treaties and not just one treaty.

Encouraged by such diplomatic achievements and Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig, in December 1813 the coalition decided to fight Napoleon on his home turf and crossed into France. Fighting Napoleon in France compelled the allies to close ranks: In the Treaty of Chaumont on 9 March 1814 they agreed to remain united for 20 years after the defeat of Napoleon. This treaty was one of the most important achievements of the coalition against Napoleon Bonaparte and is by some historians considered as the foundation of peace that followed after 1815 (cf. Schroeder 1994: 501; Ikenberry 2001: 84; Zamoyski 2007: 167-8). Three weeks after the Treaty of Chaumont, on 30 March 1814, Tsar Alexander, King Friedrich Wilhelm III. and Prince of Schwarzenberg entered Paris victoriously. An armistice between France and the allies followed on 23 April (Zamoyski 2007: 185) and on 30 May 1814 the (First) Treaty of Paris was signed.

The idea to hold a congress (the Congress of Vienna) after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and his *Grand Armée* was first agreed upon between Russia, Prussia and Austria in autumn 1813 (Lentz 2014: 24). Later, the allies' intentions were reaffirmed in Article XXXII of the Treaty of Paris, signed by Russia, the United Kingdom, Austria, France as well as Sweden, Portugal and Spain (Kissinger 2013: 144 [1957]). Article XXXII stipulated to have a congress taking place in Vienna within two months' time (Lentz 2014).



Figure 1 Map: Europe in 1815 (Wikimedia Commons)

The Congress of Vienna was a great jamboree. When the Tsar and Frederick William III. arrived in Vienna on 25 September 1814 they were greeted with 1,000 cannon shots. Of course, this exuberant mood of the statesmen at Vienna came abruptly to an end when on 7 March 1815 news reached Metternich that Napoleon had escaped from Elba (Zamoyski 2007). Nonetheless, the Final Act was ratified relatively unperturbed by Europe still assembled in congress on 9 June 1815. After the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte at the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815, on 20 November 1815 the Second Peace of Paris was signed (Lentz 2014).

Before 1815 diplomacy was traditionally speaking a bilateral endeavour, involving occasional consultations and negotiations, although high-level, multilateral political conferences were not unknown to previous times. According to Meerts (2019), for instance, the Peace of Westphalia is

“seen as the mother of concert diplomacy” (ibid.: 109) because it helped create more effective negotiations. Only then came the Congress of Vienna lasting from September 1814 until June 1815. According to Meerts, at the Congress of Vienna the first plurilateral negotiations took place, meaning that negotiations were plurilateral and not multilateral because they occurred primarily among the five great powers.⁸⁷ Other countries and parties were consulted but excluded from decision making. Some, like Lascurettes (2017), even argue that the Concert of Europe was an agreement among the elite statesmen of Europe.

3.3.1 CONCERT DIPLOMACY: CONSTRUCTIVE DIPLOMACY TOWARDS PEACE IN EUROPE

I disagree with this view of the Concert of Europe as an exclusive and elitist club of the great powers of Europe. I recognise that inter-state relations in the early nineteenth century were vertically stratified according to dynastic hierarchy, power and precedence. This surely showed in a formal, diplomatic sense, influencing structure and process of diplomatic negotiations. However, negotiations at the Congress of Vienna as well as at ensuing congresses, conferences and diplomatic meetings achieved historic results which would have been impossible without the inclusion and (often tacit) consent of minor powers and interest groups. This comes to the fore in the structure of negotiations at the Congress of Vienna. Negotiations of specific issues unfolded within special committees. These committees were often formally presided over by a representative of a great power but included many minor powers with an interest in the issues discussed (cf. Webster 1918: 75-6).⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Zamoycki (2007) criticised that the Congress of Vienna was not really a congress but merely a concatenation of negotiations.

⁸⁸ To deal with the nature of complexity the great powers established ten committees supporting their negotiations (Lentz 2014). Webster (1918) offers a detailed description of the committees.

One intriguing example is the achievement of the committee on diplomatic and dynastic issues. This committee was comprised of France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Austria, Portugal, Prussia, Sweden and Russia (Lentz 2014). This committee achieved no more than a complete overhaul of many diplomatic practices of the centuries before. Until 1815, for example, Europe still abided by diplomatic rules drawn up in 1504 (Lentz 2014). Such rules were not only difficult to understand but often caused frictions due to discord over a centuries-old ranking list of monarchs and their states across Europe. This ranking list was officially abandoned and the order of signing was conducted according to (the French) alphabet. Furthermore, the authoritative ranking among diplomats was also updated. Those were important achievements that streamlined international negotiations and offered less room for treacherous blockades (ibid.).

Such results as well as their implementation in the years after the Congress of Vienna would not have been possible without participation and consent of minor (diplomatic) actors. Furthermore, after this overhaul of diplomatic practices dynastic tensions sometimes still arose in inter-state politics, but their ramifications on peace in Europe were considerably weaker after 1815 (cf. Lentz 2014: 317; Evans 2017: 28).

That concert diplomacy during and after the Congress of Vienna was not merely an elitist and exclusive endeavour comes also to the fore through the fact that not only territorial issues like the future of Poland were discussed. At Vienna the agenda was wide-ranging and included topics that mainly concerned minor, secondary actors on the European playing field of inter-state relations, topics like inter-state legitimacy beyond dynastic rights, slavery, universal laws regarding the freedom of navigation of inland waterways, the role of religious minorities like the Jews in Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, the softening of press censorship as well as constitutional

questions of states like Switzerland and those in Germany (cf. Claude 1959: 23; Bleyer 2014; Lentz 2014).

If we recognise such achievements of the negotiations at Vienna and accept that the Congress of Vienna was not an exclusive, inefficient and frivolous gathering, it turns out no surprise to see that the Final Act bore testimony to a fledgling inter-state society emerging with rules and regulations of concerted diplomatic conciliation as the new *modus operandi* in inter-state relations at its core. This comes strongly to the fore in the preamble of the Final Act where the signatories stated that the Final Act is a confirmation of their joint purpose to *regulate* their superior and permanent interests. This joint purpose can be exemplified within three issue areas:

- First, regarding the principle of freedom of navigation on inter-state rivers. This success was enshrined in five rules laid down during the Congress of Vienna. In the Final Act itself (Art. CVIII; Art. XCVI) the signatories pledged to regulate, by common consent in an assembly of Commissioners, all that regarded the freedom of navigation (cf. Rie 1950; Vitányi 1975).
- Second, regarding the Federative Constitution of Germany from 8 June 1815, included in the Final Act. The Federative Constitution's goal was to guarantee the internal and external safety of Germany as well as the independence and inviolability of the confederated states (Art. II). For this purpose, a Federative Diet was evoked which should form into a General Assembly whenever for instance fundamental laws were to be enacted or changed (Art. VI). The course of action of the General Assembly was deliberation (debating) (Art. VI) and rulings by the Assembly depended on absolute or two-third majorities (Art. VII).⁸⁹
- Third, regarding the abrogation (in the course of time) of the slave trade. The United Kingdom took advantage of the conciliatory atmosphere after the defeat of Napoleon

⁸⁹ Each member state had different amounts of votes (cf. Art. IV and VI).

Bonaparte to advocate the abrogation of the Transatlantic slave trade. As a result, on 8 February 1815 the powers issued a public statement condemning the inter-state slave trade (Lentz 2014, Klose 2019). They thereby collectively and publicly committed themselves to the joint fulfilment of a normative (humanitarian) trans-national aim. This public statement was also included in the Final Act.

All important matters at the Congress of Vienna were discussed collectively in special committees. This shows that no state ruled unilaterally over others, at least not without having heard the opinions of other states or interest groups. Moreover, each committee mustered results which were continuously discussed collectively beyond the Congress of Vienna. For example, at the London Conference from August to November 1816 the United Kingdom created a special committee for the abolition of the slave trade. The government in London justified this committee with the announcement by the powers in Vienna on 8 February the year before (Lentz 2014: 330). The same applied to the issue of freedom of navigation on inter-state waterways, an issue that became enshrined in *The Central Commission of the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)*.⁹⁰

Furthermore, this modus operandi of concert diplomacy developed at Vienna became further enshrined in the post-1815 inter-state society through practices and agreements at other congresses like the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) and the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach (1820/21) as well as ambassadorial conferences in Frankfurt, Paris and London which lasted over several years (Kissinger 2013 [1957]). The latter were particularly effective (albeit often overlooked) achieving successful mediation in Austrian-Spanish disagreements over Parma, Piacenza and

⁹⁰ The CCNR has survived until today and on its website (www.ccr-zkr.org) refers to itself as the oldest inter-state organisation in modern history.

Guastalla as well as a successful negotiation of an agreement between Spain and Portugal over colonial issues in South America (Duchhardt 2018: 30).⁹¹

Therefore, concert diplomacy facilitated the emergence of a specific inter-state society. Lascurettes (2017) explains that the states of the Concert of Europe enforced a particular set of principles in their relations with one another. Sometimes these principles existed informally but sometimes they showed as powerful norms “in the constructivist sense that their normative content was deeply internalized by the actors that shared them” (3). They represented deeply held values and identities. Elrod (1976) highlights that “[i]t [the Concert of Europe] gradually came to *embody a code of conduct* for inter-state behavior” (163, my emphasis). Within context of the version of anomie theory developed in the previous chapter, I describe these deeply held values and identities and such a code of conduct as the moral conscience of the states of Europe that arose in 1815.

It is not far-fetched to argue that ES would consider concert diplomacy as a primary institution of inter-state society after 1815 (cf. Buzan 2004; Hurrell 2007; Schouenborg 2011). ES would then argue that from a primary institution like concert diplomacy derivative or secondary institutions as well as associated rules and regulations derive, for example concerning the conduct of congresses and conferences (cf. Dunne 2001; Buzan 2004). This, then, harmonises with Bull’s definition of an international society as “a group of states in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (13).

I take no issue with the basics of this definition but nonetheless content that it is an insufficient conceptualisation. As previously criticised, Bull’s conceptualisation of international society misses the important point of why it is important that rules are respected. However, anomie theory

⁹¹ More on the uniqueness of concert diplomacy can be found with Schroeder (1986) and Jervis (1985; 1992: 719-21).

developed in chapter 2 bestows upon rules a constitutive and characteristic meaning, similar to a social constructivist thought that rules for the conduct of congresses and conferences are constitutive in nature (and not regulatory). Constitutive rules are productive of reality (Aalberts 2010).⁹² And it is this constructivist addendum, accurately engrained in anomie theory, that makes IR's understanding of inter-state (or international) society complete.

This is to say that the existence of rules per se said little about the emergence of an inter-state society of concert diplomacy. States need to practice what they preach, too. Therefore, in the post-1815 inter-state society it was the respect for rules and regulations that imparted to all member states the moral conscience of this inter-state society. At Vienna in 1815 states realised that working within context of committees, including minor states and actors, was an effective *modus operandi* to regulate their superior and permanent interests (not least in the issues of the freedom of navigation on inland water-ways). This advantage of concert diplomacy was confirmed in additional ambassadorial conferences as well as the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Practicing concert diplomacy and appreciating its results provided for states a normative context of what was good or blameworthy behaviour in inter-state conduct in Europe at that particular period of time. At the same time, respect of concert diplomacy reinforced its moral strength: repetitive application and practice of concert diplomacy turned concert diplomacy and the rightful state behaviour it embodied into routine and a new *normal*. This is to say that every time concert diplomacy was respected, states were made aware of the rightness and validity of their behaviour. In Durkheimian language, the rules and regulations of concert diplomacy were social facts or practical imperatives, coordinating the coinciding normative rightness of behaviour of a particular group of states (signatories of the Final Act) at a particular period of time. Concert diplomacy and the post-1815 inter-state society became one for its member states: member states confronted the existence of their new post-Napoleonic inter-state environment through concert diplomacy. As a

⁹² Marriage, for example, is a social fact due to constitutive rules.

result, the post-1815 inter-state society of concert diplomacy became ontologically real for its states.

3.4 Anomie theory and the regression of the post-1815 society of states

Warfare had been a way of life in Europe until the end of the Napoleonic Wars (Evans 2017: 26): numerous, devastating wars, including the War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714, the War of the Austrian Succession 1740-1748 and the Seven Years War 1756-1763 had ravaged Europe remorselessly. However, after one final devastating episode lasting peace descended upon Europe in 1815 and European inter-state relations became remarkably peaceful (cf. Schroeder 1986: 1).

Concert diplomacy was an important factor contributing to the peacefulness of this period (cf. Rosecrance 1963: 56; Elrod 1976: 160). The ability of states to reach agreements over policy issues through multilateral communication and the exchange of opinions and views reinforced a moral conscience of the post-1815 inter-state society that kept a lid on potential eruptions. A true sense of solidarity and responsibility developed (Elrod 1976).

Nevertheless, something went wrong in the course of time and by the mid-1850s inter-state relations had changed. Concert diplomacy became weakened and soon Europe was not the same again (Evans 2017: 229). Little dispute exists in IR literature that concert diplomacy started to become undone in the 1820s and that the United Kingdom played a role in this dissolution of concert diplomacy (Rosecrance 1963; Bridge and Bullen 2005; Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Lentz 2014; Sedivy 2018). IR literature furthermore agrees that this dissolution of concert diplomacy introduced an end to the post-1815 inter-state society (Hinsley 1962; Rosecrance 1963; Bridge and Bullen 2005; Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Evans 2017). In other words, the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society refers to the weakening grip of concert diplomacy on the conduct of inter-state relations in the post-1815 inter-state society.

3.4.1 IR LITERATURE AND THE DEMISE OF CONCERT DIPLOMACY

This is, however, where consensus among scholars in IR ends. What exactly caused the impairment of concert diplomacy and the concomitant regression of the post-1815 inter-state society, as well as the United Kingdom's role in it, is largely ignored and simply not known. Some explanations of the demise of concert diplomacy and the post-1815 inter-state society focus on domestic transformations (Lentz 2014), the death of the British Secretary of State Lord Castlereagh in 1822 (Kissinger 1994; 2013 [1957]), a rise of national self-determination and a more rigorous and egoistical pursuit of economic interests by states (Bridge and Bullen 2005; Evans 2017). However, neither explanation achieves a comprehensive, inclusive and thus satisfying narrative of the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. Furthermore, there is no uniform definition of "regression" or the state the post-1815 inter-state society evolved into.

First things first. What poses difficulties in the debate of the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society is undeniably the role of the United Kingdom. Britain's role is sometimes characterised as indifferent (Bridge and Bullen 2005) and even subversive (Sedivy 2018). It appears that the United Kingdom had been dissatisfied with concert diplomacy and hence discontinued its cooperation in it. However, IR literature cannot explain why the United Kingdom became at odds and dissatisfied with concert diplomacy and why, above all, Downing Street's exit from concert diplomacy had such profound repercussions on the post-1815 inter-state society. Bridge and Bullen (2005), to take an example, show that the loss of communal spirits in international relations, the inability to reconcile divergent national interests with an overarching European (societal) interest of international relations, heralded the denouement of the concert system. They repeatedly associate with this denouement the United Kingdom's portentous and implacably critical stance towards the concert system, particularly in the 1820s. However, Bridge and Bullen offer no explanation of why the United Kingdom became increasingly *alienated* from the concert system, beyond personal issues of George Canning. Above all, they describe what happened, i.e. that the concert system

disintegrated, that the United Kingdom's dissociation from it played a role, that the ability of the international community to restrain independent Russian or French expeditions became lost and so on. Their description is, after all, the depiction of a series of events but no explanation of how the concert system disintegrated. Why did the United Kingdom sign up to concert diplomacy in the first place but became increasingly obstinate as time went by? Could concert diplomacy and the post-1815 inter-state society not simply lived on without the United Kingdom? Such questions remain unanswered.

Another example, albeit in a slightly different context, comes from Evans (2017) who argues that in the 1820s the United Kingdom and Russia were suddenly at odds over divergent geopolitical interests. However, he does not explain why this was suddenly the case in the 1820s. Evans (*ibid.*: 57) writes that serious differences suddenly opened up between the United Kingdom and Russia but does not explain the reasons for why both states suddenly became at odds. Above all, Evans omits the important detail that Russia, the United Kingdom and the other great powers of the Concert did indeed manage to find agreement regarding Greece in 1821/22, whereas in the mid-1820s finding an agreement was not possible anymore. This is an important detail because it begs the question of why Russia and the rest of the Concert managed agreement in 1821/22 but not three years later?

However, not only is the exact role of the United Kingdom unclear when discussing concert diplomacy and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. As previously mentioned, scholars agree that an impairment of concert diplomacy related to the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. But it is not only unclear what the role of the United Kingdom was but also what exactly the connection between the demise of concert diplomacy and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society meant. It is also unclear how "regression" might be understood. Did

the post-1815 inter-state society perish from the 1820s onwards? Did it never really disappear but continue in an attenuated version until the First World War or even until today?

3.4.2 ANOMIE THEORY, THE DEMISE OF CONCERT DIPLOMACY AND THE POST-1815 SOCIETY OF STATES

Anomie theory, embedded in Durkheimian sociology, can resolve such issues. It is a perfect analytical framework for explaining satisfactorily why the post-1815 inter-state society began to unravel in the 1820s, that is to say where the connection between concert diplomacy and regression of the post-1815 society of states was, what role the United Kingdom played and what regression refers to. Anomie theory embedded in Durkheimian sociology explains what it actually means to argue that a regression of the post-1815 inter-state society was connected with the impairment of concert diplomacy. Concert diplomacy and the post-1815 inter-state society had considerable overlap, but they were not the same. As mentioned previously, concert diplomacy was the moral conscience of the post-1815 inter-state society. Its rules constituted the moral of a group of states. If such a group of states respects such moral in their inter-state conduct, a particular inter-state society emerged, in this case the post-1815 inter-state society.

An analogy for illustrative purposes might be drawn to the idea by Reus-Smit (1999) that inter-state societies of a particular period of time, like the inter-state society of ancient Greek city-states, were characterised by meta-values. The meta-values of the society of states in ancient Greece represented a holistic social ontology which championed a particular kind of collective life (*bios politikos*). In contrast, the meta-values of modern inter-state society represent a highly individualistic life (Reus-Smit 1999: 122-3).⁹³ In fact, Reus-Smit applies this argument also to the post-1815 inter-state society arguing that the meta-values that shaped the social ontology of the

⁹³ Different meta-values at different periods in time engender different inter-state societies. Hence, there is an aspect of “emergence and regression” in Reus-Smit’s arguments, too, although he does not engage with aspects of regression of an inter-state society, bestowing importance on emergence instead.

modern inter-state society shaped fundamental institutions like regular and permanent conferences of states in the early nineteenth century (ibid.: 134).⁹⁴

The similarity between Reus-Smit's ideas and anomie theory in context of Durkheimian sociology is striking. If we replace "moral conscience" with "meta-values" in the equation we will reach similar outcomes. This also applies to the interchangeability of "fundamental institutions" and "rules and regulations". In the argument of Reus-Smit fundamental institutions confront states with meta-values; fundamental institutions represent meta-values. In anomie theory and Durkheimian sociology rules and regulations confront states with a moral conscience.

In line of this thinking, rules of concert diplomacy made the post-1815 inter-state society ontologically real for states. Rules represented a moral of a mutual understanding among states, a moral states were confronted with in their day-to-day dealings. Acting according to these rules was the only *acceptable* modus operandi in interstate conduct and illustrated on a continuous basis to states that they are a like-minded group. Interestingly, this latter aspect comes to the fore in some of IR's descriptions of inter-state relations from 1815 onwards. Schroeder (1992: 699), for example, writes that under the Vienna system there was a form of deterrence, but not military deterrence but deterrence in form of moral and legal political pressure. Europe was understood by its great powers not merely in balance of power terms anymore, but in legal, moral and socio-political terms (ibid.: 697). He explains that

"the stable, peaceful political equilibrium Europe enjoyed from 1815 to 1848 rose not from a balance of power but from a mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law, and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power" (694).

⁹⁴ Reus-Smit does not recognise the post-1815 inter-state society as a particular society of states. Instead, he writes about the modern inter-state society that emerged in the nineteenth century and continues to exist (chapter 6).

Ikenberry (2001), too, ascribes importance to rules-based *groupthink* vested in morality. He explains that there were restraint mechanism at play after 1815. One of these was “a diffuse promulgation of norms and rules of European law” (98) intended to give great-power relations a sense of legal-based legitimacy and authority. Unfortunately, however, Ikenberry separates the different restraint mechanisms from each other, whereas anomie theory shows that this diffuse promulgation of norms and rules of European law was in fact established and lived by concert diplomacy. Ikenberry himself is not that far-off this understanding when he writes that “concert diplomacy acted as a mechanism to moderate and restrain the exercise of power by the major states primarily through the promulgation of norms of restraint and peer pressure” (106).

If, however, the shared moral, the moral conscience of a group of states, becomes impaired or even demolished, the bonds between states disappear, they will no longer be subject to the constant reminder that they are a like-minded group. As a result, anomie creeps in: social cohesion diminishes and social standards governing behaviour disappear. From then on *anything goes* in terms of inter-state conduct. Co-operative and concerted inter-state relations give way to a Hobbesian world of every man against every man. In fact, Merton (1964) himself once offered an insight into anomie in inter-state relations depicting anomie as a situation in which “treaties become scraps of paper” (ibid.: 681), undeclared warfare serves as a technical evasion, the bombing of civilians is rationalised, international law abrogated.

However, this explanation raises further questions. If a demise of concert diplomacy brought forth the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society, what then could cause the demise of concert diplomacy itself? The answer in context of anomie theory is that the violation of rules which represent the moral conscience of concert diplomacy caused the demise of concert diplomacy. This is grounded in anomie theory developed in chapter 2 where for instance Merton (1964) explained that an irrelevance of rules signifies little social cohesion and social order. What this means is that

if the rules of concert diplomacy no longer savoured respect among states, the moral of rightful and legitimate conduct they embody vanished, and so did the feeling among states of belonging to a like-minded group of actors. This latter line of arguing is engrained in Emile Durkheim's sociology. He explained that rules which are respected constitute observable relationships which make members of a group confront objectively a society (cf. chapter 2, *The Theory of Anomie and IR*). But why did states violate rules of concert diplomacy?

Discussing an answer to this question it is perhaps equally important to wonder otherwise. Why do states usually comply with rules? According to anomie theory, members of an inter-state society usually do comply with such rules because compliance facilitates the achievement of shared goals - goals members see synonymous with their own interests. I explained in the previous chapter that Merton (1938) showed that such goals are culturally or socially defined. This means that they are not merely imposed upon a state but developed and agreed upon. In Merton's conceptualisation of anomie theory the prime example is pecuniary success in society. However, regarding the post-1815 inter-state society such shared goals were for instance permanent peace (cf. Preamble of the Treaty of Paris 1814), the maintenance of peace (cf. Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle 15 Nov. 1818) and the just repartition of force between states (ibid.). This is to say that all states who were signatories to these pivotal legal documents like the First Treaty of Paris 1814, the Final Act of 1815 and the Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle 1818, reconciled their individual state interests with those of the other signatories of these treaties and declarations towards the achievement of (lasting) peace in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. The United Kingdom did so, too.

In contradistinction to this, and according to anomie theory, rules are violated if a state considers the adherence of rules governing behaviour futile for the achievement of such overarching goals (like lasting peace). In such a case a state attempts the achievement of a goal by its own means and thereby violates the rules of concert diplomacy. In other words, a state violates rules if a

discrepancy develops between society's promises to achieve a shared goal through behaviour jointly agreed upon as acceptable. As a result, a means-ends breakdown (Hilbert 1989) occurs where a state finds it futile (or impossible) to achieve a promised goal by legitimate means. Such an alienated state displays non-conformist or deviant behaviour, behaviour that is not accepted and rejected by the rest of the inter-state society. There is an interesting example of such a deviant actor in the post-1815 inter-state society: the United Kingdom.

3.4.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE DEMISE OF CONCERT DIPLOMACY

As depicted above, IR literature has been almost unanimous in ascribing to the United Kingdom a dubious role when discussing the regression of concert diplomacy and its effects on the post-1815 inter-state society. In fact, there is substance to the fact that the United Kingdom has caught the attention of IR literature investigating the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. The interesting case with the United Kingdom is that she was at the forefront of constructing a novel inter-state environment after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. As early as 1804 the Tsar sent Count Novosiltzov to London suggesting ideas to Prime Minister William Pitt about an inter-state society in Europe where individual state-grievances had to be mediated by third parties (Delfiner 2004: 134). Prime Minister Pitt was impressed and expressed complete British agreement (*ibid.*: 135; Zamoyski 2007: 17; cf. Simms 2014: 162). In fact, the Tsar's ideas were taken up with such delight that they resulted in a commitment to a federal states system in the first and secret article of the Treaty of 11 April 1805 between Russia and Britain (Knapton 1941: 136; Nicolson 1946: 54; Schroeder 1994: 263; Delfiner 2004: 136; Boyd 2008: 235). Furthermore, ten years later, Ikenberry (2001: 81) argues it was the United Kingdom who was responsible for the fact that inter-state relations became enshrined within institutional structures of concert diplomacy.

If the United Kingdom was at the frontline of constructing concert diplomacy why then has it become so noticeable to many scholars that the United Kingdom must have played a critical role in the demise of concert diplomacy? For some scholars the answer seems simple: the United Kingdom intentionally obstructed the Congress of Verona and concert diplomacy afterwards (Bridge and Bullen 2005: 62-4). At Verona a definitive rift occurred between Great Britain and the other members of the post-1815 inter-state society (Schroeder 1962: 223). Hence, concert diplomacy did not survive the Congress of Verona (Zamoyski 2007: 555).

However, it was not that simple and Britain's harmful role within concert diplomacy cannot be reduced to Verona in 1822. The first rifts between Great Britain and the continental powers developed much earlier, perhaps during the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 when misunderstandings over a closer union came to light (Phillips 2012 [1923]: 28-32). Two years later at the congress at Troppau and Laibach in 1820/21 Britain's participation was restricted to sending an observer only (Nichols 1972), although a formal rupture at this time was postponed (Rosecrance 1963: 66). Furthermore, and I have highlighted this already, IR literature gives explanation for why this estrangement between the United Kingdom and concert diplomacy took place.

I think there is reason to believe that the United Kingdom's alienation with concert diplomacy reached a climax during the second Russo-Greek crisis in 1825. It was at that time when deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom substantially impaired concert diplomacy and the post-1815 inter-state society. This, too, comes to the fore in IR literature. Cowles (1990) explains that British foreign policy around 1825 was motivated by the "concern for the balance of power, and hatred of the Metternichian system" (ibid.: 696). Temperley (2012 [1923]) highlights that "Canning favoured individual rather than collective pressure on the Porte" (86) and he refused to have Great Britain participate in a congress (ibid.: 88). Kagan (1997) explains that "Britain, for its part, deliberately torpedoed the talks by refusing to attend them on various pretexts. British foreign

secretary Canning opined that the best thing for Britain would be for the St. Petersburg talks to ‘go on and end in nothing’” (ibid.: 28-9).

What had happened? By 1825 the United Kingdom had lost her trust in concert diplomacy. Following concert diplomacy no longer presented the prospects of peace. In the language of anomie theory the United Kingdom experienced a means-ends breakdown: legitimate means (concert diplomacy) did no longer guarantee the achievement of shared goals (peace, maintenance of peace). Hilbert (1989) described this as an incompatibility between social regulation and cultural expectations of this particular society. The result is deviant behaviour, defined as behaviour in contradistinction to accepted norms, behaviour markedly different from what is considered normal. Conducting foreign relations for the concern of the balance of power, intentionally not participating in multilateral talks, concluding bilateral agreements without consultation of other powers: such behaviour includes some of the more obvious acts of British inter-state relations in 1825.

So far, anomie theory explains what the problem between the United Kingdom and concert diplomacy was, why serious differences with the United Kingdom developed or why she became portentously critical towards concert diplomacy. What is still missing, however, is an explanation to why an impairment of concert diplomacy in the mid-1820s commenced the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society.

According to anomie theory developed in the previous chapter, deviant actors constitute a great peril to an inter-state society because they impair society’s moral conscience, the very essence which reifies an inter-state society as ontologically existent for its members. It seems negligible if one state out of many turns out a deviant actor, but nonetheless a tipping point can soon be reached. As soon as the genie is out of the bottle, violating rules and regulations suddenly seems no longer

as much of a turpitude as it used to be, especially if a deviant actor seems to fare well with its acts of deviance. As a result, other states soon stretch and violate the rules of the moral conscience.

Regarding the post-1815 inter-state society, the very rules through which states recognised the existences of this particular inter-stat society became obsolete and meaningless. States no longer coordinated their policies, no longer refrained from unilateral action and no longer participated in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. Gone was a true sense of solidarity and responsibility (Elrod 1976). The *pactum de contrahendo*, pact of restraint, among states had dwindled away (Ikenberry 2001). States had become more self-centred again, pursuing their own interests rigorously (Evans 2017). This is to say that they avoided congresses after 1822 and instead only convened within the format of conferences (Hinsley 1962).⁹⁵ Rivalries gave birth to mutual, bilateral alliances (ibid.). States were no longer embedded in political unity, and according to the Bavarian minister in Vienna, states no longer subordinated their policy aims to the general interest of Europe (Bridge and Bullen 2005: 129).

As a result, in the 1820s a new inter-state environment descended over Europe. The moral conscience of concert diplomacy had disappeared, meaning that a certain standard of behaviour among states abated. This happened, of course, not suddenly or instantaneously but unfolded over decades ensuing the 1820s. What filled the void was a lack of social and moral standards, lawlessness, disoriented and rootless individual states in an environment lacking fixed moral boundaries, an environment without social standards, an irrelevance of rules and little social cohesion – to offer only some descriptions of *anomie*.

⁹⁵ Hinsley (1962) explains that a congress was a meeting “attended by the heads of governments or their Foreign Ministers” (213) whereas a conference “was confined (except for the Foreign Minister of the state on whose territory the meeting took place) to the ambassadors accredited to the state where it was held” (213-4).

3.5 Conclusion

In the previous chapter I engaged theoretically with three questions I consider pivotal for IR's understanding of the emergence and the regression of an inter-state society: Why is it important that rules are respected in an inter-state society? Why do some states violate rules and regulations? What happens if members violate rules? In this chapter I became more specific, discussing these questions in context of English School theory and the post-1815 inter-state society. I criticised ES for offering an insufficient conceptualisation of international society. ES rightly argues that rules governing behaviour of states matter (e.g. rules pertaining to diplomacy or the convention of congresses), but ES ignored why it is important that such rules have to be respected. Anomie theory shows that only the respect of rules in inter-state behaviour gives rise to an inter-state society. At the same time, anomie theory also shows that the violation of rules and concomitant deviant behaviour can impair an inter-state society to such a degree that it gradually regressions.

In this chapter I discussed these conceptual and theoretical arguments in context of inter-state relations of the early nineteenth century. This discussion alongside post-Napoleonic European affairs served as an introduction and build-up for the reader for ensuing chapters. It mapped out my theoretical argument vis-à-vis the empirical case study in this dissertation. In the following two chapters I engage empirically with the arguments and depictions I have offered in this chapter. In chapter 4 I will investigate in detail what concert diplomacy actually meant and if lasting peace was actually an overarching goal for the major states in post-Napoleonic Europe. The former issue constitutes an essential addendum to this chapter because in this chapter I have repeatedly written about the importance of rules and respect for rules in context of concert diplomacy, but I have yet to explain to the reader what rules actually governed inter-state behaviour in context of concert diplomacy. I catch up with this issue in the following chapter where I conduct an empirical investigation alongside primary sources.

4: Anomie theory, the rules of working in concert and the emergence of the post-1815 society of states

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is about the emergence of the post-1815 inter-state society according to Durkheimian anomie theory. It addresses the question of why it is important that rules and regulations are respected in an inter-state society within the specific context of the post-1815 society of states. I have already developed a theoretical answer in the previous chapter. The answer was that it is important that states respect rules and regulations because such rules and regulations sustain a moral conscience which reifies, i.e. represents tangibly, to states that they belong to a like-minded group. Rules and regulations are about the conduct between members of a society. They are practical imperatives (Durkheim 2006b: 79) coordinating as rationally as possible the ideas and sentiments of the moral conscience of a particular period (Durkheim 2006a: 72-3; Dohrenwend 1959: 471). In other words, they are observable relationships that constitute an “unending number of phenomena in terms of which it [morality] is shaped, and which, in turn, it regulates” (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 95).

In this chapter I work with primary sources, especially inter-state treaties and documents relating to congresses and conferences between 1815 and 1818. An investigation of these sources reveals that the rules of working in concert indeed constituted practical imperatives which coordinated rationally the ideas and sentiments of states in the post-1815 era. As a result, a moral conscience among states of this post-1815 period developed which reified a moral to states that they perceived as ontologically real. In other words, states perceived themselves obligated and acted according to one particular kind of conduct considered appropriate and right.

To begin with: What role played an unevenness in power-relations between states?⁹⁶ In a research project closely associated with Waltzian realism and a case study of the halcyon days of power and glory it might be consider necessary to pay attention to a patent discrepancy in power between the states of Europe, at least between those states attending the pivotal Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815.⁹⁷ Yet, more than that, it is particularly salient that hierarchical discrepancies in power-relations arguably played not as much of a dispositive role as cursory impressions of halcyon days of power and glory might suggest. In other words, front-rank powers displayed remarkable restraint in their dealings with lower-rank powers (of course relatively speaking compared to previous as well as ensuing times). Concert diplomacy and the moral restraint it exuded played an important role in this regard. Therefore, I will begin with a brief look at the inter-state structure and its uneven distribution of power and status. This is no detailed study of power politics and first or second-class powers. Such a detailed analysis would go beyond the thesis of this dissertation. I nonetheless show that great powers like Russian, Prussia, Great Britain and Austria did not or could not do as they pleased. In fact, they displayed a sometimes obvious self-restraint.

The rules of working in concert which developed in this post-1815 inter-state society played a significant role in this much acclaimed self-restraint of powers.⁹⁸ Consequently, in the second part of this chapter I show that the rules of working in concert were enshrined in the most important treaties and agreements between 1814 and 1818. They were also engrained into the Congress of Vienna itself through the Congress' particular structure of working in committees. Still a sublime

⁹⁶ I am grateful to my supervisor for bringing up this point.

⁹⁷ It is not an exaggeration to say that as good as all of Europe attended the Congress of Vienna. Europa was represented at Vienna with 300 delegations of which about 100 delegations came from independent political entities (sovereign states or politically independent regions). In addition to this, 33 German states and free cities as well as 12 sovereign states outside Germany and about 50 mediatised princes (*Standesherren*) attended. Given the fact that some delegations consisted of over 50 delegates (e.g. Russian delegation), it is not surprising that about 500 accredited diplomats (excluding their secretaries) attended the Congress of Vienna (Lentz 2014: 68-70).

⁹⁸ The three rules are: (1) inter-state communication for the coordination of policies, (2) refrainment from unilateral action and (3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. Cf. chapter 3, *Durkheimian sociology and the post-1815 inter-state society* for the definition of concert diplomacy and the three rules that are derived from it.

novelty at that time. Furthermore, I investigate some examples of where these rules were actually successfully practiced in real-life inter-state relations: they were practiced successfully concerning the issue of freedom of navigation on in-land waterways (rivers and canals) and regarding the abrogation of the slave trade.

Third, I show what effect the rules of working in concert had on the states in post-1815 Europe: they regulated and defined acceptable inter-state behaviour for the goal of maintaining peace. In accordance with anomie theory and Durkheimian sociology I argue that this nexus between the goal of maintaining peace through working in concert as the acceptable behaviour actually constituted a society of states. I also offer the reader a counter-example through a brief excursion concerning the Utrecht settlement from the early eighteenth century. Utrecht may constitute an appropriate example because its historic context as well as its purpose show curious similarities with the post-Napoleonic period. Utrecht, like the Vienna settlement, was intended to bring tranquillity to Europe and, similarly to post-Napoleonic intentions by the victorious powers, the Utrecht settlement was designed to contain France.

4.2 Peace through powers great and small

The post-1815 inter-state society takes a special place in the history of European international relations. It was characterised by remarkably constructive inter-state relations and peace and stability for many years. This is to say that Warfare had been a way of life in Europe until the end of the Napoleonic Wars (Evans 2017: 26): numerous, devastating wars, including the War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714, the War of the Austrian Succession 1740-1748 and the Seven Years War 1756-1763 had ravaged Europe remorselessly. After one final devastating episode,

however, lasting peace pacified Europe. In fact, the following chart from *Our World in Data* visualises the impressive drop of the numbers of great power wars after 1815:⁹⁹




Figure 2 Great power wars after 1815.

Evans (2017) continues to explain that after 1815 there was the Crimean War 1854-1856, the Wars of Italian Unification, the Wars of German Unification in 1864 and 1866 and “there were brief conflicts between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1828-9 and 1877-8” (27). Yes, wars still occurred after the remarkably peaceful period between 1815 and 1854, but “altogether, the death rate of men in battle between 1815 and 1914 was seven times less than that of the previous century” (27).

⁹⁹ *World in Our Data* is a research project by young academics affiliated with Oxford University. They rely on the work of other scholars and offer their charts for free use. The sources of the statistics are indicated at the bottom of the chart. Available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace>, accessed on 21/06/2022.

In an essay Schroeder (1986) highlighted that “most scholars would agree that Europe was more stable from 1815 to 1854 than during any equivalent era in the entire 18th century, and that, taken as a whole, the 19th century was more peaceful than the 18th” (1).

A similar conclusion is reached by Kennedy (1987). Kennedy explains that there was a “spectacular growth of an integrated global economy” (143) and that

“[t]he erosion of tariff barriers and other mercantilist devices, together with the widespread propagation of ideas about free trade and international harmony, suggested that a new international order had arisen, quite different from the eighteenth-century world of repeated Great Power conflict” (143).

Kennedy also mentions the peacefulness of post-1815 international relations which, however, he emphasises, does not mean that there were no conflicts at all. Some powers waged war against lesser powers overseas and there were also some conflicts in Europe. But: “open struggles such as the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 or the wars of German unification in the 1860s were limited both in duration and area, and even the Crimean War could hardly be called a major conflict” (144).

However, the major issue Kennedy (1987) focuses on is the development of industrialisation in the early to mid-nineteenth century as well as a concomitant rise in population numbers: “Europe’s numbers [of people] rose from 140 million in 1750 to 187 million in 1800 to 266 million in 1850; Asia’s exploded from over 400 million in 1750 to around 700 million a century later” (146). And peace played an important role in those developments, particularly for the furnace of industrialisation, the United Kingdom. British wealth was based on a laissez-faire economy with as little government expenditures as possible. Defence spending was therefore kept to a minimum in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Therefore, there is hardly any doubt that the period between 1815 and 1854 was, according to inter-state standards of early nineteenth century and compared

with previous centuries, remarkably peaceful and that the peace during these 39 years gleamed far into the second half of the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, until the second half of the eighteenth-century states embodied dynastic aspirations that compelled them to keep abreast with each other, leading to the subjugation of smaller entities by alliances among stronger powers. Examples in case are the Franco-Austrian domination of Germany, the Franco-Swedish-Polish-Turkish barrier against Russia and Austria, the Franco-Spanish alliance against the United Kingdom and its British-Dutch counterpart (Zamoyski 2018: 364). Among the coalition states, this competition between hostile alliances gave way to solidary cooperation towards the end of the Napoleonic wars, and reached its pinnacle around 1815 to 1818. Besides the peacefulness of the post-1815 era, this solidary cooperation, too, had been a remarkable achievement of mankind in the history of its inter-state relations.

According to some historians, the great powers' solidary cooperation after 1815, which manifested itself as the concert of Europe, played a particularly important role in maintaining peace (cf. Claude 1959: 23-5; Elrod 1976: 163; Evans 2017: 27). Above all, historians associate the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society with the break-up of the concert of Europe (cf. e.g. Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Kissinger 1994), particularly with the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the concert of Europe (e.g. Webster 1918; Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Lentz 2014). Whereas I will go into more detail on these issues in the next chapter, I consider it first and foremost relevant to discuss the relationship between major and minor powers, between powers great and small.

Who were the great powers? And did only the great powers decide form and shape of the fledgeling European society of states? Which states counted as great powers? Above all, what is a great power?

Great powers, it seems, have great capabilities. Relatively speaking they perform exceptionally well compared to most other states in a number of important fields, like size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability and, of course, military capabilities (Waltz 1993: 50).¹⁰⁰ However, great power status does not merely have to be down to the outcome of simply adding up performances in such fields. In the early nineteenth century, at least, it was more complex. Prestige and regal ancestry played a role. Historic habitude in diplomatic relations mattered as well as ancient claims on territory, titles and prerogatives. Those intangible factors intertwined with material realities.

In concrete terms this can mean that Prussia, for example, in the early nineteenth century was only a great power on paper (Zamoyski 2007: 241). France was the defeated aggressor, an occupied perturbator and ex-usurper who may still held great power capabilities but who was nonetheless shunned as such officially until the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 (cf. Duchhardt 2018). Perhaps Great Britain and Russia were the only real great powers because even an alliance by all other *greater* powers was unlikely to defeat them (Schroeder 1992: 688). Unlike any other power they could dominate realms far beyond Europe, too. Portugal and Sweden were only admitted to great power status in diplomatic negotiations at Vienna in 1815 after Talleyrand skilfully thwarted the victorious powers' attempts to exclude all other states (Lentz 2014: 123). In fact, it was almost exclusively due to the intervention of Talleyrand and his ardent quest for great power recognition of France that states that may not have counted as a great power in materialistic terms did indeed play a great power role in the post-1815 era. This does not only relate to Portugal and Sweden but Spain as well. After much to and fro these three states as well as France joint the exclusive “club of four” at the Congress of Vienna to participate in significant diplomatic negotiations (Webster 1918: 68).

¹⁰⁰ An almost purely materialistic conception of great powers in the early nineteenth century is provided by Paul Kennedy (1987) in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*; cf. chapter 4.

What this reveals is a set-up of great powers at the helm of European inter-state affairs that also consisted of states which were not all that great in one or any other respect. In fact, despite his recognition of undeniable political inequalities Peterson (1945) recognises that eight great powers (instead of four) directed the Congress of Vienna due to “the logic of events” (541) and not due to deliberate planning. Above all, representatives of about 200 states, cities, associations and individuals converged at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, including the monarchs of Bavaria, Denmark and Württemberg (Osiander 1994: 168).

However, the picture was a slightly different one after 1815. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 minor states played no role at all. At Aix-la-Chapelle the designation of “great power” became much more restricted and pertained only to Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, Austria and France once again. This set-up of great powers survived throughout the early 1820s. But does this mean that only these great powers decided form and shape of the fledgling European society of states? Not necessarily. Great Britain, a great power par excellence, passionately tried to abolish the slave trade but depended in this matter on compliance by minor states like the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Brandenburg and, of course, Spain and Portugal (Klose 2019: 85). In some cases, the United Kingdom did not or could not command these minor powers to comply unless financial compensations were paid (cf. Zamoyski 2007: 413; Klose 2019). At the same time, in 1814/1815 Prussia and Austria had difficulties deciding the political form and shape of Germany without consent of at least Württemberg and Bavaria (Zamoyski 2007: 433-35).

Is there anything in Durkheimian sociology regarding the dynamics between minor and major states in an inter-state society? Durkheim’s own ideas on international issues are difficult to comprehend, probably because he never really explicitly engaged with the study of inter-state

relations.¹⁰¹ There is one slight exception, though. Durkheim did write about the First World War albeit purely focused on Germany as the aggressor. The reason for this could be of personal and private nature. He lost his son André in the First World War in November 1914, an experience that tormented him mercilessly (Lukes 1973: 555-56). Maybe because of this experience he tried to develop an explanation for the outbreak of the First World War. At first glance this explanation does not offer us a meaningful Durkheimian understanding of an inter-state society, mainly because he blames a German pathological quest for power, located in the soul of the Germans, for Germany's aggressive actions against states like Belgium (Ramel 2004).¹⁰² However, he also seems to agree with Heinrich von Treitschke, a German historian whose *Politik* lecture Durkheim visited, that there seems to be a natural right of stronger powers to wage war against weaker ones (ibid.). This view holds that international agreements and the integrity of smaller or weaker states do *naturally* not have to matter for an apex power like Germany in the early nineteenth century.

This is a very realistic understanding of inter-state dynamics. In fact, it seems closely associated with Waltzian structural realism. According to Waltz (1979), “[t]he theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era” (72). Great powers “set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves” (72). Much of the content of Waltzian structural realism may be too abstract and conceptual for real-life inter-state politics. However, this foregone quote on great powers setting the scene of action seems not only in accordance with Durkheim's (and Treitschke's) own thoughts on inter-state dynamics but it is also, at least to some degree, applicable to our historic period of the early nineteenth century (cf. e.g. Zamoyski 2007: 168). This is to say that the great powers of Russia, Great Britain, Prussia and Austria set the

¹⁰¹ Durkheim also hardly sowed an interest in politics, with some exceptions (cf. Fournier 2005: 48 – 51). Yet, according to Badie (2009) Durkheimian sociology has been considerably neglected in IR, mainly because it can offer students of IR great insight into a novel understanding of diplomacy. Also, Eulriet (2010) investigated the nexus between Durkheim and the study of war.

¹⁰² It has to be emphasised, however, that Durkheim adopted this idea from the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke whose lectures Durkheim visited in Berlin (Lukes 1973; Ramel 2004). Furthermore, Durkheim himself wrote a pamphlet on a morbid hypertrophy of a German will (*L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout*) (cf. Lukes 1973: 551; Meszaros 2017: 306).

agenda and prescribed broad political themes in inter-state affairs. But at the same time, they at least occasionally depended on the consent and goodwill of minor powers. *Working in concert* as the modus operandi in post-1815 inter-state relations epitomised these great and non-great power dynamics at this time.

4.3 The rules of working in concert in post-1815 inter-state relations

According to Meerts (2019: 108), concert diplomacy is defined as harmonised diplomatic negotiations in which stakeholders and shareholders with an interest are usually included. Three types of concert diplomacy can be distinguished: First, regime concert diplomacy within an institutional framework like the EU, the UN or the African Union. Second, conflict concert diplomacy outside any institutional frameworks, which often takes place in times of crises when diplomatic negotiations are a substitute for war. Third, hybrid concert diplomacy, considered a via media between type one and two, relying on structures within inter-state organisations but also ad hoc backchannel processes outside formal structures.

For the purpose of this dissertation and in connection with the society of states in early nineteenth century Europe I define concert diplomacy as multilateral inter-state negotiations for achieving agreement over political issues through the mutual communication of opinions and views.¹⁰³ Intrinsic to concert diplomacy are the following three rules and regulations: (1) inter-state communication for the coordination of policies, (2) refrainment from unilateral action and (3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. These three rules of concert diplomacy characterised the post-1815 inter-state society.

¹⁰³ Cf. the definition of concert available at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concert>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

According to Zamoyski (2007), “the reconstruction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna is probably the most seminal episode in modern history” (xiii). The prelude to this reconstruction, however, consisted of vicious fighting between the coalition forces and Napoleon Bonaparte, beginning in January 1813, at the latest, when Prussia’s indecisive and wavering King Frederick William, the “melancholiac on the throne” (Duchhardt 2018), was finally persuaded to join Russia in the fight against Napoleon.¹⁰⁴ The United Kingdom and Austria soon followed. The United Kingdom promised at the Treaty of Reichenbach in June 1813 to increase its financial support of the Russo-Prussian war efforts (Simms 2014: 173) and concluded an alliance with Austria on 9 October 1813, negotiated by Lord Aberdeen in Vienna (Schroeder 1994). About one week later Napoleon was defeated at the *Battle of the Nations* at Leipzig and retreated across the Rhine at Mainz on 30 October 1813 (Zamoyski 2018). It was during this time that the idea for a post-war congress in Vienna was first put forward by the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia (Lentz 2014: 24).

However, in late 1813 a final victory over Napoleon was far from guaranteed, Europe’s future was still entirely ambiguous. Napoleon and the *Grand Armée* seemed merely temporarily contained and respect on the allies’ side was so high that the idea of fighting Napoleon on his home turf was far from certain. After much to and fro, however, the allies took heart and announced their invasion of France on 1 December 1813, stressing that this invasion was aimed at defeating Napoleon and the *Grand Armée* but not France at large (Zamoyski 2007).

The allies were correct in exercising prudence, their hesitancy was not unfounded. Napoleon delivered crushing defeats to the coalition forces in February 1814, especially against the Russian

¹⁰⁴ Nicolson (1946) and Zamoyski (2007: 28-31) explain in detail how Prussia turned against France. Also, Zamoyski (2018: 487-89, 556) describes the first unsuccessful revolt of Prussia against France in 1806 and why it was so difficult for Prussia to defy Napoleon Bonaparte a second time. See Nicolson (1946: 20-1) and Zamoyski (2007) on how the second revolt finally unfolded due to the alleged mutiny of General Yorck. Also, see Grab (2003: 200-3) for a concise description of the downfall of the Napoleonic empire.

advanced guard at Champaubert, Russian and Prussian forces at Montmirail, the Prussian army of General Blücher at Vauchamps as well as coalition forces at the Battle of Montereau. Napoleon's spirits were high and at the latter battle he sat on a firing cannon ecstatically shouting at his enemies: "They thought the lion was dead and it was safe to piss on him" (Zamoyski 2007: 156; 2018: 695).

4.3.1 TREATY OF CHAUMONT

Perhaps out of pure desperation in the light of such fierce resistance, at Chaumont on 9 March 1814 the coalition states finally agreed on joint war aims and to continue the war. However, beyond binding together the allies, this treaty was of utmost significance for Europe far beyond the fight against Napoleon and is widely considered as the foundation of peace that followed after 1815 (cf. Nicolson 1946: 242; Schroeder 1994: 501; Ikenberry 2001: 84; Zamoyski 2007: 167-8).

What is unique about the Treaty of Chaumont is the fact that great powers of Europe committed to shared rules and regulations, not necessarily in their fight against Napoleon but regarding the inter-state relations beyond Napoleon's defeat and for the good of peace in Europe. In the Treaty of Chaumont the High Contracting Parties (the allies) pledged in Article I to employ their power and strength in perfect concert "to obtain for themselves and for Europe a General Peace, under the protection of which the rights and liberties of all Nations may be established and secured" (Foreign Office 1841: 123).¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the High Contracting Parties promise to stay united for 20 years to ensure a maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe, the repose and independence of its states and to prevent France from engaging in another invasion of Europe (Art. XVI).

¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the United Kingdom promised to pay additional subsidies (Art. III). Also, a system of collective defence (Art. VI) as well as joint force of defence (Art. VII, VIII, X-XIII) were agreed upon (cf. Foreign Office 1841: 122-28). However, for a different interpretation of the Treaty of Chaumont, an interpretation that argues that the Treaty was merely intended to re-establish a just equilibrium of power (with Castlereagh as its architect) see Seton-Watson (1945: 44).

At Chaumont, while Napoleon was still an enemy to be taken seriously, five great powers of Europe shared an aim beyond defeating Napoleon: they wanted to bring peace to Europe. Additionally, they decided to accomplish this goal by committing to (some) rules of working in concert to employ power and strength and to protect the rights and liberties of all nations. What does it mean to argue that states at the Treaty of Chaumont already decided to commit to the rule of working in concert? It means that states realised that the overarching aim of peace in Europe could only be achieved through (1) inter-state communication for the coordination of policies. This communication is logically implied in the states' declaration to employ power and strength in perfect concert and to stay united for 20 years because without inter-state communication the employment of power and strength as well as unity for 20 years are arguably impossible to obtain. It furthermore means that states (2) refrained from unilateral action. Again, employing power and strength in perfect concert and staying united for 20 years can logically not be realised if unilateral actions prevail. Therefore, states at the Treaty of Chaumont decided to commit to two of the three rules of working in concert in order to bring peace to Europe.

I have previously in chapter 3, section "Durkheimian sociology and the post-1815 inter-state society" grounded my definition of concert diplomacy in these two rules as well as a third one. The third rule (constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings) had not yet been agreed upon at the Treaty of Chaumont, but at a later instance in Paris right after the defeat of Napoleon in March 1814. However, before I come to this Treaty of Paris I should, for the sake of completeness, highlight one additional aspect concerning the commitment to shared rules for the accomplishment of common goals.

This line of thinking, i.e. great powers committing themselves to shared rules for the accomplishment of common goals, was not entirely new to Europe at this period in history. Chaumont, one might argue, was actually a continuation of ideas from ten years before. In 1804

already, the Tsar sent Count Novosiltzov with ideas about perpetual peace, principles like the rights of nations as well as a new code of the law of nations to Prime Minister William Pitt (Nicolson 1946: 54; Zamoyski 2007: 17). The respect of international law, clear principles of conduct as well as the rights and liberties of nations featured prominently in the Tsars imaginations (Delfiner 2004: 134; Simms 2014: 162). Prime Minister Pitt responded favourably in his memorandum on the deliverance and security of Europe (Delfiner 2004: 135; Zamoyski 2007: 17). This Russo-British agreement thus led to a joint treaty on 11 April 1805 where both parties agreed to respecting the liberties of smaller states and following basic rules of international law after the defeat of Napoleon (Schulz 2009: 46).¹⁰⁶ This was a moral commitment on behalf of Russia and the United Kingdom, surely not without propagandistic purpose but at the same time one step towards a new inter-state order grounded in public rules and regulations (ibid.).

However, the Treaty of Chaumont went beyond this bilateral treaty. It was a commitment on behalf of four great powers of Europe that dominated and determined the circumstances of Europe (and the world beyond) like no other group of states.¹⁰⁷ With the Treaty of Chaumont they laid the ground for the Quadruple Alliance (Schulz 2009: 56-7). This Quadruple Alliance developed into the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815, constituting an operational base for inter-state cooperation after 1815 (ibid.: 61). Therefore, the agreement to work towards a shared goal (bringing peace to Europe) by committing to a basic rule (working in concert to employ power and strength and to protect the rights and liberties of all nations) in this Treaty of Chaumont carried enormous weight for future inter-state engagements.

¹⁰⁶ According to Boyd (2008), in 1805 William Pitt had three foreign policy objectives. The third one concerned a restoration of peace and the re-establishment of public law in Europe.

¹⁰⁷ In 1815 the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria and Prussia ruled 72% of the population of Europe (Schulz 2009: 542).

4.3.2 TREATY OF PARIS

This zeal of committing to the rule of working in concert in inter-state conduct did not abate when Napoleon was defeated. Three weeks after the Treaty of Chaumont, on 30 March 1814, Tsar Alexander, King Friedrich Wilhelm III. and Prince of Schwarzenberg entered Paris victoriously. An armistice between France and the allies followed on 23 April 1814 (Zamoyski 2007: 185). On 30 May 1814 the *Definitive Treaty of Peace and Amity between his Britannic Majesty and His Most Christian Majesty* (the Treaty of Paris) was signed.¹⁰⁸ In the preamble of the Treaty of Paris (Foreign Office 1841) the shared goal of peace (“a permanent Peace”) in Europe was reaffirmed: The contracting parties stated to be “animated by an equal desire to terminate the long agitations of Europe, and the sufferings of Mankind, by a permanent Peace [...]” (ibid.: 151). This goal of peace was furthermore unambiguously agreed upon in Article I: “There shall be from this day forward perpetual Peace and Friendship between His Britannic Majesty and his Allies on the one part, and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre on the other, their Heirs and Successors, their Dominions and Subjects, respectively” (ibid.: 153).

The great powers of Europe also reaffirmed their commitment to the rule of working in concert, to which they agreed upon previously in the Treaty of Chaumont. In Article V of the Treaty of Paris they once again pledged to work in concert, agreeing to use the forthcoming Congress of Vienna “to facilitate the communication between Nations, and continually to render them less strangers to each other [...]” (ibid.: 159).¹⁰⁹ This working in concert was to be practiced at Vienna regarding the navigation of the Rhine (Article V) and the abrogation of the slave trade.¹¹⁰ Most

¹⁰⁸ For more on his treaty see Webster (1918: 42-6) and Nicolson (1946: 83ff.).

¹⁰⁹ Article V actually concerns the navigation of the Rhine. This statement of the use of the Congress of Vienna for better, friendlier communication between states is mentioned in context of the idea to extend the agreement of the freedom of navigation of the Rhine to other rivers that constitute borders between states.

¹¹⁰ Webster (1918: 41-2) argues that the slave trade was a topic at Paris in spring 1814 but quoted no evidence. The slave trade was, nevertheless, mentioned in a letter from Lord Castlereagh to Prime Minister Liverpool on May 19th, 1814. This letter shows that Castlereagh tried to put this topic on the agenda at Paris. It seems that he was not successful because he complained that the King and the French government had no interest in the topic and considered it even derogating (Webster 1921: 183).

importantly, however, the High Contracting Parties explicitly reaffirmed to hold a general congress at Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon (Kissinger 2013: 144 [1957]; Lentz 2014).¹¹¹ In Article XXXII (the penultimate article of the treaty) the great powers agreed that “[a]ll the Powers engaged on either side in the present War, shall, within the space of 2 months, send Plenipotentiaries to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating, in General Congress, the arrangements which are to complete the provisions of the present Treaty” (Foreign Office 1841: 170-1).

This Treaty of Paris was thus not merely a treaty of peace and amity; it was yet another step towards a post-Napoleonic inter-state society vested in the shared rule of working in concert in inter-state relations. It strongly reaffirmed the previous commitment to working in concert towards the shared goal of peace in Europe. This came to the fore in its promise to continue negotiations and discussions regarding some issues (like the freedom of navigation on in-land rivers, especially the Rhine, as well as the abrogation of the slave trade) within two months after the Treaty of Paris. Thus, for the first time rule #3 (constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings) became agreed upon among the great powers of Europe. However, what about rules #1-2? Perhaps naturally, rules #1-2 follow from rule #3: inter-state communication (i.e. #1) and refrainment from unilateral action (i.e. #2) are prerequisites if (#3) a constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings is agreed upon (as it was the case at the Treaty of Paris). Furthermore, rule #1 (inter-state communication) is more explicitly agreed between the states in Article 5 of the Treaty of Paris (see above).

4.3.4 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE GENERAL TREATY

In its preamble *The General Treaty Signed in Congress At Vienna on 9 June 1815* directly referred to Article XXXII (“in pursuance of the 32d Article of that Act”) of the Treaty of Paris “to complete provisions of the said Treaty” (Hansard 1816a: 72). Therefore, who possesses what territory or

¹¹¹ “reaffirmed” because the idea to hold a congress after the defeat of Napoleon was first agreed upon between Russia, Prussia and Austria in autumn 1813 (Lentz 2014: 24).

what piece of land belongs to whom is meticulously agreed upon in the General Treaty. Territorial issues clearly dominate. However, it would be misleading to believe that the signatories of the General Treaty relied on a mere territorial re-arrangement of Europe to pursue their goal of lasting peace in Europe. What good would any territorial re-arrangement be if it is not framed and secured by rules and regulations of inter-state conduct? This comes to the fore in the discussions of the territorial arrangements of Poland and Italy, where in-land rivers often constituted borders. Concerning the region of Poland, the freedom of navigation on border rivers is enshrined in Article XIV and concerning Italy it is enshrined in Article XCVI, pertaining primarily to the river Po (Hansard 1816a: 106). That the principle of the freedom of navigation is to be safeguarded by the rule of cooperation is enshrined in Article CVIII where it is written that states adjacent to the same rivers shall not prohibit each other's commerce but regulate their affairs "by common consent" (ibid.: 110).¹¹² Furthermore, this principle of the freedom of navigation "shall be settled by a general arrangement" (ibid.: 111, Article CXVI).¹¹³

However, critics may bemoan that the General Treaty of June 1815 does not convincingly resonate the rule of cooperation and working in concert, at least aside from the principle of navigation. I can appreciate this charge since it cannot be denied that the rule of working in concert comes much stronger to the fore in the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Paris. Nonetheless, I reciprocate that in the General Treaty the rule of cooperation was stated in concrete terms (it implied common consent and necessitated a general agreement) and in context of a specific principle (the freedom of navigation). In the previous treaties at Chaumont and Paris the rule of working in concert was agreed upon unequivocally but in rather broad and general terms.

¹¹² The definite agreement on the principle of freedom of navigation of rivers and canals is determined in Article CIX (Hansard 1816a: 110). More rules and regulations concerning this principle follow in Articles CX-CXV.

¹¹³ According to Article CXVII this applies especially to the rivers Rhine, Neckar, Main, Mosel, Maas and Scheldt (Hansard 1816a: 112).

Furthermore, the sheer architecture of the Congress of Vienna perfectly epitomised the post-Napoleonic inter-state rules of working in concert. Yes, the Congress of Vienna was a great jamboree. When the Tsar and Frederick William III. arrived in Vienna on 25 September 1814 they were greeted with 1,000 cannon shots. The Congress was legendary for its parties, entertainments and balls. At one event at the Austrian Riding School the court ladies dressed as the elements and during a ball thrown by the Tsar in the Razumovsky Palace a thirty-six-course dinner was served on twenty large tables (in the same night the palace burned to the ground due to a malfunction in the heating system) (Evans 2017: 20-1). For the monarchs and some of their plenipotentiaries rumbustious festivities were the norm rather than hardcore diplomacy.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, politics and diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna were organised like at arguably no other inter-state event before. At Vienna statesmen from some 200 states (Osiander 1994: 168) dealt with an enormously complex agenda of issues and future aspirations for Europe (perpetual peace). To deal with this complexity the great powers established ten committees supporting their negotiations (cf. e.g. Webster 1918, Osiander 1994, Lentz 2014, Bleyer 2014). Six committees focused on territorial issues: two on Germany, one on Switzerland, two on Italy (one on Tuscany and one on Sardinia and Genoa) and one on the Duchy of Bouillon. Three committees focused on transnational issues: one on slavery and piracy, one on the navigation of the Rhine and one on diplomatic and dynastic issues. In addition to these committees there existed an extra committee especially for statistical surveys researching population numbers, tax revenues and economic data of particular regions (cf. e.g. Zamoyski 2007, Bleyer 2014).¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ For more details on the festivities, intrigues, flirtations and seductions at the Congress of Vienna see the Timeline of Events in the appendices of this dissertation as well as Zamoyski (2007), Lentz (2014) and Evans (2017).

¹¹⁵ There was one more committee established only for the drafting of the Final Act. It was led by Gentz (a Prussian, yet Metternich's assistant and right-hand man) and convened for the first time in February 1815 (Lentz 2014). For more information on the statistical committee see Zamoyski (2007: 387).

The results accomplished by these committees were impressive.¹¹⁶ One example concerns the principle of freedom of navigation on rivers, canals and ports. With a committee on the freedom of navigation of the Rhine the great powers lived up to their promise in Article V in the Treaty of Paris where they promised to work in concert at Vienna to resolve issues pertaining to the freedom of navigation:

“The navigation of the Rhine, from the point where it becomes navigable unto the sea, and vice versa, shall be free, so that it can be interdicted to no one - and at the future Congress, attention shall be paid to the establishment of the principles according to which the Duties to be raised by the States bordering on the Rhine may be regulated, in the mode the most impartial, and most favourable to the commerce of all Nations [...]” (Foreign Office 1841: 159).

In the committee on the freedom of navigation of the Rhine the great powers adopted an idea from the executive council of the French Republic, i.e. the idea that rivers are an inalienable and common property (Lentz 2014). The rules this committee developed stipulated that all states adjacent to a river like the Rhine had to accept the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. It was furthermore forbidden to obstruct towpaths along the rivers and to violate the principle of freedom of navigation in times of war, which also implied a general prohibition of tariffs (Lentz 2014: 317 - 321; Vitányi 1975: 8). Regarding the river Rhine these rules and duties were institutionalised in an international organisation: *The Central Commission of the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)*.

The CCNR has survived until today and on its website refers to itself as the oldest international organisation in modern history.¹¹⁷ However, as if this was not enough of an achievement the

¹¹⁶ For a critical opinion on the structure and results of the Congress of Vienna see Zamoyski (2007: 558-65)

¹¹⁷ See website of the CCNR, available at: <https://www.ccr-zkr.org/11010100-en.html>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

negotiating parties also agreed to extend these principles of freedom of navigation to other rivers across Europe:

“[...] The future Congress, with a view to facilitate the communication between Nations, and continually to render them less strangers to each other, shall likewise examine and determine in what manner the above provisions can be extended to other Rivers which, in their navigable course, separate or traverse different States” (Foreign Office 1841: 159).

And there is still more to this: the achievement of the freedom of navigation of international inland waterways was extended to over 300 rivers and canals in Europe, among those the river Elbe in 1821, the river Weser in 1823, and the Danube in 1856 and 1865 (Lentz 2014: 321). It was further enshrined in international law through the *Mannheimer Akte* of 1868 and even applied to the rivers Congo and Niger in Central and Western Africa after the signing of the Congo Act in Berlin in 1885 (ibid.).¹¹⁸

Another such impressive example that epitomises the new operational structure of inter-state cooperation and working in concert concerns novel diplomatic procedures: The committee on diplomatic and dynastic issues achieved no more than a complete overhaul of many diplomatic practices of the centuries before.¹¹⁹ This development and achievement seems intertwined with an increasing juridification of inter-state relations. Buzan and Lawson (2015: 85), for example, detect a shift from natural to positive law at around this time. They see the causes for this shift in slightly different events. However, historians like Rie (1950) and Schroeder (1994) see a development towards positive international law at around 1815, too. That an overhaul of orthodox diplomatic practices contributed significantly to this development comes to the fore with Schroeder (1994).

¹¹⁸ More on the Mannheimer Akte (Mannheim Convention) can be found here: <https://www.ccr-zkr.org/11020100-en.html>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

¹¹⁹ Until 1815 Europe still followed diplomatic rules drawn up in 1504 (Lentz 2014). For some detailed achievements see e.g. Lentz (2014: 313-17) and Evans (2017: 28).

He explains that the most likely causes of war in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were dynastic quarrels. But this changed after 1815. Dynastic tensions sometimes still arose in international politics, but their ramifications were considerably weaker after 1815. This was mainly due to the fact that “[t]he state itself had now become [...] a kind of moral person [...]” (578-9), an intriguing point of view with which Zamoyski (2007) agrees, arguing that during the Congress of Vienna it became clear that “a state had come to be seen as a moral entity with a right to a life of its own” (562).

Such results of the Congress of Vienna were impressive. They were possible because the states assembled at Vienna practiced the rules they committed themselves to in the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Paris: #1 inter-state communication for the coordination of policies, #2 refrainment from unilateral action and #3 constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. It would therefore be misleading to believe that the Congress of Vienna was merely an opulent and lavish gathering for the geopolitical restoration of Europe.

4.3.5 POST-VIENNA: COMMITTEES AND AMBASSADORIAL MEETINGS

Agreeing to the rules of working in concert was theoretically laid down in the treaties mentioned above and practiced successfully during the Congress of Vienna. However, these rules were furthermore developed, refined and enshrined in post-1815 inter-state relations in the years up to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. One prominent example is the issue of the slave trade where states explicitly communicate to coordinate policies (here the abrogation of the slave trade), refrained from unilateral action (abolishing the slave trade could only be achieved if all states involved in this practice acted jointly) and participated constructively in joint congresses,

conferences and ambassadorial meetings (there was an ambassadorial committee established in London).¹²⁰

Abolishing the slave trade was high on the agenda of the United Kingdom at the Congress of Vienna.¹²¹ In December 1814 the issue was discussed formerly among the great powers assembled at Vienna (Nicolson 1946; Bleyer 2014). In January 1815 a committee on the abrogation of the slave trade convened for the first time and representatives from Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden worked in concert (Klose 2019: 152). The result was a public statement condemning the international slave trade on 8 February 1815 (Lentz 2014, Klose 2019). What is interesting to see is that in this committee states were represented which had very little stakes in the topic of abolishing the slave trade, especially Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Austria. However, this cooperation continued beyond the Congress of Vienna.

At the London Conference from August to November 1816 Britain created a special committee for the abolition of the slave trade (Nicolson 1946: 214). This committee convened for the first time on 28 August 1816 and was a direct result of the inter-state mechanism of cooperation practiced previously at the Congress of Vienna (Lentz 2014: 330, Klose 2019: 165). The powers discussed ideas like a multinational naval force and a league for the fight against piracy and slavery in the Mediterranean Sea.¹²² Such ideas did not come to fruition but working in concert towards the abrogation of the slave trade continued. At Aix-la-Chapelle in autumn 1818 Russia submitted

¹²⁰ As previously mentioned, the examples of the navigation on in-land waterways and the abrogation of the slave trade feature prominently in this case study of the post-1815 inter-state society. This is the case because they aptly exemplify the rules-based, cooperative and concerted approach to inter-state relations. They are, however, not the only examples. I will mention additional examples engendered by ambassadorial conferences further below.

¹²¹ As previously mentioned, the British plenipotentiary Lord Castlereagh already attempted to make the abrogation of the slave trade a topic in the Peace of Paris (1814) but largely failed to attract the attention of his colleagues. For more information on how the abrogation of the slave trade was discussed domestically in the United Kingdom see Klose (2019).

¹²² On 27 August 1816 a joint British-Dutch naval force under the command of Lord Exmouth destroyed nearly the entire fleet of Algerian pirates (Klose 2019: 162-3). The problem of fighting piracy in the Mediterranean Sea was closely connected with the abrogation of the slave trade. Maghrebian pirates regularly abducted people in the Mediterranean Sea and sold them to African slave traders further inland.

a revolutionary proposal: all Christian states should contribute to the founding of a joint but neutral inter-state organisation headquartered at the African coast of the Mediterranean Sea. According to Duchhardt (2018: 191), Menorca was considered a possible naval base. This organisation should have its own legal and naval capacities to enforce the prohibition of the slave trade (Klose 2019: 168).¹²³ The other states assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle did not contradict this idea but questioned its feasibility (ibid.). As is often the case in inter-state relations such big ideas come to nought because details cannot be agreed upon. In this case states quarrelled over the right to enter and inspect each other's ships (ibid.). Nonetheless, commitment to working in concert for the prohibition of the slave trade was all in all immensely successful, at least for three reasons. First, it showed that the states of Europe committed themselves to the rule of working in concert for the benefit of constructive problem solving in inter-state affairs. Second, it is an interesting example of how an idea through inter-state discussion and cooperation can morph into international law (cf. Rie 1950). Third, slave trade was officially discontinued in the late 1840s (Lentz 2014).¹²⁴

Furthermore, the ambassadorial conference in London for the abrogation of the slave trade was not the only one of its kind. Similar conferences and meetings between ambassadors took place in Frankfurt and Paris (Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Duchhardt 2018: 30). At the ambassadorial meeting in Frankfurt am Main outstanding territorial issues concerning the German Confederation were negotiated. At the ambassadorial meeting in Paris issues pertaining to the occupation of Paris dominated at the beginning. However, in the course of time this semi-permanent get-together, headed by the Duke of Wellington, was used to negotiate various problems that developed in inter-state affairs (Duchhardt 2018). It could, for instance, in 1817 mediate Austrian-Spanish disagreements over Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla within only 6 months' time (Pyta 1996). At the ambassadorial conference in London a disagreement between Denmark and Sweden regarding the

¹²³ The English newspaper *Courier* endorsed a multinational fleet off the coasts of Algeria, Tunisia and today's Libya (Duchhardt 2018: 191).

¹²⁴ According to Bleyer (2014: 68), slave trade was officially abolished in the 1860s.

debts of Norway could be reached in September 1819 (ibid.). However, an issue between Spain and Portugal regarding the “Banda Oriental” could not be solved but was nonetheless negotiated at the ambassadorial conference in Paris (ibid.).¹²⁵

4.3.6 CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

Whereas the abrogation of the slave trade is one example of states practicing the rules of working in concert, they furthermore committed themselves to them at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.¹²⁶

In mid-October 1818 the great powers founded a concert of peace (*concert pacifique*) which should regulate inter-state affairs of Europe (Duchhardt 2018: 177). The idea for such a concert came from Wellington and Hardenberg and was grounded in the consultation process agreed upon among the great powers within the quadruple alliance (ibid.: 178), an idea vested in the Treaty of Chaumont (see above). As a result, on 15 November 1818 in a joint *Déclaration* the great powers agreed upon the idea of forging an intimate union. They pledged

- to be firmly resolved “never to depart, neither in their mutual relations, nor in those which bind them to other states, from the principle of intimate union which has hitherto presided over all their common relations and interests” (Hansard 1803-2005) and
- that “for the better attaining the above declared object [peace]” particular meetings should take place.¹²⁷ Time and place of these meetings shall on each occasion be previously fixed (ibid.).

¹²⁵ Banda Oriental: Territory between Argentina and Brazil alongside the Southern Atlantic Ocean which comprises today's Uruguay.

¹²⁶ The get-together at Aix-la-Chapelle was primarily about withdrawing allied troops from France as well as a partial relief and deferral of debts. The Congress had its first meeting in the apartment of Hardenberg on 30 September 1818 and its last meeting on 22 November 1818. The agreement to withdraw the occupation armies from France was reached on 3 October (Duchhardt 2018). For more details see the Timeline of Events in the appendices.

¹²⁷ Cf. Duchhardt (2018: 179). The five powers pledged to hold occasional meetings to maintain calm (*repos du monde*).

Again, these commitments among states reverberate the rules of working in concert, i.e. #1 interstate communication for the coordination of policies, #2 refrainment from unilateral action and #3 constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. More specifically, #1 is implied in the commitment of particular meetings to maintain peace, #2 emerges from a commitment to an intimate union as well as the commitment to particular meetings and #3, too, is vested in the commitment to an intimate union and particular meetings.

It is not far-fetched to argue that working in concert reached its climax at the gathering in Aix-la-Chapelle (cf. Pyta 1996). In the Treaty of Chaumont in March 1814 states already formerly pledged to work in concert to bring lasting peace to Europe.¹²⁸ In the Treaty of Paris in May 1814 they pledged to hold a congress in Vienna to resolve outstanding issues. One example in this regard can be found in Article V in the Treaty of Paris where states promised to each other to work together at the Congress of Vienna “with a view to facilitate the communication between Nations, and continually to render them less strangers to each other” (Foreign Office 1841:159). And indeed, at Vienna states actually practiced what they preached by working in groups of special committees to solve territorial and non-territorial issues successfully. For some issues, like the abrogation of the slave trade, lasting ambassadorial committees were founded where states (not only the great powers of Europe) worked continuously in concert. Finally, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in late 1818 they once again committed themselves to an intimate union working in concert, a re-commitment they had had practiced by then for 3-4 years. As a result, some historians (e.g. Pyta 1996) speak of the *Concert of Europe* that formed at Aix-la-Chapelle because a shift from confrontation to cooperation among the great powers of Europe (including France) had finally taken place. Such a concert may be defined as “an international institution or security regime for high-level diplomatic collaboration among all the great powers of the day” (Miller 1994: 328-9)

¹²⁸ Nonetheless, as previously highlighted, first *informal* commitments to the rule of working in concert were discussed about ten years earlier.

which is the result of “a convergence of long-term, stable and deliberate collaborative approaches or strategies of the great powers” (ibid.). Striking is the self-restraint displayed by the members of such a concert (ibid.).

The rules of working in concert in inter-state affairs were at the heart of post-1815 inter-state relations. Inter-state adjustments and coordination became a fundamental rule in inter-state conduct. This was a unique achievement in the history of international relations. Not only the multilateral approach to problem solving itself was original, but the very fact that it was practiced by states to such a meticulous and loyal degree. Above all, there were no compulsory forces, no “conductor” (Pyta 1996) that reprimanded or even forced in line erring powers. This concert diplomacy was highly informal and voluntary - and, above all, very effective, despite the fact that at any moment any participant of the Concert of Europe could have deflected and pursued his own interests through bilateral agreements. How could that be? Why did states adhere to such a highly informal constraint? And what did this do to post-1815 inter-state relations? Unlike English School theory, Durkheimian sociology and anomie theory offer an answer to these questions.

4.4 Forging an inter-state society

The research has so far revealed that between March 1814 and November 1818 states committed themselves to the rules of working in concert to maintain peace in Europe. In other words, working in concert was itself a constitutive rule of the post-1815 era. This was possible because states cooperated in terms of acting together. According to Simms (2014), “[t]here was a fundamental transformation in the way the great powers did business. They had learned the virtue of cooperation and restraint during the final stages of the struggle with Napoleon, and this culture continued to permeate diplomacy after 1815” (183). States not only agreed upon the rule of working in concert on paper (in treaties) they also practiced what they preached: at Vienna in 1815 as well as in ensuing ambassadorial working groups and regarding specific subject areas like the abrogation of

the slave trade or territorial rifts in Latin America. According to Emile Durkheim (2013: 286) in *The Division of Labour*, such cooperation (rooted in regular contact, particularly in terms of cooperation) develops habits which are not just theoretically but also practically transformed into rules.¹²⁹ The rules of working in concert thus developed into a habit, became accustomed to the states of post-1815 Europe.

What is equally important, however, is to understand what effect the rules of working in concert had on post-1815 states in Europe. The rules of working in concert regulated and defined *acceptable* inter-state behaviour for the shared aim of peace. This is clearly reminiscent of Merton's (1938) theory of anomie. According to Merton, the goals an individual (state) is striving for are culturally or socially determined. At the same time there are norms of acceptable behaviour that regulate how goals are to be achieved. *Acceptable* means adequate, decent, appropriate. In the post-1815 inter-state society the goal was peace and the acceptable behaviour was working in concert towards this peace.

4.4.1 THE SHARED GOAL OF PEACE

The powers mentioned and described peace as a goal at different occasions in different wordings: in 1803/1804 the Tsar wished for a perpetual peace of Europe (Nicolson 1946: 54; Zamoyski 2007: 17), at the Treaty of Chaumont the aim was a "General Peace" (Article I), the Treaty of Paris was a *Definitive Treaty of Peace and Amity* [...] with the aim of "a permanent Peace", the General Treaty concluding the Congress of Vienna did not explicitly feature peace as an aim or purpose of working in concert, but it was a solidification of the aforementioned Peace Treaty at Paris.¹³⁰ Finally, at Aix-la-Chapelle the great powers of Europe formed a concert of peace (*concert*

¹²⁹ See above, chapter 2 *Reviewing Emile Durkheim and Anomie Theory in IR*, section *Emile Durkheim on Anomie*.

¹³⁰ It is interesting to contemplate Immanuel Kant's (1724 - 1804) influence at this time: For example, Metternich's assistant and right-hand man Friedrich von Gentz, a Prussian, was a former student of Immanuel Kant. He wrote essays about Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (Lentz 2014: 82). The Tsar, due to the teaching of his Swiss teacher La Harpe, studied *Perpetual Peace*, too (Knapton 1941: 135). Furthermore, Kant was an advocate of inter-state congresses for the achievement of perpetual peace (Schulz 2009).

pacifique) and committed themselves to working in concert for attaining the declared object of peace (cf. Hansard 1803-2005). Perpetual peace, general peace, permanent peace and peace: throughout March 1814 to November 1818 the great powers of Europe considered it paramount to connect the goal of peace with the rule of working in concert.

As a result, the rule of working in concert was not merely functional or task-related. Instead, this rule signified to states a difference between right and wrong in their behaviour while striving for a reward or incentive everyone aspired. This is an important point which is also grounded in Durkheimian ideas of the moral function of the division of labour and the rules it is associated with. Contrary to what many of Durkheim's critics profess, the division of labour was not merely task-related. At its core it was sustained by dynamic density, which itself was a moral construct (cf. chapter 2, section *Emile Durkheim and IR*). For Durkheim, rules in a society serve no simple functional or task-related purpose. Instead, they signify principles of right and wrong (cf. Durkheim 2006b: 79). According to Durkheim (2019: 3), there are moral rules relating to mankind in general. They have universal moral application. Among these moral rules are those that concern the relations between members of a society; conveyed to international relations this means that there are moral rules that concern the relations between states of a society of states. Durkheim stresses that not in all societies are such moral rules regulating the relationships of individuals the same. They vary from society to society but in each society they enact moral discipline. In other words, every rule has an imperative character of a moral force (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 98). This moral force in the post-1815 inter-state society consisted of a clear inter-state understanding of working in concert: it was right for a state to work with others, to participate in ambassadorial working groups, committees, conferences and congresses. This is, however, not the end of what effect the rules of working in concert had on post-1815 states in Europe.

Furthermore, Emile Durkheim did not disagree with Wilhelm Wundt who argued that “morality is to make man feel that he is not a whole, but part of a whole” (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 92).¹³¹ The morality reified by the rule of concert diplomacy had precisely this effect: it turned individual states into a group of like-minded states subject to a shared morality. Morality thus constitutes an obligatory force. Durkheim also explained why morality can have such an obligatory force: because individuals of a society know that their actions have consequences (ibid.: 93). Members of a society can also see beyond their immediate actions, unlike, in Durkheim’s own words (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 94) the savage and the child for whom the future hardly goes beyond the next moment. Both aspects combined depict to us that members of a society can envision a future in which everyone submits to this moral force, but they can also envision a future in which no one submits to this moral force. The same applied to the post-1815 inter-state society. Individual states subject to this moral force of working in concert could envision what Europe would look like if everyone obliged (lasting, general or perpetual peace) and what Europe could look like if states did not oblige (pre-1815 carnage). This, then, comes full circle with the goal of peace to which states subscribed in treaties and legal documents examined above. States subscribed to peace and the rules of working in concert because their vision of the pre-1815 alternative illustrated to them a world they had already experienced, an immoral world of Thomas Hobbes’ *bellum omnium contra omnes*, a war of all against all.

In some measure this also emerges in Richard Rosecrance’s (1963) *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* and *Norms and Practice* by Matthias Schulz (2009). Rosecrance developed an approach to international relations described in terms of balance, equilibrium or pendulum motion. He argued that different styles of diplomacy could cause different system of international relations. When diplomatic styles changed so did international

¹³¹ Wilhelm Wundt (1832 – 1920) was a German philosopher from the University of Leipzig. During a visit to Germany Durkheim came under the influence of Wundt. He was excited and influenced by Wundt’s sociological work (Lukes 1973; Sennett 2006).

relations: “when objectives or techniques of diplomacy were significantly altered, a system-change would be seen to have occurred” (6). The years 1814 to 1822 for instance constituted a system of international relations with a particular style of diplomacy. This particular style developed because, according to Rosecrance (1963: 56), as of 1814/1815 states overcame a purely materialistic mindset when it came to individual interests. Instead, they relied upon a new ideological harmony of self-conscious conservatism to assure peace (ibid.). The resulting Concert of Europe had a moral force of persuasion (ibid.: 168) which held international outcomes within stable limits. It thus exercised a regulating role. Rosecrance explains that “[t]he outcomes of the functioning Concert assumed the form of a multipolar international system. No single state or bloc dominated, and a bipolar division of the world did not take place”(242). There was no struggle over resources.

“At the same time major actors did not merge themselves into a single bloc under a single leadership; the action of the Concert was not dominated by a single intellect or a single actor; it was influenced by the separate and independent national wills of England, Russia, and above all, Austria” (243).

In *Norms and Practice* Matthias Schulz (2009) explains that after the Congress of Vienna a socialisation (Vergesellschaftung) of inter-state relations occurred. He thereby considers inter-state relations malleable social relations which define the rise, change and decline of cultures of peace. The Concert of Europe was an institution in sociological terms which embodied guidelines and principles. It thereby exerted a social control as a social whole which produced order (ibid.: 11-12). At the heart of the ability of the Concert of Europe to produce order were norms, norms describing how actors should behave and by what criteria their actions should be guided (ibid.: 14). States internalised (verinnerlichten) norms primarily through a qualitative professionalisation of diplomacy, yielding a discourse among states which became increasingly characterised by the

discussion of norms. This qualitative professionalisation of diplomacy developed into a compulsion to cooperate (Kooperationszwang).

4.4.2 ON THE ROAD TO PEACE: THE RESPECT FOR RULES AND PUBLIC MORAL REALITY

Rosecrance and Schulz offer an apt framing as comparison in context of post-1815 inter-state relations but anomie theory developed in this dissertation is more specific, particularly more specific in terms of causation. Through working towards a specific goal grounded in legitimate behaviour the questions of why it is important that behavioural rules have to be respected, why states may disrespect behavioural rules and what happens if they do so, a transparent operationalisation of post-1815 inter-state relations is possible. This issues into the explanation that morality enshrined in the rules of concert diplomacy constituted a moral force that morphed states into a group of birds of a feather. According to Durkheimian sociology, this group of states had a shared civic moral (cf. Durkheim 2019: 45). If this shared civic moral was abided by states, the group of states or “public moral consciousness” (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 97) reacted positively or favourably. However, for Durkheim, the point is not what exactly a positive or favourable reaction means. The point rather is that the sheer fact of positive sanctioning of a state abiding by a shared civic moral implies that morality in such a group of states is not merely obligatory but “desirable and desired” (ibid.: 97).

This, too, came to the fore in the documents and treaties examined above in which there was no single hint or subterfuge for unilateral state behaviour. In each treaty states committed themselves unmistakably to the rules of concert diplomacy. Working in concert was not only accepted; it was desirable and desired.¹³² This voluntary rules-based and morally imbued inter-state conduct gave birth to a public moral conscience. It had an integrative force due to the fact that the rules of concert

¹³² Enabled by states’ ability to look beyond the moment, to imagine and remember the pre-1815 state of affairs. Cf. above.

diplomacy coordinated rationally the ideas and sentiments of state-behaviour at that time (cf. Durkheim 2006b: 79, cf. chapter 2, section *Emile Durkheim on Anomie*). At the same time, the rules of concert diplomacy and the morality they represented constituted an objective moral core of inter-state co-existence. In other words, in their day-to-day conduct states voluntarily respected the rules of concert diplomacy and thereby confronted a moral reality in shape of a society of states (cf. Hilber 1986: 2).

At the same time, this “public moral reality” states encountered demanded respect for the rules of working in concert. It prompted states as a group to develop a sense of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of each other’s conduct.¹³³ Durkheim went as far as to argue that a society cannot exist without such a collective type of conscience because only due to a collective or public moral conscience can individual members of a society pursue collective interests (e.g. peace) (cf. Durkheim 2013: 81). Among the post-1815 states of Europe this group of like-minded states with the shared morality of working in concert was the Concert of Europe.

To offer the reader one counter-example: This was different at the Treaty of Utrecht. This treaty may constitute an interesting example, partly because it brought tranquillity to Europe after years of fierce fighting from 1701 to 1712 and partly because it was designed to contain France (Simms 2013: 76, 78).¹³⁴ In both aspects it thus resembles the treaties from 1814 to 1818. Furthermore, it resembles the post-1815 era inasmuch that the belligerent parties vowed peace above all. For instance, in the Treaty of Utrecht between Great Britain and Spain from March/April 1713 both states surrender themselves to the unconditional desire of peace and assure each others of their friendship. In Article I they vow “a true and sincere friendship” to each other (Chalmers 1985: 342). In Article II they promise to cease all hostilities and stay away from “harm-doing” (ibid.). In

¹³³ Cf. definition of conscience available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conscience>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

¹³⁴ For more information on the Wars of the Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht see Simms (2013: 66-81).

Article III they agree to hold no grudge against each other and in Article V the King of Spain promises not to disturb or molest the Queen of Great Britain and her heirs.

However, vows of unconditional desire for peace and true and sincere friendship are safeguarded by nothing but promises. There is no structure, mechanism or road map in place to overcome frictions and colliding interests peacefully. This clearly shows in this Treaty of Utrecht between Great Britain and Spain. Furthermore, articles vowing peace and friendship (Articles I, II and V) are complemented by articles clarifying the new status quo: In Article IV Great Britain and Spain acknowledge the rules of succession of the kingdom of Great Britain and that Sophia of Hanover is heir presumptive of the British crown. Article VI announces that “Europe could by no means bear the union of the kingdoms of France and Spain under one and the same King” (ibid.: 344). What follows is a letters patents by the King of Spain concerning issues of successions.¹³⁵

Utrecht was a settlement “designed to address the challenges of the past” (Simms 2013: 78). At Utrecht the powers of Europe still endeavoured to restore the general set-up of the system (Osiander 1994: 232). In other words, the only thinkable course of action states knew remained to be the preservation of balance-of-power politics (ibid.: 231; cf. Pyta 1996). This comes to the fore when the powers pledge to preserve this treaty by taking care that each other’s forces may not become too formidable (Chalmers 1985: 363). At the same time, it is legitimate to wonder whether the pledge to preserve this treaty by maintaining the balance of power really included the vows of peace and friendship or whether it just concerned Articles IV and VI. Unlike Article XXXII in the Treaty of Paris, there was no commitment to working together, neither conceptually beyond the idea of the balance of power nor temporally beyond the negotiations at Utrecht to preserve the peace. At Utrecht there was no commitment to rules like working in concert, no intentions

¹³⁵ A letters patents is a public proclamation by a monarch, usually giving someone a particular right. See e.g. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/letters-patent>, accessed on 13/06/2022.

establishing special committees, future meetings or ambassadorial gatherings.¹³⁶ As a result, inter-state relations seemed void of any sense of a rightful or blameworthy conduct which turned the genesis of a public moral reality thus impossible.

4.5 Conclusion

In the previous chapter I developed theoretical answers in context of the post-1815 inter-state society to the three questions: Why is it important that rules and regulations are respected in an inter-state society? Why do some states violate rules? What happens if members violate rules? Answering the first question I argued that it was important in the post-1815 society that states respected rules because rules sustained a moral conscience which reified, i.e. represented tangibly, to states that they belonged to a like-minded group. In this chapter I developed this theoretical, Durkheimian point alongside primary (and secondary) sources between 1814 and 1818. I showed that states committed themselves to the rules of working in concert to acquire and sustain the shared goal of peace. Working in concert meant that states communicated among each other for the coordination of their policies, they refrained from unilateral action and participated constructively in congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. This chapter showed that these rules were not merely apodictic statements: the first two rules were contrived by states themselves as early as the Treaty of Chaumont, supplemented by the rule of participating constructively in congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings at the Treaty of Paris. At the Congress of Vienna and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle as well as ambassadorial conferences for the abrogation of the slave trade and the peaceful, joint solution of various inter-state issues at that time states practiced what they preached and respected the rules of working in concert. Working in concert was thus a constitutive custom developed by states. It was constitutive in so

¹³⁶ Nonetheless, some historians believe that the settlement at Utrecht actually introduced the emergence of European inter-state relations from barbarism and conquest to civilised manners. Scholars like Ian Clark disagree and see this emergence unfolding rather in the late-nineteenth century. For a discussion see Clark (2005: 47).

far that it regulated and defined acceptable behaviour. The aim of peace was not to be reached by any means possible or unilateral action.

Following Durkheimian sociology in context of anomie theory this commitment of working in concert for the attainment of lasting peace signifies that states shared a joint understanding of not only a common aim (lasting peace) but acceptable behaviour for the attainment of this aim, too. This means that states enforced a particular set of principles in their relations with one another (cf. Lascurettes 2017). They internalised a normative content that represented their values of inter-state conduct. At the same time, respect of concert diplomacy reinforced their moral strength: repetitive application and practice turned concert diplomacy and the rightful state behaviour it embodied into routine and a new *normal*. The rules of concert diplomacy and the values and norms they embodied became social facts, practical imperatives that constituted a trans-societal moral conscience perceived as ontologically real by states. This made the post-1815 inter-state society existing and real for its members (cf. Durkheim 2006a: 72-3; cf. Dohrenwend 1959: 471).

Furthermore, an answer to why states usually respect and follow rules like the rules of concert diplomacy is now possible, too. States usually respect and follow such rules because they promise the achievement of a collective goal (cf. Merton's anomie theory). Regarding the post-1815 inter-state society this collective goal was peace, which became historically reasonable in the documents above. At the Utrecht settlement, in contradistinction, states did not develop such a mechanism or rules of concert diplomacy to achieve an unequivocally pronounced shared goal of lasting peace.

However, what nonetheless needs to be investigated is why some states violate rules and regulations and what happened to the post-1815 inter-state society if states violated rules? This is important to understand because the heydays of the post-1815 inter-state society did not last very long. As previously explained, little dispute exists among scholars in IR and History that concert

diplomacy started to become undone in the 1820s and that the United Kingdom played a role in this dissolution of concert diplomacy. But why did states violate rules of concert diplomacy and what role did Great Britain exactly play? How can such developments towards the end of the post-1815 inter-states society be explained by the notion of anomie theory and Durkheimian sociology that has been developed in this dissertation?

5: Deviant behaviour, anomie and the regression of the post-1815 society of states

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I investigate the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society within context of the notion of anomie theory in inter-state society that I have developed in chapter 3. However, this chapter does not only build on my reconstruction of anomie theory in chapter 3. It also relies on the rules of concert diplomacy of the post-1815 inter-state society that I have developed in chapter 4.

In chapter 4 I showed that the rules of concert diplomacy were enshrined in important treaties and agreements fundamentally relevant for post-1815 inter-state relations. These rules of concert diplomacy were: (#1) the coordination of policies, (#2) refraining from unilateral action and (#3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings. They are thus in this chapter not to be mistaken as apodictic statements, partly also because in chapter 4 I furthermore showed that signatory states of important treaties and agreements between 1814 and 1818 subscribed to these rules of concert diplomacy because they promised to achieve the shared goal of lasting peace in Europe.

Equally important for this chapter is the fact that in the previous chapter it was revealed that the rules of working in concert indeed constituted practical imperatives which coordinated rationally

the ideas and sentiments of states in the post-1815 era. As a result, a moral conscience among states of this post-1815 period developed which reified a moral to states that they perceived as ontologically real. Therefore, states perceived themselves obligated and acted according to one particular kind of conduct considered right.

In this chapter I go one step further investigating the violation of the rules of concert diplomacy (#1-3) in context of the notion of anomie theory in inter-state society that I have developed in chapter 3. According to this anomie theory, rules are violated if states consider their participation in concert diplomacy futile for the achievement of the shared goal of lasting peace. This means states display so-called deviant behaviour if a socially determined goal (peace) is unattainable through normatively or morally prescribed behaviour (rules of concert diplomacy) (cf. Merton 1938). In other words, deviant behaviour on behalf of an actor signifies a means-ends breakdown (Hilbert 1989: 244), it is the result of an incompatibility between cultural expectations (peace) and social regulation (rules of concert diplomacy). In this dissertation and in context of the post-1815 inter-state society I focus on the United Kingdom as a deviant actor. I explain below why.

In the first section of this chapter I investigate critically the United Kingdom's engagement with concert diplomacy and its rules in detail. I carefully weigh the content of primary sources revealing that the United Kingdom from 1815 to 1818 undoubtedly concerned herself with balance of power thinking in Europe. However, she nonetheless complied with the rules of concert diplomacy, elucidated for example by her constructive participation in several congresses and ambassadorial meetings. The investigation will also show that as of 1818 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle the United Kingdom became alienated from concert diplomacy, particularly because she did not believe anymore that concert diplomacy safeguards lasting peace in Europe. At this stage the means-ends breakdown between normatively or morally prescribed behaviour (rules of concert diplomacy) and a shared goal (lasting peace) began revealing itself.

In the second section of this chapter I investigate the United Kingdom's alienation from concert diplomacy (i.e. means-ends breakdown) more profoundly, focusing on the period between 1819 to the mid-1820s. The historic investigation will pivot on revolutions in Spain and Portugal and shows that the United Kingdom became increasingly at odds with the rules of concert diplomacy because concert diplomacy did not promise the achievement of lasting peace in Europa any longer. The violation of some rules of concert diplomacy took place, especially rule (#3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings.

In the third and final section I wonder if this alienation from concert diplomacy and the rule-breaking associated with it actually led to deviant behaviour and if social instability of the post-1815 inter-state society followed. Both points will be confirmed through the investigation of the United Kingdom's relationship with the other allied powers in the late-1820s, particularly in context of a Russo-Greek crisis. The analysis will show that the United Kingdom purportedly violated rules of concert diplomacy attempting to sustain peace in Europe on her own, through deviant behaviour. In the end, the concert of Europe commenced its regression, evidenced by the fact that as of 1827/1828 the rules of concert diplomacy played no considerable role anymore, *Realpolitik* beyond the spirit of the post-1815 inter-state society established itself again. In other words, a state of anomie spread where social instability (unilateral policies and military conflict) resulted from a breakdown of standards and values (rules of concert diplomacy).

The foundation for the investigations in this chapter consists of primary sources, especially private and official correspondences from State Secretaries Lord Castlereagh (1812-1822), George Canning (1822-1827) and Prime Minister Liverpool. I furthermore surveyed parliamentary debates from both Houses of Parliament, examined speeches delivered by the Prince Regent and by George Canning and explored official memoranda and diplomatic cables.

5.2 Commitment and disenchantment

Secondary literature almost unanimously agrees that the United Kingdom had her difficulties with concert diplomacy and played a role in the demise of concert diplomacy (cf. Hinsley 1962; Rosecrance 1963; Bridge and Bullen 2005; Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Lentz 2014; Evans 2017; Sedivy 2018). The United Kingdom's role in concert diplomacy is sometimes characterised as indifferent (Bridge and Bullen 2005) and even subversive (Sedivy 2018).¹³⁷ This is why the analysis in this chapter concentrates on the United Kingdom.

However, notwithstanding the opinions of secondary literature I wonder dispassionately if the United Kingdom subscribed to and complied with the rules of concert diplomacy, expecting peace in Europe as a result from this? An unbiased scrutinization is important because analyses from scholars like Bridge and Bullen (2005) and Sedivy (2018) are sometimes critically supplemented by different points of views. For example, scholars like Webster (1924), Kissinger (2013) [1957] and Ikenberry (2001), who have devoted themselves to this subject in detail, firmly believe that the United Kingdom was a founding member of concert diplomacy and the idea that concert diplomacy could lead to lasting peace in Europe. They unanimously stress that the attitude and convictions of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh seemed to play a particularly important role. This is for example compassionately argued by Henry Kissinger. In his critically much acclaimed book *Diplomacy* Kissinger (1994: 88) goes as far as arguing that concert diplomacy was Lord Castlereagh's idea in the very first place (cf. Evans 2017: 36). Ikenberry (2001), too, argues that Lord Castlereagh strove for a European order "based on principle, moderation, and some measure of legal-institutional authority" (97). How, then, can scholars like Bridge and Bullen (2005) and Sedivy (2018) believe that the United Kingdom's role towards concert diplomacy was indifferent and subversive? I take a close look at this probable discrepancy in this section.

¹³⁷ For the debate in IR on the United Kingdom's role in concert diplomacy see chapter 3, *Anomie theory and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society*.

However, before I continue one important point for the understanding of the United Kingdom's foreign policy at this time in history needs to be stressed: in the early nineteenth century foreign policy was almost exclusively the prerogative of individual Cabinet members. Particularly influential was Lord Castlereagh whose intentions were significant for British foreign policy at this time. He had the complete trust of Prime Minister Liverpool, who "interfered as rarely as possible in his colleague's work" (Webster 1924: 14). Allegedly, Lord Castlereagh was a more powerful member of the Cabinet than Prime Minister Liverpool himself due to the fact that he was not only Foreign Minister but also Leader of the House of Commons and the special confidant of the Prince Regent George IV (ibid.). Because of this prominent role by Lord Castlereagh it seems appropriate to take a look at some original and primary sources associated with him, to see whether British foreign policy actually subscribed to and complied with the rules of concert diplomacy and the goal of peace in Europe in the early nineteenth century.

5.2.1 Commitment: The United Kingdom and concert diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna

To begin with, the United Kingdom had a lively interest in the architecture of a post-1815 order.

This comes unequivocally to the fore in the reporting of the broadsheet newspaper *The Times*. In early nineteenth-century London *The Times* was already an exponent of English public opinion and likely had considerable influence on politicians and decision-makers in public service. During the Congress of Vienna in late-1814 it reported on a daily basis and in great detail about political and diplomatic occurrences at Vienna. Reporting of facts took place primarily by translating French and German newspaper articles as well as through the publication of letters in a "private correspondence" section of the broadsheet. Three examples include:

- In late-September 1814 *The Times* reported on the arrivals of monarchs and plenipotentiaries at Vienna. It reported on contemplated decisions of territorial re-arrangements that are supposedly to take place (*The Times* 23 and 24 June 1814).

- “It is thought that the Congress of Vienna will establish a uniformity of weights and measures in Germany” (*The Times* 30 September 1814: 3). Also, Augsburg will probably become a free city again. “Nuremberg also hopes to see its independence restored” (ibid.: 3).
- Several conferences have taken place between Metternich and Castlereagh. Diplomats continue to arrive in Vienna (*The Times* 3 October 1814).

However, *The Times* also published opinion-forming articles about the Congress of Vienna and European inter-state relations almost on a daily basis.¹³⁸ The only other matter that received such attention concerned the daily whereabouts and well-being of the Prince Regent.

The United Kingdom’s interest in post-1814/1815 inter-state relations in Europe is also illustrated by the fact that Lord Castlereagh between late September and Christmas 1814 wrote 28 letters from Vienna to Prime Minister Liverpool in London concerning the negotiations at Vienna (cf. Webster 1921).¹³⁹ In the same period the Prime Minister sent 10 letters from London to Lord Castlereagh in Vienna or The Duke of Wellington in Paris.

Nonetheless, although the United Kingdom may have been keenly interested in a post-1815 architecture, she was not engaged in the construction of the post-1815 order as much as continental powers were. There are two reasons for this. First, she was distracted by affairs in America, illustrated by a letter from Lord Liverpool to Castlereagh on 28 October 1814 where he cautions Castlereagh not to make new enemies over quarrels regarding Poland and Saxony because the war with America may last longer than expected (Webster 1921: 220). The United Kingdom’s entanglement with America comes also to the fore in a letter from 2 November 1814 when

¹³⁸ Usually on page 3. The other matter of great interest to *The Times* were developments in America. Above all, it is curious to see that this newspaper commented almost exclusively on foreign affairs and hardly at all on domestic issues.

¹³⁹ Lord Castlereagh arrived at Vienna on 13 September (see Timeline of Events in the appendices).

Liverpool lamented over the great financial expenses inflicted by the war with America, stressing that Castlereagh should shun any further pecuniary obligations on Britain's part in his negotiations (Webster 1921: 222).¹⁴⁰ *The Times*, too, reported and commented frequently on the war in America (e.g. on 10, 11, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 27 and 29 October 1814). Bridge and Bullen (2005), for example, do not observe this factor of the United Kingdom being also distracted and tied down in America. They argued that the United Kingdom emerged from the defeat of Napoleon as a satiated power with seemingly freewheeling insouciance for anything but balance of power politics. However, Bridge and Bullen (2005) do not consider the United Kingdom's distractions abroad a factor responsible for potentially limited abilities for commitment in Europe beyond the balance of power.

Second, the United Kingdom surely had her opinion on issues over Poland and Saxony, but the correspondence of Lord Castlereagh shows that often she acted as a mediator more than an affected party. When push came to shove over Poland and Saxony among the continental powers, Lord Castlereagh saw the need to explain to the Emperor of Russia the United Kingdom's point of view, for example during an audience with the Tsar in mid-October 1814. However, he much more preferred the role as an intermediary, brokering negotiations between the plenipotentiaries from Prussia and Austria in his house in late-October 1814 (Webster 1921). Furthermore, Prime Minister Liverpool himself explained to Lord Castlereagh in a letter on 14 October 1814 that the Tsar should have never raised the Poland issue himself and it was best for the United Kingdom to have as little to do with it as possible. On 28 October 1814 he sent another letter to Lord Castlereagh writing that the Cabinet believes that the United Kingdom has been involved enough in the Polish issue. He explained that "it would be far better that we should withdraw ourselves

¹⁴⁰ The United Kingdom was also engaged with affairs in the eastern parts of her Empire, which may have constituted an additional distraction, cf. a remark from MP Mr Methuen on 1 February 1816 after the Prince Regent's speech to Parliament (Hansard 1816a).

from the question altogether, and reserve ourselves for points on which we have a more immediate and direct interest” (Webster 1921: 220).

Therefore, distractions abroad and self-perception as a mediator rather than a party involved suggest that the United Kingdom was not considerably engaged, although interested, in the construction of the post-1815 order as much as continental powers. However, what, then, were her more immediate and direct interests, as mentioned by Prime Minister Liverpool in his letter to Lord Castlereagh? Above all, the United Kingdom was interested in a continental balance of power and a reasonable territorial settlement in the Low Countries (today’s Benelux states). Lord Castlereagh wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 25 October 1814 that his main interest at Vienna was the balance of power in Europe and that this was a contentious point between himself and the French plenipotentiary Talleyrand: “You will perceive, from my several despatches, that the difference in principle between M. Talleyrand and me is chiefly that I wish to direct my main efforts to secure an equilibrium in Europe; to which object, as far as principle will permit, I wish to make all local points subordinate“ (Webster 1921: 217). He furthermore explained in a letter to Liverpool on 11 November 1814 his basic strategic intentions in the negotiations, in accordance with the instructions he received from London before he travelled to Vienna: establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe, the re-establishment of the powers that fought Napoleon according to their rightful (territorial) claims and mediation between states in this process (ibid.). On 21 November he wrote to Liverpool that he received the plenipotentiaries from Prussia and Austria explaining to both colleagues that the aim of the United Kingdom was “to establish that permanent peace and equilibrium on the Continent, for which the British Nation had made such immense sacrifices, and which was the declared object of the Alliance” (ibid.: 239).

Later, in a speech Lord Castlereagh delivered to the House of Commons on 20 March 1815, he defended his work at Vienna and explained that both Prussia and Austria “where to form the

immediate bulwarks of Europe” (397) and that Germany should become a confederated system “to render it an impregnable bulwark between the great States in the East and West of Europe” (ibid.). He concluded that “a just distribution of force between the sovereigns who are to be charged with maintaining the tranquillity of the Continent” (ibid.) is not possible without considerations of population sizes “and the wealth consequent upon it” (ibid.). Secondary sources confirm this main strategic interest of a balance of power in Europe by the United Kingdom (cf. Webster 1924; Nicolson 1946; Kissinger 2013 [1957]). In fact, Kissinger (2013 [1957]), for instance, explained that after the defeat of Napoleon the United Kingdom emerged from nearly a decade of isolationism. During the struggle against the *Grand Armée* the United Kingdom had realised that Europe under a single rule presented a mortal threat to her. London thus strove for a structure in Europe that prevented any single power to dominate all other powers. At the same time, “the British nightmare was a continental peace which excluded Britain” (31).

The United Kingdom’s prevailing concerns for the continental balance of power at the Congress of Vienna does seem to be at variance with the rules of concert diplomacy practiced by states themselves at the Congress. I outlined this realisation of the rules of concert diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna in detail in chapter 4. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s foreign policy attitude during the Congress of Vienna also stands in contradistinction to her legal commitment to rules #1-3 in the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Paris (cf. chapter 4, *The rules of working in concert in post-1815 inter-state relations*).

Therefore, the picture which emerges is slightly contrarious to some of the arguments made in IR literature. Ikenberry (2001), for example, argues that Lord Castlereagh strove for a European order “based on principle, moderation, and some measure of legal-institutional authority” (97). Ikenberry’s idea that Lord Castlereagh’s intentions in foreign affairs from 1813 to post-1815 were closely associated with British thinking about a more general diplomatic restructuring of European

affairs from 1805 sound compelling and befitting for a *most European statesman* like Lord Castlereagh. However, there is no indication for this argument in Lord Castlereagh's own correspondence, nor the Prime Minister's writing to Castlereagh, nor the British Monarch's deliverances to Parliament.

Instead, it seems to be the case that the United Kingdom remained along the side-lines of concert diplomacy at Vienna in 1814/1815, preferring the role of a mediator. Yet, this is not to say that the United Kingdom was an outsider or attached no importance to her relationship with continental allies, let alone disagreed with concert diplomacy. In the Prince Regent's speech to Parliament on 1 February 1816 the Prince Regent repeatedly stressed the value and importance of relations with the continental powers. For example, he emphasised that the "intimate union" between the allied powers has been very fruitful, emphasising that both Houses should continue the alliance with the continental powers: "His Royal Highness has no doubt that you will be sensible of the great importance of maintaining in its full force that alliance, from which so many advantages have already been derived, and which affords the best prospect of the continuance of peace" (Hansard 1816a: 2).

The Times, too, showed serious interest in affairs pertaining to the Congress of Europe and inter-state relations in Europe in general. For example, on 14 November 1814 *The Times* commented on the Congress and its opening procedure. The editors wrote that Great Britain was interested in given every participant (small and great) of the Congress a fair hearing regarding the issues that should be discussed. The editors criticise that this was not respected by some allies. On 30 November 1814 the newspaper's editors wrote: "We are firmly of opinion, that the repose, the happiness, and the safety of Europe demand that the spirit of aggrandisement should be unanimously renounced" (3). *The Times* also argued that a confederate system of states could constitute a bulwark against a possibly resurgent and hostile France.

Furthermore, (even) some Members of Parliament were actually concerned about the state of the alliance among the continental great powers. In early February 1816 MP Mr Brougham filed a motion asking the Prince Regent for a treaty signed between Austria, France and the United Kingdom in Vienna in January 1815. Lord Castlereagh refused to provide this information which caused decided protest by some MPs. Mr Brougham wondered why Russia, for him a most faithful ally with which the United Kingdom is on such admirable terms, was no part of this treaty (Hansard 1816a). Mr Baring shared these worries with Mr Brougham (ibid.: 366). Mr Horner speculated that it might be a defensive treaty against Russia and Mr Tierney pertinently worried if the allies will remain united, now that Napoleon had been defeated, now “when their common enemy was supposed to be no more” (ibid.: 368). This apprehension for the relationship with the continental powers does offer a different glimpse, perhaps suggesting not such a rigid advocacy of the balance of power after all.

Therefore, balance of power considerations may have sometimes predominated the United Kingdom’s considerations vis-à-vis Europe, but not always. While attending the Congress of Vienna Lord Castlereagh explained on 21 November 1814 to Prime Minister Liverpool the architecture of negotiations, especially that different committees were formed where plenipotentiaries from states all over Europe discussed jointly various issues. The important point here is that he mentioned that several plenipotentiaries at the beginning of negotiations were worried that they might become excluded from important discussions. The concerted approach to negotiations, however, ameliorated their worries. Lord Castlereagh appreciated this approach and communicated to Prime Minister Liverpool that he himself was content with this way business is done: “I see nothing to object to in the manner in which the discussions are carried on” (Webster 1921: 238). Above all, he seemed quite content with this concerted approach himself when announcing to the House of Commons successes regarding the abrogation of the slave trade, successes for the benefit of the United Kingdom which were enabled through a concerted approach

to diplomacy at Vienna (cf. Webster 1921).¹⁴¹ In the same speech to the House of Commons on 20 March 1815 he rigorously defended the United Kingdom's participation in the Congress of Vienna, promising to fight all bits of false accusations and nefarious disinformation concerning the Congress (ibid.).

5.2.2 Disenchantment: The United Kingdom and concert diplomacy beyond the Congress of Vienna

But what about the United Kingdom's participation in concert diplomacy beyond the Congress of Vienna? From 1817 through 1819 both Houses of Parliament discussed foreign affairs concerning European inter-state relations hardly at all. This is revealed by digitised editions of Commons and Lords Hansard, the Official Report of debates in Parliament.¹⁴² It is also perfectly in accordance with Webster's (1924: 19-24) explanation of how British foreign policy was designed inside the United Kingdom at this period in time. The only exception occurred in spring 1819 when the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which took place in late 1818, briefly became a topic in both Houses.¹⁴³ Besides this, London hosted from August to November 1816 a special committee for the abolition of the slave trade (Nicolson 1946: 214) and in March 1817 the plenipotentiaries from France, Austria, the United Kingdom, Prussia and Russia convened for a small conference in Paris discussing the allocation of a passport to Lucien Bonaparte (Foreign Office 1836: 956).

The next important congress took place at Aix-la-Chapelle in late-1818 (Duchhardt 2018).¹⁴⁴ Once again, the correspondence of Lord Castlereagh is most instructive when it comes to British foreign affairs at this period in time. However, during the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Castlereagh's correspondence with Prime Minister Liverpool was considerably less copious and less frequent compared to the correspondence at Vienna three years earlier. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle

¹⁴¹ Cf. chapter 4, *Post-Vienna: Committees and Ambassadorial Meetings*.

¹⁴² For the digitised editions of Commons and Lords Hansard see <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/index.html>, accessed on 14/06/2022.

¹⁴³ I deal with this in detail below.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. chapter 4, *The rule of working in concert in post-1815 inter-state relations, The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle*.

lasted from late September to late November 1818. In this time Lord Castlereagh sent only six letters, five of which were addressed to his Prime Minister. The reason for this might be that the Congress of Vienna was much more about a post-1815 inter-state restructuring compared to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Aix-la-Chapelle was primarily about repealing the occupation status of France, including a withdrawal of allied occupational forces and the partial relief and deferral of French debts (Duchhardt 2018). In other words, these were issues where no close coordination between Lord Castlereagh and the government in London may have seemed necessary.

One aspect, however, appears obtruding. At Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Castlereagh recognised that since the Congress of Vienna relations between the continental great powers and their monarchs appear unusually cordial. The underlying cause for this seemed to be certain sentiments among the great powers. On 4 October 1818 he wrote to Liverpool that the United Kingdom would do well further encouraging these “sentiments of attachment of which all the Sovereigns are so prodigal towards each other, and which, I believe, at this moment, are sincerely entertained” (Vane 1853: 48). He furthermore wrote: “I am quite convinced that past habits, common glory, and these occasional meetings, displays, and repledges, are among the best securities Europe now has for a durable peace” (48). This reads like an unambiguous statement in favour of concert diplomacy. It furthermore seems that inter-state relations at Aix-la-Chapelle proceeded to the satisfaction of Lord Castlereagh and thus did not necessitate copious and detailed correspondence with London.

However, there is more to this. On 20 October 1818 Lord Castlereagh reported back to Prime Minister Liverpool that little embarrassment and “much solid good grow out of these reunions, which sound so terrible at a distance” (Vane 1853: 54). He seemed to have grasped the gist of concert diplomacy, explaining that:

“It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the European Government, at once extinguishing the cobwebs with which diplomacy obscures the horizon, bringing the whole

bearing of the system into its true light, and giving to the counsels of the great Powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single State” (54-5).

However, this appraisal of concert diplomacy was not shared by his colleagues in London. Behind the scene of British foreign policy attitudes towards the encouragement of sentiments of attachment among the allies, towards occasional meetings or reunions with the allies and efficiency and simplicity of a single state among the great powers, were much more cautious. It was on the same day Lord Castlereagh sent his second cordial appraisal of concert diplomacy that Cabinet member Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in 1818, sent a lengthy assessment of the same subject to Lord Castlereagh in Aix-la-Chapelle. In this letter Lord Bathurst informed Lord Castlereagh that George Canning, President of the Board of Control, a position on par with a Cabinet job, harboured stern reservations regarding the idea of announcing continued meetings among the great powers at fixed points (*ibid.*: 55-6).¹⁴⁵ Canning believed that regular meetings among the allies would only take place concerning internal affairs of France. Lord Bathurst wrote that “[h]e [Canning] thinks that system of periodical meetings of the four great Powers, with a view to the general concerns of Europe, new, and of very questionable policy; that it will necessarily involve us deeply in all the politics of the Continent, whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then with a commanding force” (56). Even more interesting is that Canning feared that “the meetings may become a scene of cabal and intrigue” (56).

Based on Lord Castlereagh’s correspondence it is difficult to assess how other members of Cabinet thought about concert diplomacy. Although, from the ensuing correspondence from Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh the impression arises that the Prime Minister himself may have

¹⁴⁵ Later, Canning became State Secretary from 1822 to 1827. He succeeded Lord Castlereagh in his office.

been equally cautious of concert diplomacy at this time. In letters dating from 23 October 1818 and 4 November 1818 he repeatedly stressed that a public declaration on behalf of the great powers at Aix-la-Chapelle concerning regular and fixed meetings among them may not go down well with Parliament (Vane 1853).¹⁴⁶

Are there any opinions of Parliament on Aix-la-Chapelle? Papers (conventions and protocols) of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle were presented to the House of Commons on 1 February 1819 (UK Parliament 1819a). On 2 February Lord Castlereagh spoke to the House of Commons explaining that the publication of further documents concerning Aix-la-Chapelle will follow suit (UK Parliament 1819b). Few days later the Prime Minister presented a paper from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle to the House of Lords (UK Parliament 1819c). This paper concerned the payment of indemnities by France to the allied powers. Lord Holland responded, asking if there were any papers concerning the slave trade. He also inquired about the idea of a Holy Alliance he had heard about. He cited a passage from a document of the Holy Alliance in which its members committed themselves “never to depart, neither in their mutual relations nor in those which bind them to other states, from the principle of intimate union which has hitherto presided over all their common relations and interests [...]” (ibid.). Lord Holland demanded a copy of this treaty.

The Prime Minister responded that the treaty regarding the Holy Alliance was signed in Paris in 1815, not at Aix-la-Chapelle. However, Lord Holland retorted that the five great powers at Aix-la-Chapelle seemed to have forged a similar bond on certain principles, similar to those of the Holy Alliance. In fact, Lord Holland was not mistaken. The United Kingdom did indeed sign a Protocol on 15 November 1818 in which all signatory powers committed themselves firmly “never to depart, neither in their mutual relations nor in those which bind them to other states, from the

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Webster (1924: 146-8).

principle of intimate union which has hitherto presided over all their common relations and interests [...]' (UK Parliament 1819d).

These scarce records of Parliament concerning the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle show that Cabinet (Prime Minister and Lord Castlereagh) delivered only compulsory information to Parliament and kept both Houses largely in darkness about foreign affairs, especially concert diplomacy, despite sporadic interests and queries. Nevertheless, Lord Holland's persistent and critical demand for information about an intimate union among the allied powers might be exemplary of the Prime Minister's worries that British entanglement in concert diplomacy may not be approved of by Parliament.

According to the notion of Durkheimian anomie theory in inter-state society that I have developed in this dissertation one important aspect yet needs to be engaged with. In chapter 2, *The Theory of Anomie and IR* I explained that according to anomie theory members of a society follow rules (like the rules of concert diplomacy) because they provide legitimate means to the achievement of a shared goal (like peace in Europe). Robert Merton (1938) prominently espoused this aspect of anomie theory. He wrote of culturally defined goals, purposes and interests vis-à-vis acceptable behaviour towards the achievement of such goals, purposes and interests in society. Merton (1938: 674) explained that satisfactions emerge from the achievement of goals and from the institutional modes (normative behaviour) of striving to attain such goals. In other words, an individual usually assimilates goals and legitimate procedures promising the achievement of goals (ibid.: 677). Did this hold true for the United Kingdom with regard to anomie theory? Did the United Kingdom consider compliance with the rules of concert diplomacy promising the achievement of the goal of peace in Europe, maybe despite her sometimes preferential treatment of balance of power considerations as well as reservations towards concert diplomacy in London?

First and foremost, several statements indicate that peace in Europe was an ardent wish of the United Kingdom in Europe. For example, Prime Minister Liverpool wrote in a letter to Lord Castlereagh on 25 November 1814 that doing what the United Kingdom thought was the best contribution for peace and tranquillity in Europe was her greatest satisfaction (Vane 1853). The Prince Regent in his speech to Parliament on 1 February 1816 explained that the restoration of peace, lasting repose and security in Europe was the Monarch's "most earnest endeavour" (Hansard 1816a: 2). Members of the House of Lords like the Marquis of Huntley, Lord Calthrope and Lord Holland shared this endeavour and achievement of the United Kingdom in their immediate responses to the Prince Regent's speech (ibid.). This pertained to some members of the House of Commons, too. Sir Thomas Dyke Acland, for example, was very relieved that the new parliamentary session opened with a lasting peace for Europe - "a peace not alone for Europe, but for the whole civilised world" (ibid.: 17).

In addition to the United Kingdom's quest for peace in Europe she also set great store by her relations with the continental powers. I have highlighted this above, where it became evident that not only was the United Kingdom's sympathy towards the continental powers stated by the Prince Regent in early 1816. It was also wished for by at least some Members of Parliament. Furthermore, an appreciation of concert diplomacy and rules associated with it seems to have come along with the United Kingdom's goodwill towards her continental allies. This, too, has come to the fore in the analysis above when, for example, Lord Castlereagh's correspondence showed that he appreciated the approach of concert diplomacy to deal with inter-state (and sometimes trans-European) issues. Above all, the rules of concert diplomacy became useful even for the implementation of specific British interests like the abrogation of the slave trade.

Furthermore, at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 Lord Castlereagh showed respect towards what he referred to as reunions that give the great powers almost the diplomatic efficiency and simplicity

of a single state. In fact, as mentioned above, he wrote that “these occasional meetings, displays, and repledges, are among the best securities Europe now has for a durable peace” (Vane 1853: 48). Therefore, until the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 the United Kingdom did not favour balance of power policies over a constructive participation in concert diplomacy. She surely kept an eye on balance of power developments in Europe but this does not mean that she rejected concert diplomacy. Above all, she did not merely tolerate concert diplomacy but actively participated in it, at least in Vienna in 1815 and at ambassadorial conference in Paris and London. For example, from August to November 1816 the United Kingdom hosted an ambassadorial conference in London concerning the abrogation of the slave trade (cf. Lentz 2014). Meanwhile, the Duke of Wellington presided over an ambassadorial conference in Paris at least until 1817 (cf. Kissinger 2013 [1957]). Finally, the United Kingdom also participated constructively in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 itself. Therefore, from 1815 to 1818 the United Kingdom (#1) coordinated her policies with foreign states while attending congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings, (#2) refrained from unilateral action vis-à-vis her European allies and (#3) participated constructively in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings, if only as a mediator in difficult times.

However, the analysis above has also revealed that the United Kingdom’s attitude towards concert diplomacy and the three rules associated with it became diffident from 1818 onwards. George Canning, for instance, saw concert diplomacy increasingly as cabal and intrigue. Cabal commonly refers to a group of people secretly working on a plot.¹⁴⁷ Whereas this may not necessarily permit the conclusion that the United Kingdom as of 1818 believed that concert diplomacy and the rules associated with it was no longer conducive to the goal of peace, it nevertheless indicates a loosening of faith in concert diplomacy.

¹⁴⁷ See Merriam-Webster dictionary, available at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cabal>, accessed on 14/06/2022.

This is supported by Rosecrance (1963) who argues that “[t]he British, through their Foreign Secretary, had authored the system of regular conferences enshrined in Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance, but they were the first to go back upon it [at Aix-la-Chapelle]” (61). According to Rosecrance, after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle the United Kingdom had no pressing reasons anymore to stick with concert diplomacy, simply because at Aix-la-Chapelle issues regarding France had been solved: occupation forces were withdrawn and “the four Powers renewed the quadripartite alliance and secretly pledged themselves not to allow France to become a member of it” (62). This is doubtful. The idea that the United Kingdom only engaged (temporarily) in concert diplomacy to curtail France contradicts the historic evidence outlined above: London wanted peace in Europe and at least until the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 concert diplomacy was considered a viable approach, besides the balance of power, to achieve this aim of peace.

Recapitulating anomie theory, especially Merton (1938) and the idea that states like the United Kingdom assimilate goals and legitimate procedures promising the achievement of such goals, it seems appropriate to conclude that until 1818 the United Kingdom did fulfil this assimilation, that she actually did consider compliance with the rules of concert diplomacy promising the achievement of the goal of peace in Europe, despite sometimes amplifying flirtations with balance of power thinking. But what beyond Aix-la-Chapelle? What might be the reason for the United Kingdom’s disenchantment with concert diplomacy?

The understanding of anomie theory developed in this dissertation suggests that the United Kingdom realised that - at some point, perhaps after 1818 - the universal goal of peace of the post-1815 inter-state society could no longer be achieved through concert diplomacy. In anomie theory this is conceptually anchored in the means-ends breakdown whereby cultural goals (peace) and socially prescribed norms for attaining such a goal suffer disjunction (Hilbert 1989). George Canning’s judgement on concert diplomacy as cabal and intrigue, as well as perhaps Lord

Holland's questioning of the United Kingdom's participation in an intimate union of continental allies, point in this direction.

I emphasise, however, that this is only a preliminary conclusion because the analysis so far has only comprised the short period of 1815 to 1818. It is therefore to the post-1818 period I will look next in order to ascertain if this preliminary conclusion can be confirmed and if so, why the United Kingdom became alienated from concert diplomacy despite her initial acceptance, if the means-ends breakdown can be upheld as an explanation. It also remains to be investigated if indeed any deviant behaviour followed from the United Kingdom's increasingly lacklustre engagement with concert diplomacy.

5.3 Alienation and deviant behaviour

5.3.1 London's disinterest and alienation from concert diplomacy

The year of 1819 was largely quiet in British foreign affairs, at least as much as Europe was concerned. *British and Foreign State Papers* show that the United Kingdom was preoccupied with business in America and the abrogation of the slave trade, among other topics (Foreign Office 1834). Meanwhile, tensions rose in Germany between liberal nationalists and conservatives. As a consequence, Prussia and Austria agreed in late 1819 in the Carlsbad Decrees on more state censorship of the press and university teaching in Germany (Zamoyski 2007: 540). None of this seemed to have resonated seriously with London. This is surprising since Lord Castlereagh himself, while representing the United Kingdom at the Congress of Vienna, wrote that Germany should become a confederated system "to render it an impregnable bulwark between the great States in the East and West of Europe" (Webster 1921: 397). Now that the stability of this bulwark might be threatened, and now that the two powers Prussia and Austria engaged in tepid endeavours subjugating Germany with conservative censorship, Lord Castlereagh appeared curiously absent. Interestingly, Webster (1924: 190-8) writes that the measures taken by Prussia and Austria in

Germany may not have been disagreeable for Castlereagh at all, mainly because he himself and Wellington were engaged in similar practices in their own country.¹⁴⁸

Unlike 1819, the year of 1820 began with a deafening explosion of revolutionary sentiment in Spain when a new military insurrection broke out in Cadiz on 1 January 1820 (Webster 1924: 227). “Ferdinand [VII.] was neither able to crush the insurgents nor willing to offer any concessions, and his weakness encouraged his opponents to press for extremes. Gradually other military leaders joined the rebels” (ibid.: 228). In the meantime, liberal agitations in France heated up again after the assassination of the Duc de Berri in February 1820 (Webster 1924).¹⁴⁹ Besides the problem of liberal agitations, the allied powers saw several other issues in France that needed their attention. Therefore, Prince Metternich wished for more cooperation on behalf of the United Kingdom, which, however, he did not receive (ibid.). Despite this request for support on 20 April 1820 Sir Charles Stuart, the British ambassador to France, wrote about the United Kingdom’s aloofness towards the allied powers in a letter to Lord Castlereagh. He explained that “[i]t is a satisfaction to me, however, to think that, [...], I have considered myself as a mere spectator of their [the allies’] public affairs, and that, without committing my Government, by attaching myself to any set of men or pleading for any particular set of measures, [...].” (Vane 1853: 247-8).

This disinterest in concert diplomacy for the alleviation of issues pertaining to France reached a pinnacle when the revolution in Spain aggravated. In May 1820 Lord Castlereagh, in consultation with the Duke of Wellington and the King, penned an official state paper in which he outlined the United Kingdom’s position concerning Spain: the United Kingdom was willing to discuss events in Spain but not within context of a conference or congress. Furthermore, the government in

¹⁴⁸ In fact, later, in a letter on 6 May 1820, Lord Castlereagh explained to Prince Metternich that the fight against radicalism in the United Kingdom is in full swing (Vane 1853: 258). Cf. Seton-Watson (1945: 38) who argued that Castlereagh was the political architect of parliamentary measures stifling the liberal freedoms in England at that time.

¹⁴⁹ Duc de Berri: Charles Ferdinand (1778 – 1820) was a Royalist and assassinated by a Bonapartist.

London “studiously” avoided any reunion of the Sovereigns regarding Spain (Foreign Office 1850: 71). The reason Lord Castlereagh gave concerned the opaqueness of the situation in Spain and the fact that there is no governing authority with which the allied powers could negotiate. However, Lord Castlereagh’s most vociferous lack of appreciation was directed at the idea that any discussions about an intervention in Spain would “push its [the Alliance’s] duties and its obligations beyond the Sphere which its original conception and understood Principles will warrant” (ibid.: 73). The alliance was never intended “as a Union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States” (ibid.: 74).

The situation became further complicated when an additional revolution broke out in Naples in July 1820. Now, it was the United Kingdom who became isolated in Europe (Webster 1924). Again, Lord Castlereagh refused to participate in a conference discussing the revolution among the allied powers. He wrote that “[w]ith all the respect and attachment which I feel for the system of the Alliance, as regulated by the transactions of Aix-la-Chapelle, I should much question the prudence, or, in truth, the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions on the present occasion” (Vane 1853: 312).¹⁵⁰ In his letter to Lord Stewart on 16 September 1820 he explained that previous conferences in Pilnitz and a declaration of the Duke of Brunswick gave occasion to “prejudicial misconceptions and popular irritation” (312).¹⁵¹ However, he had additional reasons to refuse a conference or congress. First, the British Parliament would never agree to it. Second, if such a conference or congress should lead to a military intervention, the government at Naples would “sequester all British property at Naples, and at once shut their ports against British commerce” (314). Third, the British government promised neutrality towards the security of the royal family of Naples.

¹⁵⁰ Prince Metternich, in return, saw in Lord Castlereagh’s behaviour an intention to break up the alliance, although Castlereagh denied this allegation (Phillips 2012 [1923]: 37).

¹⁵¹ He perhaps referred to the conference at Pilnitz from 1791 when during the French Revolution the great powers publicly declared their support for the King of France and monarchical governance in France.

A congress concerning Naples (and to some degree Spain) eventually did take place in Troppau in late-1820. The congress was attended by the monarchs of Prussia, Russia and Austria whereas the United Kingdom only sent an observer (Nichols 1972). By at least sending an observer, perhaps, “a formal rupture with the Continent was postponed” (Rosecrance 1963: 66). After an intermittent break the congress continued in Laibach in January 1821. It was formally concluded on 12 May 1821 (Schroeder 1962). The congresses at Troppau and Laibach resulted in the *protocol préliminaire* in which the allied great powers (except the United Kingdom) agreed, among other things, that any state that experiences change of their *regime intérieur* due to a revolution is not part of the alliance anymore (Webster 1924: 295). Furthermore, at Laibach the decision was reached “that another reunion of the Cabinets should take place in 1822” (ibid.: 319), a suggestion Lord Steward refused (ibid.). Webster (1924) explained that “Steward’s protests alone had impaired the ‘solidarity’ of the Alliance. He had, indeed, caused great irritation to the other members of the Conference” (319).

It had become public now that the United Kingdom fundamentally disagreed with the other allies, mainly because the *protocole préliminaire* became known to some of the public. At the same time, *The Morning Chronicle* in London on 15 January 1821 published contents of a British circular which went to all British representatives at foreign courts on 19 January 1821. In this circular Lord Castlereagh made the United Kingdom’s standpoint clear. For London it was necessary “to inform them [the other Courts in Europe] that Britain was not a party to the measures in question, neither as regards the general principles nor as regards the particular case of Naples” (ibid.: 321).

However, relationships between the United Kingdom and the Concert of Europe were given one last chance when Russo-Turkish affairs escalated in spring 1821. This escalation was triggered by a revolt in the Morea (Peloponnese). The violence which unfolded in the wake of this revolt gave Russia ample reasons to attack the Ottoman Empire. According to Schroeder (1994), this was the

worst crisis that hit Europe since 1815. From mid-1821 to spring 1822 Europe expected a Russo-Turkish war to take place.

Prince Metternich reached out to Lord Castlereagh in autumn 1821 asking to meet him and the King during a visit of the Monarch to Hanover (Vane 1853: 439). Initially, the King and Lord Castlereagh planned on visiting Vienna. This trip, however, was cancelled, which was met with disappointment by the government in Vienna (*ibid.*). On 20 October 1821 Lord Castlereagh and King George IV met Prince Metternich in Hanover to discuss Russo-Turkish affairs (Schroeder 1962: 176). This came as close as possible to an unofficial and secretive conference of the great powers of Europe because the Prussian Foreign Minister as well as the Tsar were invited, too (*cf.* Webster 1924: 374). Both, however, did not attend but sent representatives instead. Prussia was represented by Count Bülow and Russia by Christophe de Lieven (Nichols 1972). Prince Metternich explained that Austria could only continue to support Russia in her quarrel with the Ottoman Empire if Russia remained faithful to the alliance and stayed away from a unilateral military intervention. Lord Castlereagh agreed, although they refrained from a public declaration since this would possibly alienate the Tsar. Hence, Christophe de Lieven was sent to St Petersburg to convey the joint position of Prince Metternich and Lord Castlereagh to the Tsar.

Christophe de Lieven arrived back in Hanover on 28 October 1821 declaring that the Tsar did not intend to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, “Austria and Britain also pressed Berlin and Paris to fall into line behind them, and in this, their diplomacy was successful” (*ibid.*: 11). At the same time, they decided to hold a conference or congress on the matter of Spain in Vienna in September 1822 (*ibid.*). Interestingly, this time Lord Castlereagh agreed to attend, although he could only confirm his participation on condition of approval by Parliament.¹⁵² This approval was

¹⁵² The Tsar agreed to participate in this congress in June 1822 (Nichols 1972).

finally granted on 6 August 1822 (Webster 1924: 482). By then, however, Lord Castlereagh's mental health had deteriorated seriously. On 12 August 1822 he committed suicide (ibid.).

Before his death Lord Castlereagh started making notes on the United Kingdom's position he wanted to defend at the forthcoming congress. He wrote that the United Kingdom must not be committed to any immediate or eventual concert; guarantees are to be considered altogether inadmissible (Webster 1924: 400). To be exact, these instructions were forwarded to the Duke of Wellington on 14 September 1822, who instead of Lord Castlereagh travelled to the continent to attend the forthcoming congress (Schroeder 1962). In these instructions the late Lord Castlereagh had written that

“[w]ith regard to Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued: - Solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family; - Observance of our Engagements with Portugal, - and a rigid abstinence from any Interference in the Internal Affairs of that Country, - must be considered as forming the Basis of His Majesty's Policy” (Foreign Office 1850: 74).

George Canning had complemented Castlereagh's notes with his own instructions to the Duke of Wellington on 27 September 1822 stating that "to any interference by force or menace on the part of the allies against Spain, come what may, His Majesty will not be party." (Walsh 1836: 361).

This conference was urgently needed because France was poised for an attack on Spain. Her army at the Pyrenees was reinforced and “openly transformed into a corps of observation” (Schroeder 1962: 210; cf. Temperley 2012 [1923]: 55). On his way to Vienna the Duke of Wellington stopped at Paris attempting to soothe bellicose ambitions in France (ibid.). At the same time, George Canning became the successor of Lord Castlereagh as Secretary of State. Canning markedly differed in his opinions on Europe from Castlereagh. “Whereas Castlereagh had made the great

discovery that the business of Europe was the more easily transacted when half-a-dozen men sat around a table and tried to understand another” (Temperley (2012) [1923]: 52), Canning did not believe in the conference system. In fact, and as revealed above, as early as 1818 he rejected conference diplomacy (ibid.).

At Verona, the Duke of Wellington sent a letter to Foreign Secretary Canning on 29 October 1822 in which the United Kingdom’s longing for peace between France and Spain came unequivocally to the fore (Foreign Office 1850: 74). The Duke of Wellington explained that he objects to everything but a public declaration by one of the allies on behalf of France stating that France wants peace with Spain. He wrote that he would never agree to a defensive treaty or declaration directed against Spain. Any treaty or declaration directed against Spain would “render useless the efforts of the Powers which is to use its Good Offices to maintain Peace” (ibid.). George Canning replied on 8 November 1822: “I am to signify to your Grace His Majesty’s entire approbation of your conduct and language in respect to the Affairs of Spain” (ibid.: 75). In the meantime, the Duke of Wellington had written another letter to Foreign Secretary George Canning on 5 November 1822 in which he stated that there was a feeling within the continental *corps diplomatique* that the United Kingdom had separated herself from the allies during the Naples issue and that this separation was not an inconvenience for the allies (Temperley (2012) [1923]: 53). “On the last day of November, Wellington quit Verona for England” (ibid.: 59-50). Prince Metternich reported that the Duke of Wellington was discontented with us all and believed everyone to be wrong. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom’s quest for peace between Spain and France was imperturbable and the Duke of Wellington stopped in Paris on his way home trying to mediate between France and Spain once again. However, on 24 December 1822 this mediation was rejected by France (ibid.: 60). On 6 April 1823 the French Army crossed the Bidassoa and war began.

This preceding analysis reveals that the situation between the United Kingdom and concert diplomacy fundamentally changed from 1820 onwards. In 1820 the United Kingdom withheld support towards the allied powers when it came to issues with France. She refused to attend a conference concerning the revolution in Spain and attacked conference diplomacy in an official state paper. When an additional revolution broke out in Naples the United Kingdom once again refused to attend a conference or congress. However, in autumn 1821 a somewhat unofficial conference with the United Kingdom took place in Hanover. In 1822 another conference was scheduled, although this time without Lord Castlereagh who had by then committed suicide. Late Lord Castlereagh was deputised by the Duke of Wellington. It would be a misbelief, however, to think that Lord Castlereagh would have represented a different stance towards conference diplomacy than the Duke of Wellington: Castlereagh's notes concerning the forthcoming conference were approved by State Secretary Canning and respected by Wellington (see above).

It is evident that the United Kingdom dissociated herself from concert diplomacy as of 1820. But why did this happen? According to Durkheimian anomie theory developed in this dissertation a state dissociates itself from normative or rule-based behaviour if this (legitimate) behaviour does not any longer promise the achievement of a goal like peace in Europe. Merton (1938) explained that if institutionalised procedures (rules of concert diplomacy) do no longer promise the achievement of society's goal(s) (e.g. peace in Europe) no satisfaction accrues to individuals (states). This is the inversion of the argument that satisfaction for states emerges if institutionalised procedures facilitate the achievement of society's goal(s).

Is there evidence for this in the United Kingdom's role towards concert diplomacy between 1820 and 1822?

5.3.2 From alienation to deviant behaviour

In May 1820 Lord Castlereagh, in consultation with the Duke of Wellington and the King, declared in an official state paper that the United Kingdom rejects any interventions in the internal affairs of other states. In a letter from 16 September 1820 Lord Castlereagh stated that previous conferences in Pilnitz caused misconceptions and irritations. Two years later the Duke of Wellington attended a conference at Verona, with strict instructions to abstain from participating in any interferences in the internal affairs of Portugal or Spain. He argued that the United Kingdom would only be party to a public declaration in which France admitted that she wanted peace with Spain and that any declaration directed against Spain would threaten peace. On his way home, the Duke despairingly attempted to negotiate a peace between France and Spain at Paris.

The United Kingdom's endeavour to accomplish the goal of peace in Europe remained undeterred. One year after the conference in Verona during a parliamentary debate at the House of Commons on 28 April 1823 the Members of Parliament Mr McDonald and Mr Wortley acknowledged the King's "earnest and unwearied endeavours to preserve the peace of Europe" (Walsh 1836: 358). At the same time Messrs McDonald and Wortley deeply regretted "that those endeavours have proved unavailing" (358) when France invaded Spain that same year. In the eyes of London it seemed that conference diplomacy contributed little to peace between major powers in Europe. Yet, despite her prejudices towards conference diplomacy, peace in Europe was the only reason the United Kingdom had sent a plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna in the first place, as Foreign Secretary George Canning explained to Parliament:

"[w]e determined that it was our duty, in the first instance, to endeavour to preserve peace if possible for all the world: next, to endeavour to preserve peace between the nations whose pacific relations appeared most particularly exposed to hazard; and failing in this, to preserve at all events peace for this country [...]" (360).

The United Kingdom's strict opposition to interference's in the internal affairs of Spain and Portugal, her anxiety that conferences could cause misconceptions and irritations among other states, that conferences turn into cabal and intrigue, as well as her demand for public declarations that proclaimed endorsements for peace instead of blame for conflict indicate that after the Congress of Verona (at the latest) she had lost her faith in concert diplomacy as a means to the end of peace in Europe. So-called conformist behaviour in accordance with conference diplomacy, i.e. the rules of concert diplomacy, became increasingly difficult for the United Kingdom, evidenced by the fact that she became increasingly reluctant in participating in conferences, and if she did, a constructive participation was hardly viable for her.

However, before I continue this line of reasoning in context of anomie theory one obtruding counter-argument should gain hearing. One might argue that the United Kingdom's relationship with concert diplomacy and the rules of concert diplomacy became alienated due to the ideological principle of non-interventionism on her part. If this idea is developed further one might argue that the rift over concert diplomacy was grounded in an ideological incompatibility between a state representing proudly the modern conception of Parliamentarism and national self-determination versus states representing medieval-like autocratic ruling systems. This seems unlikely for two reasons.

First, the United Kingdom may have been studiously opposed to foreign interventions in Spain and Naples. But she quietly acquiesced Prussian and Austrian political interventionism in German affairs in 1819 to quell liberal sentiments. Also, in the before-mentioned letter from Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Bagot of 14 December 1821 Castlereagh himself came out in favour of an oppression of the liberal revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the Morea (Vane 1853). Finally, did the United Kingdom eschew military interventions herself regarding Ireland and America? Did

she grant India a constitution, concede to India liberal parliamentarianism? In either case she clearly did not.

Second, ideas like liberalism vs. conservatism had not become influential on inter-state relations at that time (cf. Rosecrance 1963). Letters from Lord Castlereagh to Prince Metternich proved that the United Kingdom was as much concerned about homegrown liberal agitations as Prince Metternich was about liberal agitations across Germany, Italy and Spain. Furthermore, in a letter to Sir Charles Bagot on 14 December 1821 Lord Castlereagh himself displayed consternation given liberal revolts not just in Europe but across the world, including Mexico, Peru and Brazil (Vane 1853). Thus, it seems likely that no ideological rift like liberalist vs. conservative foreign relations existed.¹⁵³ Although, one admission in this context has to be the fact that the Cabinet of the United Kingdom was continuously concerned about how her own parliament would judge foreign affairs, particularly in the wake of upcoming domestic elections.¹⁵⁴

Thus, the preceding analysis has shown that it is increasingly likely that the United Kingdom gradually withdrew from concert diplomacy by not adhering to its rules as studiously as she used to. She became reluctant participating in conferences or congresses and if she did participate she relinquished her constructive role (violating rule #3). The reason for this is, according to the notion of anomie theory developed in this dissertation, that a participation in concert diplomacy and an adherence to the rules of concert diplomacy did not any longer for the United Kingdom promise the maintenance of peace in Europe.

Anomie theory explains that in such a situation where an individual believes that goal(s) are not attainable by conformist behaviour (e.g. sticking to the rules of concert diplomacy) any longer, so-

¹⁵³ Cf. a speech by State Secretary Canning on 20 August 1822 on foreign policy (Stapleton 1859).

¹⁵⁴ General (parliamentary) elections in the United Kingdom took place in 1818 and 1820. Therefore, the period investigated in this study must have been, in British domestic perspective, affected by electoral considerations.

called deviant behaviour sets in (cf. chapter 2, *The Theory of Anomie and IR*). According to Merton (1938), deviant behaviour is the result of an incompatibility between cultural expectations and social regulation (Hilbert 1989: 244 calls it the means-ends breakdown). Deviant behaviour causes anomie, defined by Merton (1938) as “a breakdown of social standards governing behaviour” (ibid: 226). Along this line of reasoning in context of anomie theory there are two more questions that need to be investigated:

First, given the incompatibility of cultural expectations (peace in Europe) and social regulation (rules of concert diplomacy) I wonder what deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom could look like in the early 1820s? Interestingly, Merton (1938: 681) attempted a glimpse into international relations concerning this question. As previously mentioned in chapter 2, he believed that deviant behaviour in the international realm is associated with the abrogation of international law, undeclared warfare and the rationalisation of bombing civilians. I suggest that vis-à-vis the rules of concert diplomacy deviant behaviour by the United Kingdom would reveal itself through no coordination of policies with the other great powers, engaging in unilateral actions and rejecting conferences, congresses and ambassadorial meetings. This, then, constitutes the opposite of the rules 1-3. It furthermore goes against the legitimate behaviour the great powers of Europe (including the United Kingdom and, indeed, at the urging of the United Kingdom) have jointly agreed upon between 1814 and 1818 (cf. chapter 4) and thus suggests that behaviour contrarious to these rules is considered different from what most states consider normal or acceptable.¹⁵⁵

Second, anomie theory explains that deviant behaviour causes anomie, defined as “a breakdown of social standards governing behaviour” (Merton 1938: 226). For Durkheim, anomie was a tendency towards social death, in its extreme indicating the death of a society (Hilbert 1989: 244). Talking of the death or social death of a society sounds facile, not concrete enough and too final.

¹⁵⁵ I discussed the meanings of deviant in more detail in chapter 2, *The Theory of Anomie and IR*.

Chapter 4 therefore approached this issue of the regression (not death) of an inter-state society within Durkheimian sociology of anomie theory, wondering why it is important that rules like the ones of concert diplomacy need to be adhered by. The result was that such rules are practical imperatives (Durkheim 2006b: 79) coordinating as rationally as possible the ideas and sentiments of the moral conscience of a particular period (Durkheim 2006a: 72-3; Dohrenwend 1959: 471). States practiced the rules of concert diplomacy because they represented their values of inter-state conduct at that particular period in time. At the same time, practising the rules of concert diplomacy turned concert diplomacy and the rightful state behaviour it embodied into routine and a new *normal*. The rules of concert diplomacy and the values and norms they embodied became social facts or practical imperatives that constituted a trans-societal moral conscience perceived as ontologically real by states (cf. chapter 4). In order to experience regression (not death), the rules of concert diplomacy would have to cease constituting social facts in order to be no longer perceptible as a trans-societal moral conscience. I wonder if deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom could have caused such an outcome? Furthermore, I wonder what regression of the post-1815 inter-state society looked like in context of anomie theory? Both issues will be dealt with in the following section of this chapter.

5.4 Anomie and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society

In this section I want to go further, in aspects of anomie theory and in historical-temporal terms. I wonder what deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom looked like, if deviancy was only limited to the United Kingdom and what repercussions deviancy had on the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. In historical-temporal terms I build on the preceding analysis where I last arrived in the early 1820s. In this section I continue with the mid-1820s, starting with another crisis in south-eastern Mediterranean Europe.

5.4.1 Anomie and the second Greek crisis

In early 1825 a second Greek crisis reached its climax when the Sultan called for Mehmet Ali to suppress yet another uprising in Greece (Simms 2014).¹⁵⁶ Soon Mehmet Ali's army left a trail trenched in blood across Greece (Evans 2017: 57).¹⁵⁷ Just like in 1821, the Tsar was pressured by domestic forces to come through for the Greeks. However, whereas in October 1821 Lord Castlereagh and the King met with Prince Metternich and representatives from Prussia and Russia to discuss such very similar issues, the United Kingdom in the mid-1820s acted differently; she was not willing to participate in concerted diplomacy with the other allied powers anymore.

In a letter State Secretary Canning sent to his Prime Minister on 16 November 1824 he wrote that

“[i]n the course of the summer Russia had opened a conference at St. Petersburg on Greek affairs. Sir Charles Bagot held instructions not to join it unless Russia first restored full diplomatic relations with Turkey, and Turkey evacuated the Principalities on somewhat inadequate grounds” (Stapleton 1859: 198).

I hypothesise that the United Kingdom refused participating in this conference at St. Petersburg because she seemed convinced that concert diplomacy did not prevent war between Russia and Turkey but rather turned it more likely. This is confirmed in a letter from George Canning to Lord Granville, ambassador to France, from 21 November 1824 where Foreign Secretary Canning was sure that “Russia means force” (Stapleton 1887: 203). In fact, George Canning became quite resentful and cynical about conference diplomacy, rejoicing in a private letter to Lord Granville from 12 April 1825 about disagreements between Austria and Russia at the conferences in St Petersburg (Stapleton 1859). In this letter he also elucidated that Austria, especially Prince

¹⁵⁶ The first Greek crisis unfolded in 1821/22. I explained in the previous section in this chapter how the front-rank powers of Europe, including the United Kingdom, *concertedly* managed to settle this crisis.

¹⁵⁷ Mehmet Ali was Governor of Egypt 1805 – 1848; he had agreed to quell the rebellion in Greece in return for the addition of Syria to his fiefdom (Evans 2017: 57).

Metternich, did not follow peaceful intentions but attempted to use conference diplomacy and the United Kingdom's participation in it to sway Russia towards war with the Ottoman Empire (Stapleton 1859: 462).

At the same time, the United Kingdom herself continued striving for the shared goal of lasting peace in Europe and was open for conversation, by all means. This is demonstrated by Foreign Secretary Canning's letter to Lord Granville from 15 November 1824 in which Canning complained that France is not opening a conversation with the United Kingdom regarding the Greek issue (Stapleton 1859: 458). Given that the United Kingdom had opened a conversation with France regarding South America it would now be on Paris to approach London regarding Greece. He continued wondering why there should be any conversation at all and quickly reached the conclusion that conversations are necessary "to prevent if possible a war between Russia and Turkey" (ibid.).

Refusing to attend the conference in St Petersburg concerning affairs in Greece can be considered deviant behaviour, even if no unilateral alternative behaviour substituted staying off – after all, the United Kingdom was one of the architects of conference diplomacy at the Peace of Paris in 1814 and played along conference diplomacy's rules until 1818. However, her behaviour in 1822 and concerning the conference in St Petersburg pointed to what is referred to as retreatism in anomie theory. Retreatism means that individuals "withdraw from conventional social relations" (Cloward 1959: 175; cf. Clinard 1964: 21). It is a version of deviant behaviour still considered legitimate. Cloward explains that "[a] crucial element encouraging retreatism is internalized constraint concerning the use of illegitimate means" (175). The attitude of State Secretary Canning might be considered as an internalised constraint concerning the legitimate means of concert diplomacy. This comes not only to the fore in Canning's letters cited above, but is also shared by IR literature:

Cowles (1990) explains that the United Kingdom's foreign policy under the auspices of State Secretary Canning, was motivated by the "concern for the balance of power, and hatred of the Metternichian system" (696). Cowles explains how difficult it was for the United Kingdom to forge a partnership with not only Russia but especially the other continental powers at that time. Temperley (2012 [1923]) highlights that "Canning favoured individual rather than collective pressure on the Porte" (86). He explains that the problem was that Canning refused to have the United Kingdom participate in a congress: "Canning objected both to Congresses and to Russian penetration of the Balkan peninsula" (88). Furthermore, Temperley explains that during the early part of the year (of 1825) Canning tried to avert a congress whereas during the later part of the year "he desired to act alone and to force the Turks to make peace" (89-90). Kagan (1997) confirms Temperley explaining that "Britain, for its part, deliberately torpedoed the talks by refusing to attend them on various pretexts. British foreign secretary Canning opined that the best thing for Britain would be for the St. Petersburg talks to 'go on and end in nothing'" (28-9). This suggests what anomie theory defines as retreatism, deviant but legitimate behaviour.

It seems, the United Kingdom's foreign policy had developed an aversion towards conference diplomacy. However, one would be jumping prematurely to any conclusions arguing that it must have been a personal issue for Foreign Secretary George Canning. From his letters as well as from the secondary literature quoted above no irrational aversion to conference diplomacy can be recognised. Instead, it is shown that he was concerned that conference diplomacy would pave a road to war. How worried he was is substantiated by his assumption that Austria was looking for war (in his opinion did not follow peaceful intentions) using conference diplomacy and that Russia first had to restore diplomatic relations with Turkey before a conference could take place with the United Kingdom.

However, the United Kingdom's deviant behaviour developed while the crisis continued. This time deviant behaviour moved from legitimate retreatism to illegitimate actions. Temperley (2012 [1923]) has observed that in the second half of 1825 the United Kingdom began acting on her own, attempting to force Turkey to make peace. The United Kingdom endeavoured acting on her own as a mediator (ibid.: 89). Consequently, she displayed not only retreatism as deviant behaviour but also embarked on unilateral policies and renounced the coordination of her policies with the other great powers - both are distinct violations of rule #1 (coordination of policies) and rule #2 (refraining from unilateral action). The coordination of policies and refraining from unilateral action was one of the first major rules of concert diplomacy the United Kingdom and the other powers agreed upon even before Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated (cf. chapter 4, *The rules of working in concert in post-1815 inter-state relations*).

When the Tsar unexpectedly passed away on 1 December 1825 Foreign Secretary Canning sent the Duke of Wellington to Russia to convey the United Kingdom's condolences to Russia (Temperley 2012 [1923]; cf. Stapleton 1859: 470). Alas, this seemed to be a mere pretence. According to Canning's instructions from 10 February 1826 it was the responsibility of Wellington to convince the new Tsar of a much more purely Russian policy than before (Stapleton 1859: 470-2). Wellington should also encourage the opinions of Russian Ministers like Nesselrode, who had previously spoken with contempt of Prince Metternich's policy. In short, Russia should be taken out of the influence of Austria and listen only to the United Kingdom.

This, too, violates the rules of concert diplomacy. Wooing unilaterally one allied state trying to extracting it from the influence of another allied state to follow one's own course of action violates rule #1 (coordination of policies) and #2 (refraining from unilateral action). It also once more

offended the spirit of concerted diplomacy in which these rules were agreed upon as early as the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814.

Eventually, the United Kingdom succeeded in wooing Russia, separating Russia from concert diplomacy in order to safeguard peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Stapleton (1859) explained:

“The result of the Duke’s mission to the Czar was the signature of the celebrated Protocol between Great Britain and Russia, which regulated the action of the two Powers in the affairs of the East, whereby the Greek question was brought into a train of settlement, with the co-operation of Russia, but without affording to Russia opportunities of aggrandizement” (474-5).¹⁵⁸

This protocol between the United Kingdom and Russia developed into the Treaty of London signed by the United Kingdom, Russia and France on 6 July 1827 (Kagan 1997; cf. Stapleton 1859: 487). In this treaty the three parties agreed upon calling on Greece and Turkey to cease hostilities and pledging not to seek “territorial extension, exclusive influence or commercial advantage” (Temperley 2012 [1923]: 96). Prussia and Austria were conspicuously absent from this treaty, whereas France entered the treaty only later on (Kagan 1997).¹⁵⁹

This was a watershed moment in the post-1815 inter-state society of concert diplomacy. Strangely enough Russia had been pulled out of concert diplomacy by the United Kingdom (cf. Kagan 1997: 30-32), despite the fact that only five years earlier, when almost the same problems with Greece

¹⁵⁸ George Canning carefully orchestrated the publication of this Protocol to the other great powers in Europe (cf. Stapleton 1859: 477-9). Also, Prussia (Count Bernstorff), upon having been informed about the Protocol, regretted that the United Kingdom did not adopt the agreed-upon content of the Protocol years earlier since it is the same position the great powers represented towards Russia at this earlier time (ibid.: 481).

¹⁵⁹ For the discussions between George Canning and the King of France regarding the protocol between the United Kingdom and Russia, as well as the Treaty of London (1827) see Stapleton (1859: 484-5).

had already occurred, she displayed remarkable restraint, forwent concrete advantages for the sake of the moral principle of concert diplomacy (Ikenberry 2001) and refrained from declaring war on Turkey just to save the European alliance (Schroeder 1994: 621). The difference, however, between 1822 and 1827 was that in 1822 the United Kingdom supported concert diplomacy to resolve the Greek problem (cf. above). By 1827 the United Kingdom may have had become weary of concert diplomacy, but during the Russo-Greek crisis of 1827 she had not yet engaged in deviant and illegitimate behaviour.

The situation five years later was different. Bridge and Bullen (2005) explained that Russia refrained from unilateral action in the early 1820s because with the support of the United Kingdom Russia could be restrained in harmony. According to Ikenberry (2001), the allied powers succeeded in 1821/1822 to restrain Russia because “concert diplomacy acted as a mechanism to moderate and restrain the exercise of power by the major states primarily through the promulgation of norms of restraint and peer pressure” (106). Ikenberry refers to this restraining mechanism of concert diplomacy as moral suasion, defining it as “an appeal to the collective responsibility of the great powers for European peace and stability, to the norm of what the other powers considered appropriate and legitimate behaviour” (ibid.). Moral suasion, or constraining forces through the promulgation of norms of restraint and peer pressure, was precisely what was missing in the mid-1820s, thwarted by deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom.

At this stage the discussion above has revealed some important answers. At the beginning, I wondered what deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom could look like. I suggested that deviant behaviour would perhaps be behaviour contrarious to the rules of concert diplomacy and thus different to what most states of the concert of Europe would consider normal or acceptable. In the mid-1820s and in context of the Greek crisis there were three examples of deviant behaviour:

First, deviant behaviour on behalf of the United Kingdom displayed in her refusal to participate in the conference in St Petersburg. Following anomie theory, this was a case of retreatism violating rule #3 of concert diplomacy.¹⁶⁰ The discussion showed that although George Canning was a key figure responsible for this, his concerns were associated with a misappropriation of concert diplomacy for war instead of peace. Second, the United Kingdom also displayed deviant behaviour when she attempted to solve the crisis on her own through unilateral policies. This was an obvious violation of rules #1 and #2. Third, the United Kingdom showed deviancy when she successfully removed Russia from concert diplomacy and thereby violated rules #1 and #2.

At the beginning of this section I also wondered what repercussions deviancy could have had on the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. I have shown in chapter 3, *Anomie theory and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society* that there is little doubt in IR literature that the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society was introduced in the 1820s. But how does this regression connect with the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation, particularly deviancy? Developments between the great powers of Europe towards the end of the 1820s are insightful in this regard.

5.4.2 Anomie and its effects on the European society of states

Towards the late-1820s, Russia blatantly disregarded the great powers, including the United Kingdom with whom Russia had signed an agreement in 1827, and unilaterally attacked Turkey in 1828.¹⁶¹ By 1829 Russian forces had approached Constantinople and seemed on the verge of taking the city. Out of fear that Russia might take Constantinople the United Kingdom reinforced its Mediterranean fleet and advanced to the vicinity of the Straits, joined by her former arch-rival

¹⁶⁰ Rules of concert diplomacy: (#1) the coordination of policies, (#2) refraining from unilateral action and (#3) constructive participation in joint congresses, conferences and ambassadorial meetings.

¹⁶¹ The protocol between the United Kingdom and Russia as well as the Treaty of London (1827) did not prevent what concerted diplomacy prevented five years earlier.

France. Kagan (1997) believes that Russia refrained from taking Constantinople not because of “adherence to Concert norms, but rather from considerations of the balance of power and deterrence” (33).

This Russo-Turkish war was terminated by the Treaty of Adrianople from 1829, concluded without the opinions of the other great powers. “Indeed, Russia refused an Austrian proposal of a joint great power guarantee of Turkey” (35). Temperly (2012) [1923] writes that:

“The Treaty of Adrianople marked the culmination of Russian policy. Russia had actually achieved what Canning had always attempted to prevent her from accomplishing. She had acted alone; she had declared war on Turkey; she had emerged triumphantly from the War, and was therefore naturally inclined to demand her own terms” (101).¹⁶²

This signifies that *Realpolitik* and unilateral, arbitrary military campaigning was on the table again. Constructive inter-state cooperation in context of concert diplomacy between at least most of the great powers of Europe was over. The true sense of solidarity and responsibility that developed through concert diplomacy after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte (Elrod 1976) had disappeared. Rosecrance (1963) and Elrod (1976) ascertained that concert diplomacy was an important factor contributing to peace in the post-1815 inter-state society. Scholars in IR largely agree in this regard arguing that the demise of concert diplomacy introduced an end to the post-1815 inter-state society (cf. Hinsley 1962; Rosecrance 1963; Bridge and Bullen 2005; Kissinger 2013 [1957]; Evans 2017).

As of 1829, not only had this peace been broken but the constructive cooperation among the powers of the Concert of Europe had ceased. Therefore, what signifies an increasing state of

¹⁶² Kissinger (1994: 92): “the concert of Europe was ultimately shattered on the anvil of the Eastern Question”. George Canning did not live to witness it. He had passed away in 1827.

normlessness and a breakdown of social standards is not merely Russian action in 1828/1829. The word *regression* (of the post-1815 inter-state society) donates to a deterioration of the post-1815 inter-state society into an inferior condition, towards increasing normlessness and a breakdown of social standards (like the rules of concert diplomacy).

Where does this come from? Deviant behaviour is not merely a violation of rules. Deviant behaviour violates norms that are embodied by rules. Such norms constitute a moral conscience of a particular time, an awareness of what kind of behaviour is right or wrong. If deviant behaviour violates this moral conscience, a breakdown of social standards governing behaviour occurs which is referred to as anomie (Merton 1964: 226). The effect of anomie on an inter-state society can be devastating. Social instability can result from such a breakdown of social standards (cf. chapter 2, *The Theory of Anomie in IR*).

Such social instability did not follow right away from 1829 onwards, although the decades after the 1820s nonetheless suggest that it had gained a foothold in inter-state relations in Europe. This is explained by IR literature itself. Referring to the inter-state period after the 1820s as one of social instability means that a true sense of solidarity and responsibility had vanished among the great powers in Europe (Elrod 1976). The *pactum de contrahendo*, pact of restraint, had dwindled away (Ikenberry 2001). States had become more self-centred again, pursuing their own interests rigorously (Evans 2017). They were no longer embedded in political unity, and according to the Bavarian minister in Vienna, states no longer subordinated their policy aims to the general interest of Europe (Bridge and Bullen 2005: 129).

Furthermore, encroaching social instability in inter-state relations is also visible by the fact that after the 1820s states seemed less capable of dealing with subsequent issues in Europe, particularly nationalist revolutions in 1830 and the great upheavals of the 1840s (Evans 2017). No inter-state

mechanism like concert diplomacy existed anymore which could have funnelled and checked inter-state or trans-European challenges.

For what is worth, between the 1830s and 1850s old rivalries arose and new ones developed. In the early 1830s, for example, Great Britain suddenly found herself cooperating with the Eastern powers against France who tried to gain a foothold in the Belgium crisis of 1831-2 (Hinsley 1962). At the same time, the Eastern association of great powers became increasingly tottering due to seething rivalries between Austria and Prussia over Germany on one side and Austria and Russia over the Near East on the other side (ibid.). This new rivalrous conflict situation among the former members of the Concert of Europe soon escalated in the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 where, for the first time since the defeat of Napoleon, great powers of Europe fought against each other again. Two decades of conflict and at least four great-power wars followed after the Crimean War: the war of Piedmont and France against Austria in 1859, the war over Schleswig-Holstein of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 (Kissinger 1994: 103). What entailed the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society, introduced by deviant behaviour leading to anomie, was a conflict-riddled field of battle so well known to Europe before 1815.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I highlighted a discrepancy in IR literature between those scholars who revealed that the United Kingdom had played a detrimental role in concert diplomacy and scholars who argued that the United Kingdom, at least with Lord Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary, was a staunch supporter of concert diplomacy.

The UK had an interest in the post-1815 architecture but due to entanglements in America was not engaged as much as continental powers. Furthermore, in some important matters the UK acted more as a mediator than an affected party. A proponent of concert diplomacy was Lord

Castlereagh, who recognised concert diplomacy's contribution to amicable relations and repose on the Continent. As of 1818, primary sources showed that this stance was not supported by some influential politicians in London. Particularly George Canning became sceptical toward concert diplomacy.

The important issue was, however, whether the United Kingdom considered concert diplomacy and the rules associated with it conducive and promising towards lasting peace in Europe, a goal the United Kingdom evidently shared with the rest of the states committed to concert diplomacy. The preceding analysis showed that this was the case until at least 1818 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. As of 1820, however, London's mood towards concert diplomacy changed. Discordance over Spain precipitated a loss of faith in concert diplomacy and the rules associated with it.

This dissatisfaction with or alienation from concert diplomacy reached a climax over a second Greek crisis in 1825. This time, the United Kingdom displayed deviant and illegitimate behaviour by violating the rules of concert diplomacy. However, despite the United Kingdom's perhaps honest endeavours for peace the state-society of concert diplomacy lost track thenceforth. In the years following the mid-1820s the Concert of Europe dismantled and slid back into inter-state relations of *Realpolitik*, encapsulated by what is referred to as a system of states (as opposed to a society of states). Rivalries, zeros-sum-competitions over the pursuit of individual state-interests, the disability of jointly finding solutions to shared issues and a farewell to political unity and moral parity threw back Europe's achievements of concert diplomacy.

6: Theoretical and empirical implications for IR

6.1 Introduction

In this dissertation anomie theory has been developed vis-à-vis criticism against the use of Durkheimian sociology in IR (cf. chapter 2) as well as English School (ES) theory conceptualisations of international society (cf. chapter 3). In light of this criticism, it has been argued that anomie theory in this dissertation is an accurate and holistic element of Durkheimian sociology with significant explanatory strength. This means that the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation can explain how an international society develops and why it can regress. This has become apparent in the previous chapters (4 and 5) using the historic case of the post-1815 inter-state society where the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation was put to proof. This dissertation's version of anomie thereby constitutes an important complement to ES's understanding of international society.

In this chapter I re-engage with the previously heralded value of anomie theory and emphasise the additional insight anomie theory can offer the study of IR. I begin with my initial critique of IR theory and highlight that anomie theory is firmly grounded in Durkheimian sociology. Unlike IR's previous engagement with Durkheimian sociology, anomie theory in this dissertation is not merely an isolated concept but constitutes a fundamental component of Durkheim's sociology. It addresses the pivotal ideas of Emile Durkheim's scholarly interests, particularly the cohesion of society. Anomie theory is also clean of any outdated biological explanations and Darwinian or racist prejudices (unlike Durkheim's differentiation between mechanical and organic societies, cf. chapter 2, *Emile Durkheim and IR*).

In the second section I discuss the added value the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation can offer for IR's understanding of post-1815 inter-state relations. I draw on three particularly elaborate and insightful analyses from scholars who have discussed post-1815 inter-

state relations. I also consider the contributions by numerous additional scholars in IR and History. This discussion shows that many scholars have highlighted correctly important characteristics of this period, but failed to explain them. Some of these important characteristics were an unusual degree of inter-state cooperation, strong vows for peace and shared feelings over a future destiny of Europe. Anomie theory can synthesise these characteristics within its explanatory capabilities. According to anomie theory, the strong vows for peace and shared feelings over a future destiny of Europe are implicit in states' quest for peace in conjunction with the inter-state mechanism of concert diplomacy. In other words, the joint agreement on rules of behaviour towards the achievement of the shared goal of peace enabled an unusual (qualitatively and constructively) degree of inter-state cooperation.

In the final section of this chapter I address the perhaps strongest insight anomie theory in this dissertation can offer the study of IR: an explanation for why an inter-state society can regress and what regression in this regard means. This explanation is rooted in the empirical investigation of chapter 5 and, at its core, argues that a state's inability to attain a society-wide goal by behaviour deemed legitimate can lead to deviant behaviour. Such deviant behaviour can violate the moral conscience of an inter-state society, leading to deteriorating social standards and social instability (referred to as anomie). In the post-1815 inter-state society this became obvious through the increasing irrelevance of the rules of concert diplomacy in inter-state relations as well as a rising tendency towards *Realpolitik*. In this final section I also discuss the meaning of regression in context of this dissertation's anomie theory and draw a parallel to Joseph Schumpeter's atavism in the sociology of imperialism. In combination with ES discussions on international system and international society I conclude that regression of the post-1815 inter-state society was a gradually atavistic development (regression) from an inter-state society towards a system of states which unfolded from the late-1820s onwards.

6.2 Anomie theory: a theory of International Relations

At the beginning of this dissertation I criticised IR for having relied upon the sociology of Emile Durkheim erroneously and superficially. I discussed particularly the work of Kenneth Waltz who has grounded one of his most influential works considerably in Durkheimian sociology (cf. chapter 2). However, I argued that Waltz misinterpreted Durkheim and applied his concepts too selectively. I furthermore criticised other scholars in IR for committing the same mistake. Now that I have constructed a version of Durkheimian anomie theory for the study of IR and employed this version of anomie theory in context of early nineteenth century inter-state relations, it is time to compare the added value and insight of anomie theory with the foregone criticism.

In chapter 2 I explained that two flawed approaches in IR's engagement with the sociology of Emile Durkheim stand out. One concerns Durkheim's idea of dynamic density. For example, Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert (2010) explain that "dynamic density is a materialist theory of the driving forces that push development up the ladder of differentiation" (ibid.: 323), caused by increasing numbers of people in a society as well as increasing contacts and interactions among them (ibid.: 319). As a result, a task-related, materialist and production-centred functional differentiation develops. However, Buzan and Albert ignored that dynamic density is not merely a materialist theory (if at all) but has a strong moral component.¹⁶³ Durkheim (2013: 202; 2019: 8) himself referred to it as *moral* density and stressed that the exchange of ideas and sentiments played an important role, too. If this moral, non-materialist character of dynamic density is ignored, it is also not self-evident that a task-related, materialist functional differentiation develops from dynamic density. Above all, Durkheim himself doubted that functional interdependencies alone could form a stable society (Bowring 2016). Other scholars (e.g. Ruggie 1986; Cerny 1993; Barkdull 1995) made similar mistakes. They attributed to dynamic density a certain degree of rationality, materialism as well as egoism which simply remains concealed if Durkheim's own

¹⁶³ Cf. Chapter 2, *Emile Durkheim and IR*.

thoughts on dynamic density are investigated thoroughly. It seems that scholars in IR have relied upon their understanding of dynamic density almost exclusively through Durkheim's work of *The Division of Labour* and failed to consider some of his other major works (like *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* and *On Suicide*).¹⁶⁴

This unwarranted approach to Durkheim's idea of dynamic density in such a utilitarian, materialist and profusely rational fashion evokes the thought that IR has misunderstood his sociology fundamentally. This is particularly evident in Kenneth Waltz's engagement with Durkheim's sociology. Waltz (1979: 104) used Durkheimian ideas of the division of labour and mechanical society to argue that the two different realms of domestic political order and international political anarchy exist. He equalled the international realm of anarchy with Durkheim's idea of the mechanical society. This was a problem in so far that Waltz bestowed upon state-egoism in an anarchic realm of self-help a functional role that stands in contradistinction with Durkheim's understanding of the role of egoism in a mechanical society. Waltz (ibid.: 91) applied the role of egoism according to egoism's function in a perfect economic market and according to utilitarian microeconomic ideas where egoistic behaviour of self-regarding units manufacture coercion. Durkheim, however, never bestowed upon egoism such productive, conducive character, neither from a general sociological standpoint nor in regard to the mechanical society (cf. chapter 2, *Emile Durkheim and IR*).¹⁶⁵

Waltz once mentioned that Emile Durkheim was the most influential thinker on his conception of international relations (Rosenberg 2013: 189). Therefore, my criticism towards the erroneous and superficial application of Durkheimian sociology by Kenneth Waltz seems to have particularly

¹⁶⁴ Although Durkheim also explained in *The Division of Labour* that increasing interactions among an increasing number of people draws members of a society *morally* together (cf. chapter 2, *Emile Durkheim and IR*).

¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, Waltz ignored that Durkheim's ideas pertaining to the mechanical society were rooted in biological and Darwinian ideas (Lukes 1973: 82ff.; Delitz 2013: 96) and that Durkheim, in context of the mechanical society, worked with racial prejudices (both aspects were rather normal at this time, compared to today's standards).

far-reaching consequences on his theory of structural realism. Does it not falsify his theory altogether? To be fair, Waltz (2001 [1959]) also relied upon Durkheimian sociology to underpin his argument that an anthropocentric epistemological approach is inappropriate for students of international politics. This is, in my opinion, justified because Emile Durkheim was indeed averse to sociological reasoning grounded exclusively in for instance psychological factors or other causes specific to individuals (cf. Durkheim 1901; Durkheim 1981). Nevertheless, in his *Theory of International Politics* he bestowed upon the role of egoism a property irreconcilable with Durkheimian sociology. If rectified, Waltz would have to award egoism a detrimental role. Consonant with Durkheim's understanding of egoism Waltz would have had to argue that egoistic behaviour of so-called self-regarding units does not foster coaction but makes it impossible. Consequently, egoistic behaviour does not warrant a stable system in an anarchical realm but confounds it. However, this idea that egoistic, self-regarding units, in an ostensibly Hobbesian realm of anarchy, create a stable international realm was perhaps one of his major contributions to the study of IR.

Similar to the scholars working with the idea of dynamic density, Waltz, too, bestowed upon Durkheimian sociology a utilitarian, amoral character. This is a recondite characterisation of Durkheimian sociology impossible to reconstruct by a broad but thorough examination of his sociology. Scholars in IR have ignored or overlooked that Emile Durkheim was deeply critical of utilitarian approaches. He rejected Herbert Spencer's idea that removing moral, juridical and political restraints from individuals is a form of differentiation that will allow every individual to strive without hindrance for his own private advantage (Poggi 2000: 46). Three years before Durkheim died he reverted to "the utilitarian idea of the naturally egoistic self which must be tamed and controlled for the sake of social order" (ibid.: 28). It is true that Emile Durkheim pioneered sober calculations of social facts (Delitz 2013: 21). Perhaps scholars in IR have been

distracted by his sober, scientific and factual approach to understanding social phenomena and confounded his ideas, concepts and theories with this epistemological approach.

The theory of anomie developed in this dissertation averts such shortcomings. To begin with, the theory of anomie I have developed in chapter 2 and 3 is firmly grounded in Durkheimian sociology. It is not a merely isolated idea. Instead, it is colligated with Emile Durkheim's major sociological interests like the concern for the cohesion of societies as well as social integration in times of transformations; it is also grounded in Durkheim's normative understanding of the role rules play. Furthermore, anomie is a subject Durkheim had handled in some of his major sociological contributions, not just in *The Division of Labour* but also, for example, in *On Suicide*. Anomie thus constitutes a fundamental component of Durkheim's sociology. Furthermore, scholarship on anomie continued beyond Durkheim's lifetime. Sociologists and criminologists like Robert Merton, Marshall Clinard and Marvin Olsen revived and refined anomie theory from the 1930s to the 1960s. Their contributions proved invaluable for the theory of anomie in this dissertation, too. Anomie theory, as constructed in this dissertation, is thus a sound sociological concept firmly grounded in Durkheimian sociology.

Furthermore, the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation is not associated with Darwinian or racist philosophies nor biological explanations. It has been developed soundly and comprehensively within the broader sociological oeuvre of Durkheimian scholarship. It integrates not only Emile Durkheim's scholarship on anomie but also his ontological thinking on what makes a society (the moral conscience). More than that, it epitomises his renowned approach that not an individual in a society must be at fault but that society itself can have adverse repercussions on the individual. In Durkheim's sociology this does not only come to the fore in his research on anomic suicide and that suicide is not necessarily down to madness of an individual. It is also inherently anchored in anomie theory and the idea that deviant behaviour of a state is not by necessity due to

a hostile character of the deviant actor. Instead, deviant behaviour and anomie are the property of a social environment (Merton 1964: 234-5). Above all, the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation implicitly confers to egoism its accurate property. This implies that in a certain sense an inter-state society regression occurs if egoism spreads. This is the case if egoism is connected with deviant behaviour, particularly given the fact that deviant behaviour epitomises solo action in violation of concerted, collective and so-called legitimate behaviour towards a shared goal (like peace).

The compelling character of anomie theory, and the benefits it offers contrary to previous engagements with Durkheimian sociology, has come to the fore in its empirical application, too.

First, the type of anomie theory developed in this dissertation tackles the fundamental issues of cohesion and integration of an inter-state society. Anomie theory explained how the post-1815 inter-state society came into existence, even while Napoleon was still not quite defeated. As early as October 1813 coalition states agreed to convene in congress to debate post-war Europe. They thereby committed to a fundamental aspect of concert diplomacy: assembling for the joint discussion of inter-state issues. In treaties like the Treaty of Chaumont, the Treaty of Paris, the General Treaty from the Congress of Vienna and a joint *Déclaration* from the Congress of Vienna states solidified their will to work towards lasting peace in Europe by means of behavioural rules leading to concert diplomacy. These rules, according to anomie theory, were constitutive in nature because they represented acceptable, legitimate norms of behaviour towards the shared goal of peace. According to the sociology of Durkheim, rules, just like dynamic density, serve no mere task-related, regulatory function. They signify principles of right or wrong to states. They have the imperative character of a moral force (Durkheim and Giddens 1972: 98). For Durkheim, states submit to such a moral force because it promises them a glimpse beyond their own horizon of perhaps national interests. The moral force or moral conscience promises them the achievement

of a society-wide, shared goal like peace. The attainment of this promised goal through legitimate behaviour was shared by coalition states which morphed them into a cohesive group of like-minded partners. It integrated states previously loosely associated by weak agreements, promising subsidies and balance of power considerations, into a cohesive, that is closely united, group.

Second, from this explanation of a cohesive society follows anomie theory's ability to conceptualise ontologically what actually constitutes an inter-state society. Durkheim explained that rules like the rules of concert diplomacy are not only practical imperatives but constitute social facts (Hilbert 1986). What are social facts (*sozialer Tatbestand*)? According to Emile Durkheim (1901), social facts are "capable of exercising a coercive influence on the consciousness of individuals" (13). Social facts can come into existence if several individuals interact together through which a plurality of consciousnesses evolves, crystallizing certain modes of action and certain ways of judging which are independent of the particular independent will (ibid.: 15). Social facts are social in so far that their fulfilment meets an obligation beyond and external to the individual, an obligation that meets social or societal interests. The social facts in the post-1815 inter-state society were the rules of concert diplomacy whereas their adherence promised the goal of lasting peace in Europe, the social or societal interest at that time. Furthermore, such social facts like the rules of concert diplomacy make states confront an objective society. The reality of society is strongly felt through such social facts, "facts that for all intents and purposes *are* society" (Baumann 2005: 362, italics in the original). Unsurprisingly, then, following Durkheim a society of states for its members is a thing-like, corporeal, palpable entity (cf. ibid.: 362). A comparison with the Utrecht settlement 100 years earlier in chapter 4 showed that this was not the case back then. At the Utrecht settlement, states' vows of friendship and peace were not buttressed by rules such as those of concert diplomacy in 1814/1815. Generally speaking, there was no (rule-based) convention among states about how to realise the promises of peace and friendship. As a result,

no society of states between the parties of the Utrecht settlement could emerge, because no social facts in shape of a shared morality confronted states.

Third, anomie theory enables an investigation into early nineteenth century inter-state relations that is not state-centric but holistic, systemic and still sociological in nature. Very much in tradition with Durkheimian sociology, anomie theory does not locate causes for an explanandum in society with individual members; Durkheimian sociology and anomie theory consider social facts external to the individual. More than that, social facts act as constraints, they are compulsory and authoritative, exerting moral pressure on individuals (cf. Müller 2006: 169). Therefore, in Waltzian (1979) terms anomie theory does not suffer the folly of reductionism. In a nutshell this means that “[t]heories of international politics that concentrate causes at the individual or national level are reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic” (ibid.: 18). In this sense anomie theory developed in this dissertation can be considered a systemic theory in IR.

In more detail this means that the original conceptualisation of anomie theory by for instance Robert Merton, which played an important role in the development of anomie theory in this dissertation, considers anomie theory as a non-biological sociological explanation for deviant behaviour. One of Merton’s major drivers for his curiosity on Durkheimian anomie theory came from the fact that until Durkheim anti-social behaviour was frequently associated with biological drivers (Merton 1938). The systemic character of anomie theory also emerges from the distinction between anomie and anomia. Anomie is not the state-of-mind of an individual. It is rather a property of a social system, “a condition of the social environment, not of the isolated self. It is not one’s private estrangement from the goals and rules laid down by society that constitutes anomie [...] but the visible estrangement from these goals and rules among the others one confronts” (Merton 1964: 234-235). Anomie lies at the heart of the value system of a society, like

in its institutions (Besnard 1988: 93) whereas anomia refers to the anomic state of an individual (Merton 1964: 227).

This, too, became apparent in anomie theory's application in context of post-1815 inter-state relations. The quest for lasting peace in Europe was not imposed upon any major state, including the United Kingdom. Rather, it was collaboratively agreed upon among coalition states. Furthermore, the United Kingdom's deviant behaviour was not due to an inimical character on her part. The investigation in chapter 6 demonstrated that peace in Europe continued to be the United Kingdom's wanting despite her illegitimate behaviour. Instead, she had lost faith in the social institution of concert diplomacy and the rules associated with it. In the vocabulary of anomie theory a means-ends breakdown occurred whereby society's promise (peace) could no longer be achieved by society's prescribed legitimate behaviour (rules of concert diplomacy) – at least in the eyes of one member of the post-1815 society of states. Furthermore, the resulting state of anomie understood as a departure from previously agreed upon normatively legitimate behaviour was not the fault of one singular state neither. The United Kingdom's deviant behaviour, particularly her successful commitment to removing Russia from concert diplomacy in the mid-1820s, had acted upon Russia and other states in such a way that concert diplomacy played a decreasing relevance as of the late 1820s in inter-state relationships, to the point that constructive solutions to trans-European or inter-state challenges became harder to solve and increasingly had the potential for inter-state frictions and rivalries unknown to the heydays of concert diplomacy (cf. chapter 6). One early and prominent example in chapter 6 was the impossibility or failure of concert diplomacy to restrain Russia in its policies towards Greece and Turkey in the late 1820s. Therefore, European inter-state relations of the formerly concertedly associated major powers became unhinged not due to the hostility of one state but due to deviant behaviour and anomie as a social property of the post-1815 inter-state society.

However, what is of significance in this debate of IR theory and anomie is not only the criticism of IR's engagement with Durkheimian sociology in comparison to the benefits that can be gained from anomie theory developed in this dissertation. It is also important to understand what analytical insight anomie theory can offer IR beyond erroneous and cursory adaptations of Durkheim's sociology. This puts the English School (ES) theory back on the agenda.

In chapter 3 I discussed ES's understanding of international society. In chapter 3 I employed ES's understanding of international society to refine anomie theory as the analytical framework in this dissertation. This was a detailed discussion which brought to light that ES offers good conceptualisations of international society. Scholars including Charles Manning, Hedley Bull and Martin Wright ascribed morality and rules (or positive law) a necessary role in their ideas of international society.¹⁶⁶ Barry Buzan became more specific in terms of rules, explaining instructively how Manning, Bull and Wright considered rules while at the same time refining or categorising rules into three levels. I criticised, however, that rules on their own, no matter how determinant, authoritative or functional they might be, serve little purpose in ES's understanding of international society, if rules are not adhered by. Therefore, the first question should be why states follow rules after all and what effect this has on our understanding of international society. Only afterwards does it make sense to go one step further contemplating the different kinds of rules.

More recent ES contributions like Ian Clark's scholarship on legitimacy in international society offered no solution. Clark (2005: 24) argued international society is defined by the fact that states seem to accept that they are obligated to respect rules. His ideas of legitimacy in international society are intrinsically connected with rules (2005: 18). However, Clark bypassed the idea of why states follow rules in the first place, too. He once mentioned that rules are respected because they

¹⁶⁶ Cf. chapter 3 for definitions of international society by ES theory.

embody proper ends and standards, because they represent a certain morality (Clark 2005: 18). This explanation nonetheless leaves the question unanswered of why a powerful state, a front-row power like Russia or the United Kingdom around 1815 should have followed rules? If the respect for rules should only serve the realisation of a morality I find this explanation not convincing because altruism for a greater good (like a kind of morality) has not (yet) found traction in the study of IR as a motive for state behaviour.

To make it more specific: How would ES explain the post-1815 inter-state society? According to ES a group of states would A) be bound by rules regulating their relationships and B) work together in joint institutions. Following Buzan (2006: 79) such rules would be rules regarding constitutive normative principles, rules of coexistence and rules regulating cooperation. Buzan's writing permits some intelligent guessing: a normative principle in post-1815 inter-state relations might have been nationalism. Rules regulating relationships could be the sanctity of agreements, diplomacy and the balance of power. Rules regulating cooperation include perhaps the abrogation of the slave trade and freedom of navigation on inland water ways. The problem is that any powerful state like Russia at that time could have disregarded these rules as irrelevant. For example, the normative principle of nationalism entails respect for territoriality and sovereignty - a rule quickly discarded by a unilateral intervention. After all, Russia, for example, had 150,000 troops and 540 pieces of artillery outside Paris, almost right in the middle of Europe, in late 1814; arguably enough to turn around and go against Prussia and Austria (Simms 2014). There was no higher or stronger power that restrained her. In short, in ES's definition of international society is no stimulus for adhering to rules. Of course, neither Russia nor the United Kingdom violated such rules after the defeat of Napoleon. But the vexing question that is not answered by ES is why they didn't.

Anomie theory is more instructive and in this case complements ES's conceptualisation of a society of states. Anomie theory developed in this dissertation argues that states follow rules, like the rules of concert diplomacy, because they promise the achievement of a specific good. In the example of the early nineteenth century and post-1815 inter-state relations this specific good was (lasting) peace in Europe. It was a greater goal for the whole of Europe but it was also a specific goal explicitly pursued by individual states like the United Kingdom. Following rules of concert diplomacy for the achievement of such a goal implied behaviour jointly considered by the front-row powers as rightful and legitimate: The goal of peace was not to be achieved collectively by other means like war, unilateral actions etc. Through the adherence to rightful behaviour (rules of concert diplomacy) a morality of rightful conduct was recognised by states, a morality by which they identified their inter-state conduct at that particular period in time. States' recognition of this shared morality became the glue that closed their ranks and made them realise that they are a like-minded group of states. This was the case until at least the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818.

This dissertation's version of anomie theory thereby completes ES's understanding of a society of states in so far that it explains why states follow rules in the first place and why rule-abidance is relevant for a society of states to emerge: states follow rules because they promise the attainment of a goal and following rules, rules which epitomise a shared morality, engenders a society of states (a group of like-minded).

6.3 Anomie theory and post-1815 inter-state relations in IR

How has IR literature understood the inter-state relations between 1815 and the 1820s? What are the differences that come to light vis-à-vis this dissertation's appropriated version of anomie theory? One of the earlier conscientious analyses of post-1815 inter-state relations came from Charles Webster. His processing of historic facts is imposing. From today's perspective, however, his interpretations of facts might be considered insufficient and outdated. It is frequently difficult

to see what his conceptual framework could have been beyond balance of power considerations. Webster (1913) mentions from early on it was the United Kingdom's declared aim to construct a just equilibrium in Europe. He argues that the Congress of Vienna was about the balance of power, particularly from London's perspective. However, he does not define or discuss what just equilibrium means (particularly the aspect of *justice*). The same applies to the balance of power. There is a variety of different meanings of the often ambiguous concept of the balance of power (cf. Claude 1962). It is, for example, unclear whether for Webster the balance of power in post-1815 inter-state relations was a situation, a policy or a system. And did the balance of power epitomise just material factors or political inequality, too (cf. Peterson 1945)? How did it wield its influence? Was it a "self-regulatory mechanism of the social forces" (Morgenthau 1985: 27)?

Furthermore, Webster's (1924) conclusions often seem profusely anthropocentric (i.e. persona-related), for example derived from what Lord Castlereagh or Prince Metternich apparently said or decided. This is to say that intentions and actions of states are frequently rooted in the character of individuals. To be fair, individuals like Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich did have at times a strong influence on the foreign policies of their states. But Webster's description of inter-state relations hardly goes beyond anthropocentric reasoning. Furthermore, individual events are pertinently explained but scarcely assembled into a bigger picture. To offer the reader one example: Webster (1918: 82) explains that by signing the Final Act at Vienna in 1815 each front-rank power committed herself to respecting the special interests of the other powers. This is an interesting and potentially important finding. But Webster does not use this finding for a more conceptual analysis of inter-state relations at that time.

Nonetheless, Webster's scholarship on post-1815 inter-state relations was pioneering, especially his collection of historic facts accurately describing events at that time. His influence on IR's understanding of this period has been profound. Still, not without reason, scholars have frequently

chafed at Webster's balance of power references.¹⁶⁷ Their criticism and counter proposals have been particularly rich. Especially noteworthy are, among others, the contributions by (in chronological order) Henry Kissinger, Paul Schroeder and Robert Jervis.

Similar to Webster, Kissinger (2013 [1957]) puts particular focus on the roles played by Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich. However, he explains that stability after 1815 originated within generally accepted legitimacy. This accepted legitimacy was grounded in an international agreement on permissible aims and methods in foreign policy. "It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers" (ibid.: 1) insofar that no power is dissatisfied to the degree of expressing her dissatisfaction with revolutionary foreign policy. Kissinger (1994) believes that the balance of power was a present issue at that time arguing that the international order contrived by the Congress of Vienna "was created more explicitly in the name of the balance of power than any other before or since" (79). However, it "relied the least on power to maintain itself" (ibid.). Concerning the United Kingdom's role Kissinger (2013 [1957]) recognises that the United Kingdom's aim around 1815 was "a stable balance of power brought about by the reduction of France and the augmentation of the Central Powers" (39). He also stresses an important discrepancy between the United Kingdom and continental front-rank powers: "[t]o Castlereagh the equilibrium was a mechanical expression of the balance of forces; to the Continental nations, a reconciliation of historical aspirations" (147). At the same time, however, Kissinger stresses that it was Lord Castlereagh who introduced concert diplomacy to the continent (ibid.: 215). In fact, the concert of Europe was identical with Castlereagh's and Metternich's notion of equilibrium, whereas it was Castlereagh's invention of the conference system which maintained this equilibrium (ibid.: 323).

¹⁶⁷ Besides Webster, Rie (1950), too, interpreted post-1815 inter-state relations partly in context of the balance of power. Nicolson (1946), in the introduction to *The Congress of Vienna* wrote of the United Nations between 1815 and 1822 ("This study of the grouping and regrouping of the United Nations between 1812 and 1822..." (vii). However, what enabled these united nations and the peacefulness of this era was, according to Nicolson, (ibid.: 123-4), British supremacy alone.

Kissinger's contribution to IR's understanding of post-1815 inter-state relations have been critically much acclaimed. He provides an ingenious rejoinder to Webster's contributions. However, he explains that international legitimacy originates within an acceptance of permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. But this raises the question of why states should accept permissible aims and methods of foreign policy if no overarching, shared incentive (like lasting peace in Europe) exists? Anomie theory shows that common ground towards a shared goal brings together states with different characteristics and often diverging national interests. For example, the United Kingdom was an island state, a trading power with mighty naval power on a global scale. Whereas Russia was a continental power of staggering geographical extent and impressive land forces. Without a commonly shared goal, why should these two powers have agreed upon permissible aims and methods of foreign policy? Anomie theory shows that there needs to be common ground, something that all states strive for. After the defeat of Napoleon this was lasting peace in Europe, a goal one single state, neither the United Kingdom nor Russia, could enforce. Hence, cooperation grounded in agreed upon legitimate behaviour was inevitable. Unfortunately, however, this does not come to the fore in Kissinger's scholarship.

Schroeder (1962) investigated a different analytical avenue of post-1815 inter-state relations. He argued that one purpose of the Concert of Europe was the restoration of a balance of power in Europe. Another purpose was "the achievement of a large measure of international cooperation, together with the provision for certain machinery to be used by the Allies to carry on their collaboration in the future" (4). There are various names for it but the fact remains that "during this period the great powers of Europe felt themselves bound together by an overriding common interest in the maintenance of peace and order" (5). Interests of peace and order were followed by joint conferences where the powers not only discussed how to keep France in check but also dealt "with general questions and policies of common interest and benefit as a means of cementing a union salutary for Europe and the world" (5). Over 20 years later Schroeder (1986) became more

specific explaining that concert diplomacy was indeed the means towards the end of the balance of power. However, unlike Webster he had a specific idea of this balance of power. It was a balance of power characterised by the intermediary body of smaller states working as a buffer zone in the middle of Europe (the German Confederation). It was therefore not to be understood as an orthodox balance of power grounded in material capabilities of the different major powers themselves. Instead, the balance after 1815 was a broader balance in general political conditions and goods, it was a political equilibrium (Schroeder 1989: 142). It was a form of political equilibrium for the enjoyment of stability, peace, and guaranteed rights (ibid.: 143). Unfortunately, in successive writing Schroeder (1992) departs from his original idea that such a political equilibrium was sustained by concert diplomacy and instead puts forward the argument that it was an Anglo-Russo hegemony that guaranteed this equilibrium. Nevertheless, he does not pivot this argument against concert diplomacy but orthodox ideas of power balancing. His major explanation is that in 1815 there was no classical balance of power in Europe. Instead, Russia and Britain both enjoyed literally invulnerable security due to their geographic position. Both states “were so powerful and invulnerable that even a (highly unlikely) alliance of the three other powers against them would not seriously threaten the basic security of either” (687). It was this Anglo-Russo hegemony that brought a mutual consensus of norms and rules. According to Schroeder, from this followed that “the needs of Europe were understood more in legal, moral, and socio-political terms than in terms of simple power” (697) and that “the Vienna settlement involved achieving a consensus more than competing or fighting” (701). Schroeder (1994) advocated this argument also in his magnum opus *The Transformation of European Politics 1763 - 1848*.

Whereas his original idea of the purpose of the Concert of Europe was promising, Schroeder’s evolution of ideas until 1994 brought this erstwhile promising idea to nought. This is particularly

the case since the idea of a benign Anglo-Russo hegemony has been refuted since.¹⁶⁸ In a direct response to Schroeder's article in *The American Historical Review* from 1992, Kraehe (1992: 712), for example, explains that the rivalry between the United Kingdom and Russia was real and keenly felt on both sides, beginning with the Saxon-Polish crisis in 1814/1815.¹⁶⁹ Above all, he argues that the relationship between Russia and Britain was no benign joint hegemony over Europe. Instead, "their relationship was adversarial, constituting a bipolar balance of power, which in turn fostered the development of other regional spheres of influence that neither could easily menace without the risk of provoking a hostile coalition" (715).

Schulz (2009) criticised Schroeder's thesis of an Anglo-Russo hegemony, too, albeit from a different angle. He stresses that the United Kingdom was no hegemonic power in 1815. The United Kingdom was a global actor who could increase the number of colonies in her possession during the Napoleonic wars. In spite of that, her control over colonies was mainly restricted to coastal areas. India, for example, was hardly under control of the British Empire in 1815. In terms of industrial development, Schulz explains that the United Kingdom in 1815 was hardly ahead of other front-rank powers. Her real industrial revolution did not commence before the 1840s to 1860s. Schulz casted doubt on Russia's status as a hegemonic power, too. Russia's territorial extent from Alaska to Central Asia was impressive, but the natural resources enclosed in this vast territory could not be exploited at that time. Above all, Russia was constantly plagued by the fear of insurrections across her huge empire.

The refutation of Schroeder's thesis by Kraehe and Schulz therefore begs the question of what kept a lid on the Anglo-Russo rivalry and, more than that, enabled cooperation between the two

¹⁶⁸ For a generally critical evaluation of the theory of hegemonic stability see Keohane (2005) *After Hegemony*, particularly chapter 3.

¹⁶⁹ Schroeder's (1992) article "Did the Vienna system rest on a balance of power?" in *The American Historical Review* was responded and discussed by not only Kraehe (1992) and Jervis (1992) but also by Gruner (1992). All three scholars criticised Schroeder and made counter-proposals.

framed by the Concert of Europe? According to the appropriated theory of anomie in this dissertation, the United Kingdom and Russia both committed themselves towards the goal of lasting peace from the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Paris in spring 1814. They reiterated this commitment at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. At the same time, they agreed to three elementary rules of legitimate inter-state conduct constitution concert diplomacy. Schroeder rightly identified in his earlier writing an unusually high degree of inter-state cooperation. In his ensuing publications, however, he correlated this inter-state cooperation only with Anglo-Russo relationships. Not only was this benign Anglo-Russo hegemony questionable, but he bestowed upon this high degree of inter-state cooperation, which he recognised in 1962, a merely bilateral dimension instead of crediting it as a property of all front-rank powers at that time.

A similar argument has been made by Osiander (1994). Osiander explained that the negotiators during and after 1815 had a strong bond due to the shared realisation of a common responsibility for the future destiny of Europe. “As a result, the peacemakers approached the congress with a very high degree of system-consciousness” (186). This system-consciousness, however, did not inevitably lead to the re—establishment of the balance of power. Osiander explained that “[i]t soon became clear that, as a guideline for the decision-making, the balance-of-power concept was in fact inadequate” (227). However, what occurred adequate to negotiators was consensus framed by an abstract concept. This abstract concept that stabilised the European international system was the great-power principle. It was a concept to stabilize the system. “Interestingly, the great-power principle displayed an inbuilt capacity to generate consensus among the members of the great-power club. This is one functional reason why it proved so successful” (239).

This interpretation, too, leaves some questions unanswered. To begin with, what was so peculiar about 1814/1815 that at this period in history the coalition partners felt a strong bond due to the

shared realisation of a common responsibility for the future destiny of Europe? Did they not feel a strong bond due to a common responsibility for the destiny of Europe after 1714? In chapter 4 I discussed the Utrecht settlement which brought an end to the War of the Spanish Succession in 1714. The Utrecht settlement shows that the longing for peace and overtures to mutual friendship among states was just as profusely communicated by the once-belligerent parties as it was in 1814/1815. However, if vows for peace and friendship at Utrecht and in 1814/1815 were comparably vociferous, why could these vows become converted into actual inter-state politics after 1814/1815 but not after 1714? What was missing at the Utrecht settlement was a mechanism or road-map to safeguard peace. At Utrecht in 1714 the idea of balancing power was utilised as an attempt to safeguard peace; at Chaumont, Paris, Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle from 1814 to 1818 concert diplomacy came into existence. In fact, Osiander himself recognises that ideas of the balance of power played a role at Utrecht but not that much at Vienna anymore:

“the balance-of-power principle was, nevertheless, no longer the chief source of consensus that it had provided at Utrecht. Indeed, the need for some other concept to play that role, and to supplement the balance-of-power principle, is in fact apparent from the very ubiquity of the expression ‘*just equilibrium*’” (231, italics in the original).

However, Osiander’s great-power principle does not provide a viable or convincing alternative to the balance of power concept. Above all, it is difficult to see what the great-power principle actually means for him since it is never clearly defined. At its core it seems to entail the idea that proceedings at Vienna in 1815 and afterwards were first-and-foremost decided upon by the great powers who felt a particular responsibility for the future of Europe (cf. *ibid.*: 234). It thus appears to me that Osiander’s great-power principle is to be understood similar to Schroeder’s idea of a benign hegemony between the United Kingdom and Russia, but consisting not only of two front-rank powers but all the major coalition states (Austria, Prussia, Russia and the United Kingdom).

This, however, would bring up the same issues I have discussed with Schroeder's interpretation above.

Anomie theory in this dissertation is more insightful because it is explicitly defined and clearly structured. According to anomie theory, the vows of peace and friendship, realisations and shared feelings over the future destiny of Europe in 1814/1815 had no special leverage on the peace that followed until the 1820s. Instead, it was the quest for peace in conjunction with the inter-state mechanism of concert diplomacy, i.e. the joint agreement on rules of behaviour towards the achievement of the shared goal of peace. This came, above all, to the fore in concrete documents and treaties signed by the coalition powers between 1814 to 1818. This conceptualisation of anomie theory also showed between 1814 and 1818, in other words, states practiced what they preached.

Jervis (1985) ascertains that the Concert of 1815 "was characterized by an unusually high and self-conscious level of cooperation among the major European powers" (59). According to Jervis, against the template of the security dilemma four factors made the concert system possible: First, the offense-defense balance which implies that states have less fear of each other exploiting temporary imbalances because they share the belief that such exploitation by one state would not be tolerated by the other states. Second, changes in payoffs which impose costs for a state who does not want to cooperate. The outbreak of a revolution could be one such cost. Third, conferences and congresses facilitated transparency due to fuller and franker communication. Fourth, changed estimates of behaviour of others. This implies that states judged the cooperation of their peers more likely and were thereby themselves more likely to cooperate. According to Jervis, the Concert of Europe was possible in the first place because the aftermath of the war against Napoleon (a major war) had undermined the assumptions of a balance of power system and altered the perceived

payoffs in a way that facilitated cooperation (ibid.: 60). Concert systems, like the one in 1815, are therefore formed against a former hegemon.

Years later Jervis (1992) refined his thinking on post-1815 inter-state relations applying the prisoners' dilemma as an analytical backdrop. He explains that the prisoners' dilemma shows that "actors will cooperate if others cooperate and defect if others defect" (721). There is only a choice between conflict or mutual cooperation. During the 1815-period the costs of war were seen higher than during previous periods and mutual cooperation seemed increasingly attractive as soon as states' basic interests had been satisfied, and especially since it showed that cooperation could solve important problems. At the same time "short-run gains appeared foolish because it would not be too long before others responded with hostility" (721). Unlike the balance of power, this new system of inter-state relations "calls for explicit and self-conscious management. Each state not only depends on others doing their share but must also regulate its own behavior so that it is not excessively disturbing" (724).

Jervis (1992) is correct when he argues that after 1815 "international politics was then characterized by an unusual degree of moderation, respect for others' interests, and attempts to work with as many other states as possible" (719). However, the security dilemma and the prisoners' dilemma do not explain this unusual degree of moderation, respect and cooperation. The offense-defense balance, for example, may make an argument for why a state like Prussia or Austria would have refrained from exploiting weaknesses of other front-rank powers: simply because they were too weak politically and militarily after more than a decade of fighting. But it does not explain what Jervis himself finds so remarkable about this period: the unusual degree of moderation, respect and cooperation, particularly the latter two. There was no overarching authority that would have penalised the United Kingdom, for example, for not cooperating between 1815 and 1818 the way she did. There was also no overarching authority which compelled

Russia to make such an effort in the spirit of concert diplomacy and a community of states at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. The same applies to changes in payoffs for non-cooperation. They, too, are hardly substantiated by the historic record. The United Kingdom did not suffer dire consequences like a domestic revolution when she became alienated by concert diplomacy as of 1818 onwards, not even when she disengaged from concert diplomacy in the 1820s. The same was the case with Russia who did not suffer seriously during or after her unilateral attack on the Ottoman Empire in the late 1820s. What I find also difficult is Jervis' idea that concerts are formed after a major war against a defeated erstwhile hegemon (like France after 1815). If this was the case a concert would have had to arise after every major war, including after the Thirty Years' War in 1648 and after the Wars of the Spanish Succession in 1714.¹⁷⁰ However, Jervis (1985) himself explains that concert systems have occurred only three times: after 1815, 1919 and 1945.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. chapter 4 where I offer a comparison between the Utrecht settlement at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession and post-1815 inter-state relations.

IR Scholars	Interpretation of post-1815 inter-state relations	Weakness
<i>Webster (1913, 1918, 1924)</i>	The United Kingdom, particularly at the behest of Lord Castlereagh, took responsibility for re-constructing a balance of power in post-1815 Europe.	(1) Definition / understanding of balance of power. (2) Interpretation hinges almost exclusively on the persona of one man (Lord Castlereagh).
<i>Kissinger (1994, 2013 [1957])</i>	A legitimate balance of power was created, with a shared understanding of permissible aims and methods in foreign policy.	Leaves open why and how states reached an understanding towards permissible aims and methods in foreign policy.
<i>Schroeder (1962, 1986, 1989, 1992)</i>	A benign hegemony of the United Kingdom and Russia created mutual consensus.	(1) The idea of a benign hegemony / hegemonic stability has been refuted. (2) Both powers' status in 1815 as hegemonic powers is doubtful. (3) The relationship between both powers was mainly competitive and not cooperative.
<i>Osiander (1994)</i>	Coalition partners were bound by the great power principle, rooted in a shared responsibility for Europe.	(1) No definition of great power principle. (2) No explanation how the great power principle worked (e.g. vis-à-vis Utrecht settlement).
<i>Jervis (1985, 1992)</i>	Concept of the prisoners' dilemma explains cooperation among the powers, e.g. why short-term gains were avoided. Concerts are formed after major wars.	(1) Not a convincing argument. Leaves many questions unanswered (e.g. What deterred solo actions of states?). (2) History disproves the idea that concerts are formed ("just like that") after major wars.

Figure 3 Summary of arguments from IR scholars on post-1815 inter-state relations and critical evaluation.

Webster, Kissinger, Schroeder, Osiander and Jervis contributed considerably to IR's debate on post-1815 inter-state relations. This means that they have written more extensively or more frequently about this period than other scholars have. However, in addition to IR literature, it is also curious to see how historians like Richard Evans, Brendan Simms and Jürgen Osterhammel interpreted inter-state relations in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon's *Grand Armée*.

Evans (2017) in *The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815 - 1914* puts European history in the early nineteenth century in an interesting perspective. He highlights the hardship of ordinary people, a kind of hardship which perhaps concerned political elites at that time, too. Europe was depleted after ransacking by the French army which had swept back and forth across the continent for

almost 20 years. An estimated five million people had lost their lives (ibid.: 3). As if this wasn't enough, this man-made disaster was not simply over after the fighting had stopped. Nature upped the ante even before the final battle against Napoleon at Waterloo in June 1815 was over. Evans explains that in April 1815 a volcano erupted on the island of Sumbawa in today's Indonesia. It was the largest volcano eruption known in history which "sent a vast dust cloud up to twenty-seven miles high" (5) into the stratosphere. The particles stayed in the stratosphere for more than two years, creating spectacular orange sunsets. In January 1816 brown snow fell in Hungary. Unfortunately, "the eruption occurred in the middle of a decade of cold summers that had already begun in 1811" (6). The result was changing weather conditions. For example, "[t]he Lower Rhine flooded for five whole months, and in Lombardy-Venetia snow was still lying on the ground in May. Early frost during the autumn did further damage" (6). For Croatia, for example, the years of 1816 and above all 1817 were the years of the great famine.

"This global climatic calamity thus resulted in the worst harvests to be seen in Europe for more than a century; and it happened when Europe was struggling to recover its trade and industry after the disruptions of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The British blockade and the Napoleonic counter-blockade known as the Continental System had ruined commerce on the Continent and in the United Kingdom too, cutting off markets and throwing thousands out of work. By the end of 1816 there were said to be between 20,000 and 30,000 unemployed weavers in the London district of Spitalfields" (7).

In addition to this, hundreds of thousands of soldiers across Europe were demobilised "adding to the already numerous armies of the unemployed" (ibid.).

Carl von Clausewitz toured the Rhineland in 1817 and noted that there was a complete harvest failure and southern and western Germany. In "Lombardy, the poor were living off roots and herbs" (ibid.). Begging and stealing became widespread, people close to starving moved to towns. Many of the poor left Europe altogether. Evans explained that "more than 2,000 people left Baden

for Rio de Janeiro in 1818; 20,000 German and 30,000 French people were said to have left for the United States in 1817” (8). Those mass movements of people were also conducive to the spread of diseases and epidemics. “In most of western Europe death rates rose by 8 or 9 per cent, but some areas were particularly badly affected; for example, mortality rates doubled in eastern Switzerland over the same period” (9).

In early 1816 there were grain riots. They turned into riots as bad as those during the French Revolution. In East Anglia protesters carried a banner saying Bread or Blood.¹⁷¹ Grain riots also broke out in Augsburg and Munich with protests against the price of bread. “Even as the crisis began to subside, in 1819, rioting continued” (Evans 2017: 10). They turned into political and racist riots. In western and central Europe the “Hep-Hep” movement against the Jews developed. “In all likelihood they [the Hep-Hep movements] emerged from popular resentment against the perceived commercial success of Jewish businessmen at a time of economic distress” (ibid.). These riots spread from Würzburg to Karlsruhe and Heidelberg, down the Rhine to Frankfurt (ibid.).

This picture of Europe matters because in context of anomie theory in this dissertation it perhaps suggests that peace in Europe was an absolute necessity. This illustration of Europe after 1815 by Richard Evans may therefore provide an indication to why peace was so firmly enshrined in treaties of inter-state relations between 1814/1815 and 1818. It was no serene, diplomatic whim of monarchs and their plenipotentiaries detached from ordinary lives. What Evans described were serious socio-political issues that could not have gone unnoticed by those responsible for post-1815 inter-state relations in Europe.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Seton-Watson (1945: 38) for another description of the grave socio-political issues that engulfed England after the defeat of France.

Simms (2014) in *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy 1453 to the Present* interpreted post-1815 inter-state relations mainly according to balance-of-power aspects. He explained that at the Congress of Vienna “at the top of the agenda was the containment of future French expansionism through territorial reorganization” (178). According to Simms, “Britain was determined to prevent Russia from filling the vacuum in central Europe” (179). But “at the same time, the Austrian chancellor was anxious to stop the Prussians from gaining hegemony in Germany, and from helping themselves to too much territory” (179) especially in Saxony, Napoleon’s defeated ally. Hence the aim was “to keep the British in, the Russians out and the French down” (179). Simms mentions the congress system on page 180 but he does not bestow upon it any significant relevance. Above all, his analysis is mainly grounded in geopolitical discussions of which state received which territory so that a European balance of power could be sustained to contain Franco-Russian ambitions (182).

Quite contrary to Simms’ viewpoint is how Osterhammel (2013) discussed post-1815 inter-state relations. From his eagle-eye perspective on world politics Osterhammel explained that in nineteenth century international relations two strands of thought stood opposite each other: the idea of arranged (reguliert) world peace and the principle of egoistic *Realpolitik* (*Staatsraison*). The Vienna system managed an ingenious connection between both schools. While contemplating this ingenious connection, Osterhammel is, to my knowledge, the only scholar, including among the scholars quoted above, who consciously considered differences between an international system and international society. Drawing on the scholarship of Hedley Bull as well as Barry Buzan and Richard Little, Osterhammel (ibid.: 673) explained that an international society is an advanced development of an international system. In an international society states are related to each other by institutions as well as norms.

Osterhammel explained that after the Congress of Vienna the European international system was not a natural states-system anymore in so far that balances of power occurred naturally. Instead, a rule-based coexistence of states took place which was in need of political management (ibid.: 674). This rule-based coexistence was underpinned by normative beliefs (ibid.: 145). It was furthermore consciously devised by political elites keen to establishing peace (and avoiding revolutions) in Europe. Therefore, and in contrast to eighteenth century systems, the Vienna order was characterised by explicit rules forging elementary consultation mechanisms (elementare Konsultationsmechanismen). From a historical standpoint this reinforces anomie theory's argumentation. Quite contrary to Simms, Osterhammel brings out the essential aspects of the post-1815 order.

Scholars in History	Historicising of post-1815 Europe
<i>Evans (2017)</i>	There was considerable social and economic hardship among people across Europe after 1814/1815, including food shortages, unemployment, mass-emigration, crime and riots.
<i>Simms (2014)</i>	Power-struggle between Russia and the United Kingdom and Austria and Prussia as of 1815 characterised post-1815 inter-state relations.
<i>Osterhammel (2013)</i>	Vienna system blended supposedly opposing world-views among the great powers. This led to a rules-based co-existence of states forging consultation mechanisms.

Figure 4 Historians and their (modern) view on post-1815 Europe.

I have so far discussed the strengths of anomie theory in reference to IR's writing on post-1815 inter-state relationship as well as some historic international framing. However, the strongest explanatory power of the intellectual implications imputed to the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation concerns the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society. What original (i.e. previously unknown) insight can anomie theory offer the study of IR regarding the regression of the post-1815 society of states?

6.4 Society to system: Anomie, Regression and atavism of an inter-state society

In the previous chapters I regularly wrote about the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society explained by anomie theory. In chapter 5 I stated that the term regression in this dissertation signifies a deterioration of a society into an inferior condition. In context of anomie theory this pertains to increasing normlessness and a subsequent breakdown of social standards. This understanding has yet to be discussed in context of IR literature.

IR literature is ambivalent when it comes to the idea of the regression, demise, breakdown or any other reverse development of an inter-state system or society. Of course, this issue alone pre-empts the clarification that not all theoretical strands believe in a similar definition of *development* of systems or societies in the international realm in the first place. As is often the case, structural realism and ES offer opposing arguments, each insightful in their own regard.

6.4.1 Polarity as development in structural realism

Structural realism facilitates a discussion about regression of an inter-state system with the idea of stability. Stability of an inter-state system exists as long as the system remains anarchic (no single power dominates all other powers) and as long as its principal members (number of great powers) remain. In structural realism the validity of the former aspect is some kind of pre-condition for any discussion about international politics, for otherwise structural realism would not be discussing affairs of an international realm. The latter aspect is important, too, and less of a pre-condition. Furthermore, it is an aspect discussed by Kenneth Waltz in context of early nineteenth century inter-state relations and thus warrants a closer look. If an inter-state system has three, four or five great powers it is deemed particularly unstable (Waltz 1979: 163).¹⁷² These numbers are threshold numbers marking the transition from one polarity to another.

¹⁷² The most stable inter-state system is a bipolar system (Waltz 1964).

According to Waltz, in 1800 (and until the 1870s) five great powers dominated Europe. In this pentagonite polarity the United Kingdom played a particular role as balancer. Waltz (1979: 164) explains that the United Kingdom could only be an effective balancer if power on the aggressor's side was not so overwhelming that a balancing act on behalf of Britain vis-à-vis the aggressor's side would have been futile. In other words, the United Kingdom as a balancer could only act if her own power could tip the balance, if both balancing sides were close in power. Waltz also explains that the United Kingdom's role as a balancer was naturally defensive. Defending the status quo against any aggressor(s) meant that she could never side with those states who became revisionist, demanding additional or new territory. This curtailed her diplomatic options by restricting them to one side of the balance of power only. Waltz's point here is that the example of the United Kingdom shows that the conditions under which a balancer in a balance of power might act are so particular that they cannot be incorporated into theory. Instead, they are only relevant as historic generalisations. However, what is, according to Waltz (1979: 168-170), of theoretical relevance is the idea that stability is best ensured if polarity is low. A bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one because in a bipolar system two powers balance each other internally rather than externally; this means that balancing does not compel one power to rely on a third party as much as it does in a multipolar system.

In structural realism, therefore, development in a system is accounted for as a change in polarity. This kind of development is only associated with stability, but not with some kind of social development from one stage towards a *better* (e.g. more cooperative, more juridified, less violent, etc.) stage. This also comes to the fore in Waltz's exemplary discussion of the United Kingdom and its special role as balance in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.

At the same time, this perspective of structural realism permits the conclusion that an inter-state system never really goes away, it does not disappear or die. There seems to be no lower lifeform

of a system, not even unipolarity because unipolarity is in itself an incessantly unstable condition. Any unipolar power is a danger to all other powers and therefore unipolarity is always about to change (Waltz 2000).¹⁷³ At the same time there also seems to be no higher lifeform of a system. The only development that may take place occurs in terms of polarity. This seems in line with classical realism because Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1985: 12) himself argued that the contemporary condition of international politics can be changed only by the perennial forces that have shaped the past and will shape the future. These perennial forces are, of course, power, particularly since, following Morgenthau, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (ibid.: 31). John Mearsheimer (2001), too, believes that states always try to maximise their power relatively to other powers.

6.4.2 Development according to ES

On the other end of this power-centric and polarity-infused discussion of change in an inter-state system lies ES. Change, as regression, demise or development, does not feature prominently in the ES. Unlike (structural) realism, ES does, however, permit a qualitative development between an international system and an international society. Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]), for example, was quite clear about the fact that an international society presupposes an international system (13). He also explained that several different international societies can exist in one international system.¹⁷⁴

Buzan and Little (2000) do not make clear distinctions between international system and society but still offer some insight into the aspect of change, either in form of progressive or regressive development. They explain how sometimes revolutionary changes in interaction capacities have shaped the international system in the last 500 years. Fifteen years later Buzan and Lawson (2015) argue in *Global Transformations* that during the nineteenth century at its core a change in the

¹⁷³ See Walt (2009) for a discussion of alliance formation in a unipolar system.

¹⁷⁴ Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]: 40-1) also championed the belief that even under conditions of world wars does the *idea* of an international society never really go away but the *idea* itself continues to influence inter-state relations.

distribution of power took place into a core-periphery order. This had wide-ranging repercussions on power gaps, the distribution of power and sources of power (1). These repercussions pulled the world into a single system (2). Furthermore, the European international society became a Western international society “through incorporation of the new states of the Americas” (176). In the course of time the periphery of this international order closed the gap to the core.

This is to say that the global transformations produced a fully-fledged international system. Similar to the argument in Buzan and Little (2000), Buzan and Lawson (2015) argue that increasingly integrating interaction capacities have played a major role in this development. More precisely: “The nineteenth-century revolutions in interaction capacity shrank the world into the integrated modern international system in which we still live” (78).

These discussions pivoting on interaction capacity offer an intriguing view on the relationship between technological progress in communication and infrastructure and its impact on inter-state relations throughout the long nineteenth century. However, they seem not to permit the regressive development from an international society to an international system, or the regression of an international society into any other configuration. If interaction capacities are so central to modern-day inter-state relations, what if they are at some stage - for whatever reason - are not used anymore by societies across the globe? Would this (de-globalisation, re-regionalisation?) cause a throwback from a society to a system? Above all, technological progress in communication and infrastructure would probably have to be reverted altogether, in order to, for example, exclude North America or Europe from the Western international system or society. In addition to such points, the analysis of Buzan, Little and Lawson seems very power focused and functional in nature. The latter aspect seems to entail a recognition of states as billiard balls, rolling across the pit due to force effects and collisions with other billiard balls, collisions brought about more frequently by deterritorialisation.

In previous years Buzan (1993) had devoted his attention more concretely to differences and developments at the threshold of an international system and an international society. He explained that a system comes before a society and that an international society cannot exist without an international system. However, at what point is a system not a system anymore but a society? And, more importantly, is there an option for a backward development?

Buzan (1993) discussed the first issue through the concepts of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* by Ferdinand Tönnies and ultimately arrives at a conclusion in accordance with Bull's functional approach to international society. Buzan explained that an international system develops no matter how inimical states may confront each other. The reason for this is that the realm of anarchy at some point will coerce states to establish contact and cooperation beyond no matter what. For instance, some states will forge a balance of power, negotiate a ceasefire, maybe engage in very basic trade (perhaps of war material) and so on. An international society emerges if states, on top of this cooperation, recognise each other as being the same type of entity and accord each other equal legal status (ibid.: 345). Buzan (1993) explained: "Mutual recognition and legal equality signify not only a turning point in the development of rules and institutions but also acceptance of a shared identity in which states accept each other as being the same type of entity" (345). According to Buzan, in Europe this transition unfolded when sovereignty as a principle (of legal equality) emerged. For Buzan, this is a rather functional approach to the development of an international society which is not only in line with Bull's approach to international society but it is also in accordance with Tönnies' idea of *Gesellschaft* "in which the development of international society can be seen as a rational long-term response to the existence of an increasingly dense and interactive international system" (334).¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ The alternative would be the *Gemeinschaft* concept where an international society exists through a shared culture alone. This shared culture simply exists and is not purportedly created by states. Wight argued this approach, citing classical Greece and early-modern Europe as examples (cf. Buzan 1993: 333).

Some points of criticism might be raised at this stage. However, focusing on reverse-engineering Bull's and Buzan's definitions instead can offer insight into the central issue of this section of a retrogression of a society into a system. According to Bull's (2002 [1977]) definitions of international system and international society states in an international society would have to lose the perception that they are bound by a common set of rules and lose the perception that they jointly work in common institutions. According to Buzan (1993) and his functional conceptualisation above, an international society would cease to exist when states no longer recognise each other as equal entities. How can these two frameworks apply to post-1815 inter-state relations?

Beginning with Buzan, I cannot see that states in post-1815 Europe at some point no longer recognised each other as equal entities. This certainly applies to the front-rank powers. Admittedly, an exceptional case might be made arguing that a state like Austria or France would have no longer recognised any longer a government or head of state in post-revolutionary Naples or Spain. But even with this train of thought two problems stand out: First, neither revolution was successful and thus this situation never came into play. On 7 March 1821 Austria destroyed the Neapolitan Army at Rieti. On 23 March 1821 Austrian troops entered Naples and re-established order. On 6 April 1821 the French army crossed into Spain. They reached Madrid easily and occupied at least parts of Spain until 1827. Second, deeming a government or head of state illegitimate and not on par is not tantamount to recognising a complete state, empire or nation as what it is - a state, empire or nation (apart from the fact that neither in Naples nor in Spain situations evolved in this way). Even during the wars against Napoleon and his *Grand Armée* did other states not refrain from recognising France as an empire, a like-minded, albeit hostile, but nonetheless political, military and cultural as well as geographically discernible entity in Europe. France under Napoleon was not deprived of this recognition as a sovereign equal and thus, at least theoretically, ousted from an inter-state society. Napoleon Bonaparte was considered a usurper but France herself never lost

legitimacy. This latter point can be substantiated by the allies' strong will to communicate to the people of France in December 1813 that their invasion of France was directed only towards defeating Napoleon and not against France herself (cf. chapter 4.3 *The rules of working in concert in post-1815 inter-state relations* and Zamoyski 2007). Because of these issues I see difficulties, at least in context of post-1815 inter-state relations, with Buzan's approach explaining a regressive development from an international society into an international system or some other "lower" lifeform of an inter-state disposition. What about Bull?

Following Bull's logic, an international society would regress into an international system when members lose the perception that they are bound by a common set of rules and lose the perception that they jointly work in common institutions. Particularly the first aspect of losing a sense of being bound by common rules is greatly in line with the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation. According to anomie theory, states from the late-1820s onwards no longer felt obliged aligning their behaviour in accordance with the rules of concert diplomacy. Unfortunately, Bull's logic stops here. He did not explain why states might lose the perception that they are bound by a common set of rules. He did not explain what exactly this would do to an international society or why this would precipitate a regression from an international society into an international system. Neither can IR scholarship on post-1815 inter-state relations fill this gap, as I will explain further below.

6.4.3 Anomie theory and atavism: from society to system

Anomie theory, however, can fill these gaps. According to the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation, states no longer abide by the rules because the rules no longer promise the achievement of a shared goal. As a result, states become alienated and engage in illegitimate or deviant behaviour. This deviant behaviour does not only violate rules but the very norms associated with rules. Such norms constituted social facts for members of an inter-state society

which are perceived as real. If these social facts are violated a breakdown of social behaviour can follow. In other words, previously agreed upon behaviour (deemed legitimate) towards achieving a jointly agreed upon goal loses validity. This is referred to as anomie.

Anomie can precipitate the regression of an inter-state society. Regression in this dissertation refers to a development of an inter-state society into an inferior condition. This inferior condition is characterised by normlessness and a breakdown of social standards (i.e. anomie).¹⁷⁶ The disregard for the rules of concert diplomacy as well as perhaps the relinquishing of a shared goal like lasting peace in Europe illustrate such atavism. The term atavism donates to the retrogression of an organism into a previous, ancestral form (an evolutionary throwback) or the reappearance of ancestral characteristics.¹⁷⁷ To my knowledge, it is a sociological term hardly used in the study of IR. One noteworthy exception is Schumpeter (1951 [1919]) who applied the term atavism. Writing on the sociology of imperialism he characterised imperialism as atavistic. According to him, imperialism is a surviving feature from earlier ages, a condition not from the present but from the past (ibid.: 65). His idea, however, that imperialism will gradually become extinct is questionable - just like the Durkheimian idea that anomie can cause the (complete) death of a society (Hilbert 1889: 244).¹⁷⁸ In an atavistic fashion, anomie qualitatively transforms a society of states from an evolved to a lesser evolved version, from society to system. What does this exactly mean in context of post-1815 inter-state relations?

What plays an important role, and what echoes in the understanding of atavism as an evolutionary throwback, is what anomie theory refers to as deteriorating social standards and ensuing social

¹⁷⁶ Cf. chapter 5.

¹⁷⁷ See definition available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atavism>, accessed on 29/06/2022.

¹⁷⁸ Depending on how imperialism is defined, it will arguably always be a part of international relations, for instance as neo-imperialism. The same arguably applies to states, nations or societies. They hardly ever completely die (with perhaps some noteworthy exceptions like Assyria, Carthage and the Incan Empire) (cf. Buzan 1993: 341). At least, not every war, not even major world wars, can obliterate states, nations or societies, even if there are nuclear weapons involved in warfare (e.g. Nazi-Germany, Japan and WW2).

instability. In context of post-1815 inter-state relations, I associate deteriorating social standards with the disappearance of concert diplomacy and ensuing social instability with increasing conflict and violence.

First, regarding deteriorating social standards: congresses, i.e. meetings between heads of governments or their foreign ministers, reminiscent of the Congress of Vienna or the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, no longer took place after 1822. There was one congress in Paris in 1856 which was, however, a gathering for the signing of the Peace concluding the Crimean War. Another congress took place in Berlin in 1878. At Berlin in 1878 the repercussions of the Russo-Turkish war from 1877-78 were dealt with. One might still believe that this may have been a gathering reminiscent of Vienna in 1815. However, this was a congress primarily concerned with territorial settlements in the Balkans. It was not preceded by several vows of peace in Europe, establishing a collective goal all major powers agreed upon. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 was also not a congress which engaged constructively and collectively in problem-solving of trans-European issues beyond territory and power. In addition to this, after the 1820s frequently congresses were proposed but failed to take place (Hinsley 1962: 215).

At the same time it is undeniably the case that conferences (as opposed to congresses) still took place after the 1820s (cf. Hinsley 1962). This is referred to by Hinsley (1962) as “a looser association of the Great Powers” (213) and “an attenuated Congress system” (ibid.). Other scholars (e.g. Elrod 1976; Ikenberry 2001; Bridge and Bullen 2005) in IR have described this looser association, too.¹⁷⁹ They have also pointed to the conspicuous fact that concert diplomacy was no part anymore in this looser association (cf. chapter 5, *Anomie and the regression of the post-1815*

¹⁷⁹ Elrod (1976) recognised that after the 1820s a true sense of solidarity and responsibility among the great powers had vanished. Ikenberry (2001) argued that a *pactum de contrahendo* had dwindled away. Evans (2017) explained that state became more self-centred again. Bridge and Bullen (2005) elucidated that states were no longer embedded in political unity and no longer subordinated their policy aims to the general interest of Europe. Cf. chapter 5.

inter-state society; e.g. Evans 2017; Hinsley 1962; Bridge and Bullen 2005). However, what I have previously criticised as a lacuna in IR literature regarding early nineteenth century inter-state relations pertains to these two issues: IR literature accurately *described* the changing inter-state dynamics after the 1820s, it also accurately ascertained that the vanishing of concert diplomacy as well as the United Kingdom's ominous role in it must have stood in relation with these changing inter-state dynamics. IR has done a good job describing what had happened but no *explanations* have so far been offered.

Second, regarding social instability: Following anomie theory, this atavistic development from society to system became obvious as soon as first the United Kingdom and second Russia displayed deviant behaviour, disregarding the rules of concert diplomacy. This led to anomie in the late 1820s society of states. Unilateral behaviour and uncoordinated actions conditioned inter-state relations of the front-rank powers again.¹⁸⁰ As a result, *Realpolitik* entered the stage again, signifying social instability. This became apparent not only in British and Russian behaviour in the mid-1820s but revealed itself more discernibly when states became less capable of dealing with international issues from the 1820s onwards, for example regarding revolutions and upheavals (cf. Evans 2017). In the late-1840s Hungary expelled Austrian forces which disclosed frictions between Austria and Prussia (Taylor 1954). Prussia offered Austria help to regain Hungary under the condition that Austria recognises Prussian hegemony over Germany. This was rejected by Austria (ibid.). It was Russia, instead of Prussia, who saved Austria by supporting her, restoring pre-eminence in Hungary. However, such co-operations were crude calculations of *Realpolitik*. Russia did not want to see Austria weakened in Europe to such a degree that Prussia could take over (ibid.) and when Russia needed Austria's support in 1854 Vienna refused (ibid.). I recognise such *Realpolitik* as social instability because compared to the years 1815 to the early

¹⁸⁰ IR literature has correctly described this development in numerous publications (but not explained it). Cf. chapter 5, *Anomie and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society*.

1820s states no longer jointly pursued a shared goal (of peace) and conducted their behaviour and actions in line of agreed upon corridors deemed legitimate.

Here, too, a counter-argument could be made that *Realpolitik*, perhaps aptly characterised as state behaviour disregarding normative aspects for the greater good of a society of states for the benefit of one's own interests, and a regression into systemic inter-state relations, may not necessarily lead to social instability because states nonetheless act and re-act according to "rules of the game" (Cohen 1980), if no official, legal, written agreements but at least tacit understandings, gentlemen's agreements or self-limitative behaviour (ibid.: 133-42). Therefore, a minimum of rules will still exist preventing havoc from wrecking inter-state relations. This is not denied by anomie theory and, furthermore, serves not as an indicator for anomie. Anomie and its characteristics of deteriorating social standards and social instability depart from a standard of social standards and stability pre-established and bygone.

In inter-state relations beyond the late 1820s this departure from a pre-established, former standard was also signified by resurgent revisionist intentions, even by smaller states like Denmark who challenged Prussia over Schleswig and Holstein in March 1849 (ibid.) and again in 1864. Hinsley (1962) described how old rivalries between front-rank powers resurrected, too. One example concerns the United Kingdom, Russia and France, leading to the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856. The same applied to rivalries between Austria, Prussia and France, culminating in the Austro-Prussian war in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870/71. Also, Russia and the Ottoman Empire collided again in 1877-78, according to Taylor (1954: 252) a war almost exclusively due to reasons of Russian pride.

IR literature on post-1815 inter-state relations described the deteriorating developments from the 1820s onwards correctly, but did not offer any explanations. ES, too, has a hard time getting to

grips with regressive developments from an international society back to an international system.

The version of anomie theory in this dissertation, however, can fill these gaps.

Inter-state relations late-1820s		Inter-state relations 1830s onwards	
Anomie: <i>normlessness and breakdown of social standards</i>	<i>Normlessness:</i> rules of concert diplomacy are violated, play no role anymore.	Atavism: throwback to a foregone stage, associated with <i>deteriorating social standards</i> and <i>social instability</i>	<i>Deteriorating social standards:</i> resurrection of Realpolitik, no constructive and concerted solutions to rising problems (like nationalist revolutions in 1830 and the liberal upheavals in the 1840s)
	<i>Breakdown of social standards:</i> concert diplomacy as a compensatory and constructive mechanism dissolves.		<i>Social instability:</i> resurgent great power conflicts (Crimean War 1853 – 56, Piedmont and France vs. Austria 1859, Schleswig-Holstein 1849 and 1864, Austria vs. Prussia 1866, France vs. Prussia 1870)

Figure 5 Anomie to atavism from the late-1820s to the 1830s onwards.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I returned to IR theory and IR scholarship on post-1815 inter-state relations vis-à-vis anomie theory. First, I re-capitulated the criticism I applied to IR theory, particularly structural realism and ES, in context of its engagement with Durkheimian sociology. What the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation characterises is a holistic Durkheimian sociological theory free of racist and bygone prejudices. Furthermore, anomie theory is not an isolated idea that excludes broader Durkheimian sociology. In fact, anomie theory tackles the fundamental issues of cohesion and integration of an inter-state society, issues that are at the heart of Durkheim's sociological scholarship. This holistic and qualitative application of anomie theory in IR can

explain how a society of states, like the post-1815 one, can come into existence. It thereby offers a sociological conceptualisation of a society of states, particularly through an ontological viewpoint, grounded in the argument that rules represent norms which constitute social facts for members of a society. Anomie theory thereby complements ES's scholarship on international society in some major aspects: It shows the importance of rules and regulations at the heart of any conceptualization of international society. As shown in previous chapters, too, ES overlooked the fact why states usually follow rules, why it is important that rules are respected and what might happen if they are violated. This triptych characterised the version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation and revealed significant explanatory capabilities.

Second, I discussed what novel insight anomie theory can offer IR in terms of post-1815 inter-state relations. One important point was that anomie theory in its analysis of post-1815 inter-state relations combines two important factors: a shared goal of states (peace) and commonly agreed upon behaviour to fulfil this goal (rules of concert diplomacy). This synthesis is novel to IR literature's engagement with post-1815 inter-state relations. It enables IR to go beyond descriptions and offers explanations, for example, why the period between 1815 and the 1820s was such a peaceful and, first and foremost, constructive one. The latter point means that states managed to solve constructively trans-European issues and challenges (like the abrogation of the slave trade and the freedom of inland waterways). IR has so far not been able to explain such aspects of post-1815 inter-state relations with, for example, balance of power conceptualisations.

Third, grounded in the idea of atavism the appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation offsets ES's deficiency of explaining the regressive development from an international society to an international system. This idea seemed to have been neglected altogether in IR. For Durkheimian anomie theory, however, this is the central topic to deal with. Social instability, disorder, changing societies and declining societies were at the heart of Emile Durkheim's

scholarly interests. Therefore, issues pertaining to anomie permeated most of his important sociological work. It is not surprising, then, that anomie theory constitutes a fitting analytical framework for any investigation that seeks to explain why such a peaceful and constructive post-Napoleonic inter-state society made leeway from the 1820s onwards, leading to characteristics of international systems, particularly resurgent *Realpolitik* and increasing conflicts.

7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This conclusion begins with a brief summary of the dissertation which briefly outlines the roots and core of the arguments made, the criticism of existing engagements with the sociology of Emile Durkheim in IR and the results of this dissertation's discovery and development of anomie theory and its empirical application. The second part discusses the key findings, contemporary implications and IR's benefits from this dissertation's version of anomie theory. It is highlighted that anomie theory is particularly fitted for complementing IR's understanding of international society in context of ES and also furthers IR knowledge on international society in particular terms, for example, concerning ideas of regression and atavism. In the final section I discuss some limits of anomie theory in this dissertation. Some limits seemed unavoidable, whereas others seemed less unfavourable at first glance but turned out necessary from an analytical point of view. Yet, in some cases limitations provide a gateway for additional scholarship on anomie theory in the study of IR.

7.2 Dissertation summary

At the heart of this research lies the criticism of an inadequate engagement with the sociology of Emile Durkheim in the study of IR. Most noticeably is this inadequate treatment in the scholarship of Kenneth Waltz as well as authors in IR who have criticised and attempted to improve Waltz's reliance on Durkheimian sociology. In this dissertation, a detailed investigation of IR's engagement with Durkheim's sociology showed that scholars misinterpreted his sociology and relied upon it too selectively. In order to rectify this shortcoming, I engaged with the sociology of Emile Durkheim extensively, considering his sociological oeuvre at large and beyond his lifetime. This revealed that a pervasive theme in his sociology is anomie theory, closely associated with Emile Durkheim's deep-rooted interest in the cohesion and disunity of societies during his own lifetime. I considered anomie theory not only in context of Emile Durkheim's scholarship but also how sociologists and criminologists after Durkheim have further developed his thinking on anomie theory. In doing so, scholarship on anomie theory throughout the 1930s to 1960s played a

particularly important role. I thereby developed an appropriated version of Durkheimian anomie theory which explained how a society of states can emerge and why a society of states can regress into a system of states, whereby it loses important qualities that contribute essentially to constructive inter-state policy making and a peaceful environment. In this dissertation, this latter dynamic is conceptualised as anomie: increasing normlessness and a subsequent breakdown of social standards.

Having developed this hypothetical anomie theory, I tested it through a historic case study of early nineteenth-century inter-state relations. In this case study I chose terms carefully, referring to states as states and not as nations and writing of inter-state relations instead of international relations as well as inter-state society (society of states) instead of international society. Due to the social nature of anomie theory some anthropocentric qualities were also bestowed upon states in an analytical context (explained in detail in chapter 1, *Definitions and concepts*).

The hypothetical assumptions, grounded in the theory of anomie, that were connected with the case study, claimed that (1) a society of states develops if states jointly pursue a common aim. The pursuit of this common aim is grounded in shared rules which states respect; (2) if some states (or a state) consider the aim to be unachievable by adhering to the rules agreed upon, deviant (or illegitimate) behaviour occurs which can lead to increasing normlessness and a subsequent breakdown of social standards (anomie) in a society of states. Thus, at the beginning of the case study I wondered how the society of states, often referred to as the concert of Europe, emerged after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. In IR history, this has been a thoroughly investigated topic, particularly because after the defeat of Napoleon and his *Grand Armée* Europe entered a strikingly peaceful period of inter-state relations. Historians differ but most recognise that peace lasted at least for nearly 40 years until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853. Some scholars went further and argued that post-Napoleonic diplomacy among the front-rank powers of Europe sustained

peace until the First World War in 1914. I discussed different opinions on this periodising in chapter 4, *Peace through powers great and small*.

The emergence of the post-1815 inter-state society has been largely explained by either balance-of-power arguments or arguments pertaining to legitimacy in IR. In other words, after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte a society of states emerged because of a functioning power equilibrium, vested mainly in territorial restructuring which took place during the Congress of Vienna, or because major states accepted the order of concert diplomacy as legitimate, which includes ideas of benign hegemony and just equilibrium (cf chapter 6, *Anomie theory and the post-1815 inter-state relations in IR*). Whereas balance-of-power explanations are considered outdated to explain the peacefulness and constructive cooperation of this time, ideas pertaining to legitimacy are often incoherent and insufficient. For example, it is regularly highlighted that states vowed each other peace and friendship, but it is not explained how this translated into peaceful and constructive inter-state relations. In contrast, anomie theory hypothesises that it was a quest for peace and friendship in combination with rules developed towards achieving these goals (rules of concert diplomacy) that safeguarded peace and constructive cooperation. A counter-example of the Treaty of Utrecht 100 years before the Congress of Vienna revealed the differences (cf. chapter 4, *Forging an inter-state society*).

However, there is another reason why post-1815 inter-state relations have caught the attention of IR scholars. It has not only been of interest for IR literature how this peaceful period could emerge but also why it did not last “forever”. Different scholars have found different words to describe this decline, end, demise or, how I refer to it, regression. In IR literature, this is where the problems continue: there is no clear understanding what the “end” of the post-1815 inter-state society meant. To offer one brief example: Evans (2017) wrote of serious differences opening up between Russia and the United Kingdom (ibid.: 57) over the Greek rebellion in the 1820s. He wrote that the concert

of Europe “had come so badly unstuck over the Greek rebellion” (59) but that in the end the Concert had held together (ibid.). As a result, by the end of the 1820s the edifice constructed at the Congress of Vienna was shaken but fundamentally still intact (63). The final end is mentioned by Evans in so far that “[w]hatever was restored in 1850, it was not the Europe of the Vienna Settlement” (229).

Evans’ choice of vocabulary allows for fluid and enjoyable reading, but has little explanatory power. It is only descriptive in nature. What does it mean that the concert of Europe had become badly unstuck over the Greek rebellion? How is the inquisitive reader to understand “badly unstuck”? In how far was the edifice constructed at Vienna in 1815 shaken by the end of the 1820s? Other scholars, too, engaged in similar ambiguous descriptions from which no conclusive explanations could be inferred, particularly when the role of the United Kingdom became relevant in their investigations. This is not to say that scholars in IR have been categorically wrong with their views on the post-1815 society of states and the United Kingdom’s role in it. However, they have not devised conclusive explanations that not merely describe what happened but explain how the three factors “concert diplomacy/demise of concert diplomacy”, “United Kingdom’s ominous role in concert diplomacy” and “end of post-1815 society of states” are to be meaningfully related (cf. chapter 3, *Anomie theory and the regression of the post-1815 inter-state society*).

Anomie theory hypothesised that the post-1815 society of states came to a close because the United Kingdom did, as of 1818 onwards, no longer believe that the shared goal of lasting peace in Europe could be sustained by adhering to the rules of concert diplomacy. Primary sources confirmed this hypothesis (cf. chapters 4 and 5). As a result, the United Kingdom displayed deviant behaviour which seriously impaired the construct of concert diplomacy and the normative reality it confronted other states with, particularly Russia. IR literature’s description of the inter-state environment beyond the 1820s confirmed this normlessness and recurrence of *Realpolitik* which

stood far afield the constructive and cooperative inter-state engagement from 1815 to the mid-1820s. Yet again, IR literature described such dynamics accurately but struggled with conceptualising and explaining what had happened from the late-1820s onwards. In this context, I avoided ambiguities in vocabulary by resorting to the understanding of regression. In other words, I argued that the post-1815 society of states regressed from a society of states into an inter-state system. I encapsulated this regression in the term of atavism: a qualitative loss of conceptual attributes (e.g. no acceptance of shared rules and common goals) that causes a retrogression of a society back into a states-system (cf. chapter 6, *Society to system: Regression and atavism of an inter-state society*). An investigation into IR theory, beyond ES, also showed that, to my knowledge, IR theory has so far ignored a regressive development in context of discussing conceptualisations of the international realm, particularly international system vs. international society.

Put differently, the hypothetical approach of this dissertation's version of anomie theory in context of the case study bestowed meaning upon the relationship between an explanandum and explanans that have previously only been described. This means that if we consider retrogression or atavism ("end of post-1815 society of states") the explanandum, concert diplomacy and the United Kingdom's role in it are explanans. The appropriated version of anomie theory in this dissertation bestowed meaning upon the nexus between this hypothetical explanandum and explanans in so far that (1) the United Kingdom had become alienated from concert diplomacy, signified by increasing reticence towards it from 1818 onwards, and (2) violated the rules of concert diplomacy, signified particularly by its behaviour from the early 1820s onwards, because (3) the United Kingdom did no longer believe that the goal of lasting peace in Europe could be achieved by adhering to the rules of concert diplomacy. This deviant behaviour (4) spilled over on Russia in the mid to late-1820s, not by accident but because the United Kingdom intentionally attempted (successfully) to pull Russia out of concert diplomacy, and thus (5) caused what many scholars in IR have aptly

described (but not explained) as a “loss of communal spirit“ (Bridge, Bullen 2005), or the inability of the great powers to solve their differences and to take common action (Evans 2017).

Yet, as previously mentioned, IR literature has not explained in conceptual terms what this meant. According to anomie theory, the outcome after #4 is anomie, defined as increasing normlessness and a breakdown of social standards. Both aspects, increasing normlessness and a breakdown of social standards, are reflected by the return of *Realpolitik* from the late 1820s onwards whereby states increasingly refrained from what was considered rightful and acceptable state behaviour within the framework of concert diplomacy. I described this normlessness and breakdown of social standards also as social instability among states. Towards the end of chapter 6 I mentioned some concrete examples like the inability of states to deal constructively with perils that affected most of them (e.g. liberal revolutions in the 1830s onwards) and revisionist intentions of smaller states (e.g. Denmark which challenged Prussia over Schleswig and Holstein in 1849) as well as the resurrection of rivalries among front-rank powers (e.g. between the United Kingdom, Russia and France leading towards the Crimean War in 1853-1856 and rivalries between Prussia and Austria leading to Austro-Prussian war in 1866).

Having summarised the important contents of this dissertation, their additional benefit for the study of IR become apparent in discussing this dissertation’s key findings.

7.3 Key findings, contemporary implications and benefits for IR

The research in this dissertation was guided by two research questions: First, *what* benefit can the study of IR acquire from the sociology of Emile Durkheim beyond earlier engagements with his scholarship? Second, *why* is anomie theory of benefit for the study of IR?

Answering the first research question, a thorough investigation of Durkheimian sociology showed that one benefit of Durkheim's sociology for the study of IR can be found in the appropriated version of anomie theory developed in this dissertation. There are three reasons for this. First, anomie theory explains why a society of states emerges: because states agree to adhere by certain standards of behaviour (rules) while pursuing a shared goal. Second, anomie theory explains what characterises and makes such a society of states: shared morality, a shared understanding of differences between right and wrong. Third, anomie theory explains what happens if previously agreed upon rules are violated: a regression of a society of states into normlessness and a breakdown of social standards.

The added-value of anomie theory in context of these three reasons constitutes an important complementation for IR theory, particularly ES. It complements ES's understanding of a society of states in so far that it focusses on why rules among states have to be respected in order for a society to develop, as well as what happens if rules are not respected anymore. It also explores a wholly new avenue not investigated by ES: the regression from an international society back into an international system. ES builds its definition of an international society on a clear demarcation to an international system. It also argues that an international society develops from an international system. But what happens if factors, ES determines crucial for an international society to exist, no longer apply? ES has not contemplated this thought. In chapter 6 I showed that ES quite unanimously argues that the emergence of an international society is presupposed by an international system. In chapter 3 and 6 I showed that, according to ES, the step from an international system to an international society is contingent on the fact that states conceive themselves to be bound by a shared set of rules and work towards common institutions. Unfortunately, ES does not factor-in the possibility of a break-away of these circumstances. What happens if one or more states decide not to be bound by a shared set of rules? Why could this

happen? ES has no answer for these questions, which is all the more unfortunate, because these issues are of contemporary relevance.

Contemporary international relations in the European Union (EU) are emblematic for this. In 2015 states in Eastern Europe vehemently rejected participating in a distribution of refugees and migrants according to an EU-wide quote.¹⁸¹ Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were particularly exposed to criticism because they refused taking part in a legal and mandatory refugee scheme. As a result, the EU Commission challenged these countries in front of the European Court of Justice in December 2017.¹⁸² Arguably, an infringement of such rules occurs frequently in EU policies. Recalcitrant individual states frequently protest. However, although the quarrel over refugee quotas since 2015 may not have brought an end to the EU as a society of states, because fundamentally its member states still seem bound by shared rules and work jointly towards common institutions, it is nonetheless ominous if such ruptures occur. The relationship between the United Kingdom and the concert of Europe in 1818 showed how evocative dissatisfaction between the rules-based structure of a society of states and one or more of its members can be. Deviant behaviour and ensuing anomie does not have to occur right away but can simmer over time before irreparable damage is inflicted.

What policy advice for current international relations in this context could be derived from this dissertation? One implication is that a society of states should prioritise continuously advertising the benefits of a shared goal. In day-to-day politics and wrangling over technicalities states should not forget the overarching goal and hence benefit they acquire from rule-based participation in a given society of states. At the same time, it seems important that rules-based behaviour towards

¹⁸¹ See <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-gipfel-verteilungsquoten-105.html>, accessed on 21/04/2022; See also <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eu-fluechtlingsquote-interview-101.html>, accessed on 21/04/2022. In English see <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34998615>, accessed on 21/04/2022.

¹⁸² See <https://www.politico.eu/article/3-eu-countries-broke-law-by-refusing-to-take-in-refugees-says-court-lawyer/>, accessed on 21/04/2022.

goals and their benefits also have to be communicated to the people of a society of states. If this does not occur or if this communication is perverted by internal party politics, cases like Brexit and anxieties of “ever closer union” and the like seem probable. Second, states as members of a society of states should regularly realise and have confirmed that rules-based behaviour is actually beneficial towards achieving a shared goal and its profits. Attention should be given to an equal share of benefits for all states abiding by the rules towards a shared goal. Furthermore, this may imply and demand a certain flexibility of the structure of rules itself. Perhaps an amendment of concert diplomacy and the rules associated with it might have made the concert of Europe more durable in the early nineteenth century. Today, too, new policy issues, digital transformations, an increasing attention on inter-state politics by citizens of states and shifting models of sovereign states demand flexibility on how states interact, communicate and find agreement. Third, shared goals among states of a society of states should be realistic achievements; the rules associated with achieving goals should carry with them actual prospects of reaping the benefits of a shared goal. Otherwise frustration, alienation and deviant behaviour, particularly of states with lesser capabilities, seem inevitable.

Beyond these contemporary implications of the research, this dissertation is also of benefit for IR theory in so far that the enclosure of anomie theory within ES contributes to forestalling IR theory from turning into a patchwork of manifold divergent theories. In other words, too much diversification beyond the orthodox juxtapositions of realism vs. liberalism, social science vs. history and so on entails its own perils. This has, arguably, already taken place. The discipline of IR is, after all, a discipline of theories or, alternatively, a discipline of theoretical disagreement (Burchill and Linklater 2009). This is unsurprising in so far that the subject matter of international politics (or international issues at large) is so diverse that it seems hardly possible to bestow meaning upon all aspects of international relations with one theory (cf. Burchill and Linklater 2009: 17). Therefore, theories in IR must, to always some degree, simplify our analyses (Baylis,

Smith, Owens 2008: 3-5; cf. Booth and Smith 1995). My point is, however, that it is to the benefit of IR if this simplification better takes place within established and proven theories instead of adding half-cooked stand-alone theoretical arguments incessantly. Sociological stimuli are therefore beneficial to any theoretical framework whose epistemological and ontological premises permit their incorporation. The appropriated version of Durkheimian anomie theory in this dissertation thus offers no radically novel understanding of international society but it pertinently refines ES's existing understanding of international society in important aspects.

At the same time, IR theory has not been under-theorised in terms of sociological contributions. For example, social constructivism by scholars like Alexander Wendt or Martha Finnemore, to name only two of many who have contributed to this strand of IR theory, has anchored many of its premises in sociology.¹⁸³ Finnemore (1996), for example, has focussed extensively on social structures, pursuing ideas that investigate norms as social structures while attending to the premise that states are socially constructed and historically contingent. Such contributions played an important role in overcoming IR theory's disciplinary crisis, a crisis of narrow paradigmatic debates of realism vs. liberalism, social science vs. history and agency vs. structure through which IR as an academic discipline has emerged (Levine and Barder 2018). This dissertation's investigation of the sociology of Emile Durkheim contributes to an ongoing balancing of IR theory. It diversifies IR's sociological debates by casting a spotlight on the classical sociology of Emile Durkheim in a comprehensive and proper fashion, thereby contributing to the loosening of IR theory from irreconcilable paradigmatic debates. It contributes to the sociological turn in IR by appropriating a social concept (anomie theory) in order to offer novel understanding of social relationships within what today is commonly referred to as the international realm. Anomie theory

¹⁸³ This does not only apply to social constructivism which I merely use as an example. Critical theory in IR, for example, has been largely grounded in the work of Jürgen Habermas (cf. Devetak 2009) whereas ideas on the differences between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* from Ferdinand Tönnies influenced ES writing by Buzan (1993: 333).

in this dissertation offers this diversifying and enriching contribution to IR theory particularly pertaining to ES and IR's understanding of international society.

7.4 Limitations and future perspectives on anomie theory

This dissertation's research on Durkheimian sociology and IR with its particular focus on an appropriated version of anomie theory has its limits. To begin with, the theory of anomie developed in this dissertation has little predictive capabilities. Instead, it can merely explain how a society of states can come into existence and why a society of states can fail and backdrop to a previous social or societal form. It offers, therefore, one of many possible explanations and conceptualisations that can be applied by students of IR to understand or interpret an international society. Furthermore, anomie theory in this dissertation has been framed by concrete ontological and epistemological viewpoints on my part (cf. chapter 1, *Approach to Research and Structure*). My argument of states as superorganisms coincides with Durkheimian sociology, although it can easily be considered unfitting. After all, I criticised Waltz myself for not explicitly dissociating himself from outdated organicist Durkheimian views. Thus, a refinement of Durkheimian anomie theory in IR should re-consider the topic of states as persons and state-agency. A central issue in this regard would have to tackle the discrepancy between Durkheimian sociology and a non-materialistic ontology of states as purposive actors.

In a similar vein, anomie theory grounded in Durkheimian sociology in this dissertation had been furnished with analytical simplifications. For example, ideology, political system, geography, personalities of decision makers and measurements of powers in all their varieties (economic, politically, technologically etc.) have been ignored in this appropriated version of anomie theory. Cultural aspects, too, played no role, albeit all major European states at this period in time arguably shared a similar culture, not merely due to their geographical proximity but also due to the fact

that regal ties and kinships existed across state borders.¹⁸⁴ The contingency of anomie theory on cultural aspects has always struck me as particularly important. Although, to my knowledge, scholarship on anomie theory has largely ignored this aspect, anomie theory itself, as first developed by Emile Durkheim, could theoretically permit easily the consideration of cultural norms and habits. This is to say that, whereas some groups of states may strive for the overarching goal of peace due to a shared traumatic experience of a prolonged war, other states may share a different overarching goal, like economic success. Yet again other states in other regions of the world, with other domestic political and ideological features (like socialism), may once again strive for different overarching goals, like equality in various forms. I believe that anomie theory, as an analytical lens, has great potential to become localised across regions and cultures in this regard. Anomie theory itself has great potential to be falsified or confirmed within context of different cultural settings. This, however, also turns anomie theory apparently into a regional theory of international society; its universal applicability seems thus greatly limited. It is so far, in the context of development in this dissertation, a purely European/Western construct. This is to say that anomie and the theory of anomie was first developed by a French sociologist and later on refined by American sociologists and criminologists. It is therefore European and Western centric in nature.¹⁸⁵ Such things considered, anomie theory holds vast potential for *ceteris paribus* analyses.

Additional scholarship on Durkheimian anomie theory can also re-visit its theoretical core by, for example, comparing the role played by rules with the understanding of rules by other classical sociologists. Max Weber comes to mind in this regard. He classified rules in three ideal types

¹⁸⁴ French, for example, was the major lingua franca in diplomacy and among the decision-making elites across Europe.

¹⁸⁵ A shortcoming in some sort all of IR theory seems to suffer from, considering the fact that IR as an academic discipline itself is primarily Western and IR theories almost exclusively developed by Western scholars at Western universities.

(Onuf and Klink 1989). How does Weber's understanding of rules compare with Durkheim's? What can Durkheimian anomie theory learn from Weberian sociology in this regard? Above all, Weber intertwines rule (*Herrschaft*) with rules (*Regeln*), which opens up an entirely new avenue of thinking concerning the rule of the rules of concert diplomacy: what does it mean to consider the rules of concert diplomacy as a *Herrschaft* (in terms of authority) over members of a society of states? What does his do to our understanding of the relationship between anarchy and states in a society of states?

What has also been left out of this dissertation's version of anomie theory is the idea of measuring anomie. This has been a tricky aspect for Durkheim himself, who believed that social cohesion could not be measured or even exactly observed (Durkheim 2013 [1902]: 52). Rose (1966) aptly cited Merton explaining that "anomie refers to a situation in which norms lose their validity to some degree" (30). Rose rightly criticised that we should have a form of measurement concerning the degree to which norms lose their validity. How much validity of norms has to be lost for anomie to spread? How can this be measured? This poses questions of the difficulty of operationalising anomie theory in quantitative terms that pertain to IR, too. In fact, measurement of anomie has been attempted by using factor and correlation analysis (Clinard 1964). It would be fascinating to see further research on anomie theory in IR which incorporates some of the shortcomings of this dissertation, where factors external to anomie theory like states' ideologies and cultural contingencies can be operationalised towards a quantitative measurement of anomie within a society of states. A theory of anomie equipped with such multi-factor considerations and quantitative measurement could offer us a precise indication of the well-being of the cohesion of a society of states. It could serve as an early warning system stressing the need for attention and correction of inter-state relations, perhaps by a supranational institution or outsiders, in order to prevent damage to a society of states and preventing it from backdropping into a life-form less amenable for peace and prosperity in international relations.

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Appendices

Timeline of events 1813 – 1823

N.B.: the sources for the dates and events of this timeline are the literature listed in the bibliography of this dissertation. Sometimes sources disagree regarding some dates; this can be due to the backdating or postdating of treaties (e.g. Treaty of Chaumont).

Date	Event
January 1813	Prussian General Yorck organises a Prussian militia in East Prussia to fight Napoleon. Prussian King Frederick William is shocked and denounces the deeds of General Yorck as an act of mutiny.
13 January 1813	Russian General Wittgenstein crosses the Vistula and enters Pomerania. The French army has already retreated behind the river Oder.
22 January 1813	King Frederick William leaves Berlin for Breslau making repeated professions of loyalty to Napoleon. He offers Napoleon additional troops in the spring.
9 February 1813	King Frederick William sends Colonel Knessebeck to the Tsar proposing Prussian neutrality but also demanding territory occupied by Russia in return. The Tsar will decline this proposal.
14 February 1813	“I desire peace; the world needs it” Napoleon proclaims at the opening session of the Legislative Assembly. However, his predicament was that he felt compelled to negotiate peace only from a position of strength, a position he will never achieve again.
25 February 1813	Stein arrives in Breslau to meet King Frederick William. He carries with him a draft treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia. The King is forced to accept.
27 February 1813	Treaty of Kalish. Prussia joins the coalition against Napoleon. Russia secretly promises Prussia a restoration of her political position of 1805. The Treaty of Kalish is ratified and dated 1 March 1813.
03 March 1813	Treaty of Stockholm between Britain and Sweden. Britain promises to assist Sweden in taking possession of Norway, to give Sweden the former French West Indian island of Guadeloupe and to pay her 1 million Pounds. Sweden pledges to fight Napoleon with 30,000 men and promises to abandon the slave trade.
7 March 1813	The main Russian army is set in motion and marches West.
16 March 1813	Prussia declares war on France.
19 March 1813	Convention between Russia and Prussia: All “liberated” territory will be administered by a Central Administrative Council directed by Stein. Stein will collect taxes, marshal resource and raise troops in those regions.
20 March 1813	General Kutusoff, Commander in Chief of the Russian Army, dies.
07 April 1813	French ambassador Narbonne delivers Napoleon’s demands to Austria. Napoleon demands Austria to increase her army and coordinate her movements with Napoleon. Also, Napoleon demands Austria to take military action against the Allies.

16 April 1813	Napoleon leaves Berlin to travel to Germany to fight the Prussian/Russian army.
25 April 1813	Napoleon arrives at his army in Erfurt.
2 May 1813	Russians and Prussians are defeated by Napoleon at Lützen.
20 May 1813	Napoleon attacks Bautzen (near Dresden) with 205,000 men. He will defeat the Prussian/Russian army. However, due to his lack of cavalry (lost in the Russia campaign) he cannot pursue the fleeing armies and rout his enemies. He can win battles but not defeat his enemies.
04 June 1813	Armistice between France and Prussia and Russia signed at Pläswitz. The armistice will last until early August and was proposed by Napoleon. It was a fatal strategic error. The armistice saved the Russian and Prussian forces and bereaved France from maintaining the initiative (Zamoyski 2007). Britain was not informed, let alone included.
14 June 1813	Treaty of Reichenbach between Great Britain and Prussia. Prussia promises to fight Napoleon with an army of at least 80,000 men and Britain promises subsidies of 666,000 Pounds in return. In a secret article Britain also promises Prussia to tolerate the restoration of her territories of 1806. Furthermore, both signatories promise not to enter into any negotiations with any other party without consulting each other first.
15 June 1813	Treaty of Reichenbach between Great Britain and Russia. Russia promises to fight Napoleon with an army of at least 150,000 men and Britain promises subsidies in return. Also, both signatories promise not to enter into any negotiations with any other party without consulting each other first.
17 June 1813	Metternich meets with the Tsar at Opotschno, south of Breslau, convincing Alexander that he will suggest negotiations to Napoleon, but if negotiations fail and no peace will be reached Austria promises to fight France.
19 June 1813	Metternich meets with Hardenberg, Humboldt and Nesselrode at Ratiborwitz, south of Breslau, trying to convince the Prussians of the sincerity of his plans to suggest negotiations to Napoleon and fighting him if negotiations brake down.
24 June 1813	Treaty of Reichenbach between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Metternich agrees to put four demands to Napoleon and to join the war against him if he rejects the demands.
26 June 1813	Metternich and Napoleon meet in Dresden. Metternich tries to persuade Napoleon to make peace. Napoleon responds: "Stop lying and tell me what you really want!" The discussion took 9 hours. The only source for what was said is Metternich himself.
27 June 1813	Another Treaty of Reichenbach. Prussia and Russia agree that Austria should mediate a peace with France on behalf of the allies. If Austria fails she promises to join the war against Napoleon. The groundwork for this treaty was laid on 17 and 19 June 1813. Britain was excluded from all of it.
30 June 1813	Metternich and Napoleon sign an agreement. Napoleon accepts Austrian mediation, an extension of the armistice to 10 August and a conference at Prague.
10 July 1813	Conference at Prague. Napoleon did not go, he sent Caulaincourt instead. Negotiations last until 12 August when no peace agreement can be reached.

12 July 1813	Metternich tries to convince his Emperor Francis to actually declare war on France if the conference at Prague fails.
25 July 1813	Napoleon shows to the Allies how unconcerned he is by everything and visits Marie-Louise in Mainz for ten days. He behaves ostentatiously self-confident.
04 August 1813	Napoleon arrives in Dresden. He writes to Metternich asking for his conditions for peace. Metternich will reply on 7 August 1813.
11 August 1813	Austria declares war on France. Napoleon is now faced by 120,000 troops from Austria, 70,000 from Russia and 60,000 from Prussia. The reserve behind this army consists of another 250,000 troops. Over half a million soldiers oppose Napoleon now. (Napoleon had about 400,000 men at this time)
16 August 1813	Napoleon's army leaves Dresden. Moral is high. Napoleon's brother-in-law Murat from Naples is commanding the cavalry.
20 August 1813	The main Allied army under Schwarzenberg takes to the field.
21 August 1813	Prussian General Blücher defeats the French army of Oudinot at Großbeeren, a village only 20 km south of the Brandenburg Gate, and saves Berlin.
27 August 1813	Napoleon defeats the coalition army outside Dresden. Upon victory over all the allied troops Napoleon suffers violent fits of vomiting. He will feel better by 30 August 1813.
30 August 1813	Napoleon is informed about the defeat of Oudinot at Großbeeren. His reaction: "That's war. Up there in the morning, down there in the evening" (Zamoyski 2007: 92).
6 September 1813	Prussians and Swedes under the command of Bernadotte defeat the French troops of Ney at Dennewitz, about 70 km south of Berlin. Ney's troops were supposed to support Oudinot's attack on Berlin.
09 September 1813	Alliance at Teplitz between Austria, Russia and Prussia. They unite for war and mutual defence after peace.
08 October 1813	Treaty of Ried between Austria and Bavaria. Puts an end to their rivalries. Bavaria leaves the Rheinbund and joins the allies. She contributes 36,000 men who operate under Austrian command.
09 October 1813	Alliance treaty between Britain and Austria. Britain pays 1 million Pounds war subsidies for Austria's 150,000 troops.
12 October 1813	Napoleon cannot hold his position in Dresden and moves his army to Leipzig.
16 - 19 October 1813	<i>Battle of the Nations</i> at Leipzig. After this battle all of central Europe joins the alliance against Napoleon. It was Napoleon's first total defeat. Upon the allies entering Weimar (west of Leipzig) Johann Wolfgang Goethe writes: "The medicine is worse than the illness" (Zamoyski 2007: 117).
18 October 1813	Napoleon orders his troops to retreat from Leipzig.
20 October 1813	Metternich is honoured by his Emperor with the title of Prince.

30 October 1813	Napoleon and his army cross the Rhine at Mainz on their way to Paris.
09 November 1813	Frankfurt Proposals: The Allies are unsure if they really want to fight Napoleon in France and therefore propose peace to Napoleon. They offer France to keep her “natural” borders along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. The initiative of this peace offer came from Metternich and Nesselrode. They send Baron Saint-Aignan to Paris.
15 November 1813	Baron Saint-Aignan delivers the Frankfurt Proposals to Napoleon in Paris. He arrived one day earlier.
19 November 1813	Allies agree on a military campaign on French soil. Invasion by three forces: in the North the Prussians cross the Rhine at Mainz and Cologne, in the South the Austrians push into Italy and in the Middle Austro-Russian forces cross into France between Bâle (Basel) and Mannheim.
1 December 1812	The allies issue a declaration for the French people saying that they are not at war with the French people but only French preponderance.
02 December 1813	Caulaincourt writes to Metternich that Napoleon will accept the Frankfurt Proposals. However, this was too late. The Allies had already agreed on a military campaign in France.
07 December 1813	Allies announce that the Frankfurt Proposals are obsolete.
12 December 1813	Murat, King of Naples, writes to Napoleon promising him his friendship until he dies. He will betray him three weeks later.
20 December 1813	British Cabinet takes the unprecedented step to send its Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh on a mission to the Continent.
21 December 1813	Austrian troops enter Bâle (Basel). According to the Tsar this violated Swiss neutrality, which he himself promised to safeguard. He feels betrayed by Metternich. This incident poisoned relations between both men forever.
26 December 1813	Lord Castlereagh leaves London and travels to Harwich to board <i>HMS Erebus</i> . He will arrive at The Hague about a week later.
29 December 1813	Switzerland announces the end of French occupation.
8 January 1814	Metternich and Hardenberg have dinner together. Metternich tries to lure Prussia away from Russia by promising that Austria would allow Prussia to take Saxony if Prussia opposes Russia’s Polish plans together with Austria. The proposal by Metternich will turn out a hostage to fortune.
9 January 1814	Lord Castlereagh leaves The Hague and travels to Bâle (Basel) where he will arrive on 18 January.
11 January 1814	Murat, King of Naples, signs an alliance treaty with Austria. Napoleon did not know about this. It was probably Napoleon’s sister (Caroline), wife of Murat, who was the driving force behind this alliance. Murat is promised the kingdom of Naples and additional territory with 400,000 inhabitants. In return, he promises to use his 30,000-strong army against Napoleon.
14 January 1814	Treaty of Kiel. Alliance between England and Denmark. Denmark cedes Norway to Sweden and in return receives Swedish Pomerania and Rügen.

16 January 1814	Schwarzenberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Grand Army, is ordered to stop his advance towards Paris and wait for further instructions.
18 January 1814	Castlereagh reaches Bâle (Basel) and meets Metternich. Crucial issue to discuss: Continue war with Napoleon and advance to Paris or make peace?
25 January 1814	Napoleon leaves Paris to join his army at Châlons-sur-Marne. The odds are stacked heavily against him but he is nonetheless optimistic that one decisive victory could reverse the situation.
28 - 29 January 1814	Conference at Langres. Allies agree that French borders of 1792 are an unalterable precondition for any peace deal with France.
1 February 1814	Prussians under General Blücher defeat Napoleon at La Rothière.
04 February 1814	Beginning of the Congress at Châtillon. The first formal session begins on 5 February. The Congress will last until 18 March with prolonged interruptions. The Tsar attempted to discontinue negotiations at Châtillon but the victories of Napoleon over the allies throughout February compel Prussia, Austria and Britain to try and make peace with Napoleon.
10 February 1814	Napoleon defeats the Russian advanced guard at Champaubert.
11 - 12 February 1814	Russian and Prussian army defeated by Napoleon at Montmirail.
13 February 1814	The allies receive Napoleon's foreign minister Caulaincourt at Troyes. Britain, Austria and Prussia accept Napoleon's peace offer but Russia refuses.
14 February 1814	Napoleon defeats the Prussian army of General Blücher at Vauchamps. A compromise among the allies is finally reached at the Congress at Châtillon.
18 February 1814	Another victory for Napoleon at the Battle of Montereau. Napoleon is ecstatically triumphant. He fires a cannon by himself yelling: "They thought the lion was dead and it was safe to piss on him" (Zamoyski 2007: 156; 2018: 695).
20 February 1814	Napoleon hears about the betrayal of Murat.
24 February 1814	Napoleon occupies Troyes.
27 February 1814	A French army is beaten by Wellington at Orthez, opening up south-western France.
07 March 1814	Napoleon defeats the Prussian army of General Blücher at Caronne. This was one of his bloodiest battles.
09 March 1814	Treaty of Chaumont (pre-dated to 1 March). Allies agree on joint war aims and to continue the war against Napoleon. Britain promises additional subsidies. Allies pledge to stay united for 20 years to guarantee peace in Europe. This treaty was one of the most important achievements of the coalition against Napoleon and is widely considered as the foundation of peace that followed after 1815 (Schroeder 1994 & Zamoyski 2007).

	6,000 British troops and a small number of Sicilian troops land at Leghorn (Livorno). Their commander Bentinck calls upon all Italians to rise against France as a nation.
12 March 1814	Bourbon movement takes control of Bordeaux.
13 March 1814	Napoleon gains a decisive victory over a Russian corps near Reims. Days later the Allies intercept a courier and learn that Napoleon is not in Paris but busy collecting troops in Eastern France. They therefore decide to attack Paris (which they would maybe not have done if Napoleon had been in Paris).
17 March 1814	General Blücher defeats the French at Fismes.
18 March 1814	The plenipotentiaries at Châtillon announce that negotiations for peace have failed due to the French government.
20 March 1814	Allies meet a representative (Baron de Vitrolles) from the Bourbon movement. They authorise Bourbon activity within France.
	Napoleon, with only 20,000 men, takes on Schwarzenberg's army of 80,000 men. But from now on Napoleon simply lacks the troops to go on.
22 March 1814	Lyon is abandoned without a fight.
25 March 1814	All contact between Napoleon and Paris is cut off. Prussian and Russian forces have encircled Paris.
	The French are beaten at La Fère Champenoise.
29 March 1814	Napoleon's wife Marie-Louise and his son, the King of Rome, as well as the Regency Council (government of Paris) are evacuated from Paris.
30 March 1814	Fierce but indecisive battles between French and allied troops in the suburbs of Paris. The eldest brother of Napoleon (Joseph) is in charge of defending Paris.
	Napoleon hastens back to Paris to take command of its defence. Just outside Paris late at night he is informed that the city had just surrendered to the Allies. He rides back to Fontainebleau.
31 March 1814	The Tsar, Friedrich Wilhelm III. and Karl Philip Fürst zu Schwarzenberg enter Paris victoriously.
3 April 1814	The 12,000-strong army corps under command of Marmont camping outside Paris accepts an armistice. They were Napoleon's last military option.
04 April 1814	Napoleon offers to abdicate in favour of his son. One day later Tsar Alexander refuses and offers Napoleon the island of Elba if he abdicates unconditionally.
06 April 1814	Napoleon abdicates unconditionally.
	New Constitution proclaimed in Paris. Louis XVIII restored to the throne.
10 April 1814	Franz I., Metternich, Castlereagh and Hardenberg arrive in Paris.
11 April 1814	Metternich, Castlereagh, Nesselrode and Caulaincourt sign the Treaty of Fontainebleau.
15 April 1814	The Tsar ratifies the Treaty of Fontainebleau.

16 April 1814	Franz I. and Friedrich Wilhelm III. ratify the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Napoleon moves to Elba.
	Armistice between Eugène Beauharnais (adopted son of Napoleon) and Austria. French army marches home across the Alps from Italy to France.
20 April 1814	Revolution breaks out in Milan. Austrian commander Heinrich von Bellegarde enters Milan and re-establishes order.
23 April 1814	Armistice signed between the King of France and the Allies.
27 April 1814	Castlereagh ratifies the Treaty of Fontainebleau, having waited for the final instructions to do so from his King.
28 April 1814	Austrian troops occupy Milan.
29 April 1814	Hardenberg suggests a major part of Poland to be given to Russia and the Prussian annexation of Saxony.
3 May 1814	Louis XVIII back in Paris on the throne. His restoration will become unpopular, especially in the army.
04 May 1814	Napoleon arrives on Elba (at Portoferraio).
13 May 1814	Talleyrand is appointed Foreign Secretary.
15 May 1814	Austrian troops occupy Venice.
20 May 1814	Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia, returns from exile in Sardinia back to Turin. "The next day he decreed a return to the laws as they had been in 1770, which meant reintroduction of torture, flogging, quartering and breaking on the wheel" (Zamoyski 2007: 235).
24 May 1814	Pope Pius VII returns to Rome from exile. The Pope had been in exile since 1809.
29 May 1814	Empress Joséphine dies in Paris.
30 May 1814	Treaty of Paris signed.
27 June 1814	The Tsar and Friedrich Wilhelm III. leave London. The Tsar travels to St Petersburg. The Tsar's stay in London caused tensions between Britain and Russia.
30 June 1814	Metternich leaves London. He travels to Paris on his way to Vienna where he negotiates with the King of France and Talleyrand.
18 July 1814	Metternich arrives in Vienna and begins with the preparations of the Congress of Vienna.
19 July 1814	Metternich receives the <i>corps diplomatique</i> . Diplomats are optimistic that most issues have already been solved among the Sovereigns in Paris and London.
25 July 1814	The Tsar arrives in St Petersburg
27 August 1814	Castlereagh stops in Paris on his way to Vienna. He is surprised how many commonalities there are between French and British interests regarding the upcoming Congress.
08 September 1814	Nineteen cantons of Switzerland sign the Treaty of Zurich, agreeing on neutrality and an administrative re-structuring of Switzerland.
13 September 1814	Castlereagh arrives in Vienna.

14 September 1814	Nesselrode arrives in Vienna.
17 September 1814	Hardenberg arrives in Vienna. (Wilhelm von Humboldt has already been waiting in Vienna since August).
18 September 1814	First meeting of the four great powers in Metternich's office. Metternich suggests that they agree on questions regarding the territories ceded by France and then merely communicate their decisions to France and Spain. Hardenberg, Humboldt and Nesselrode agree, Castlereagh disagrees.
19 September 1814	Second meeting of the four great powers. Nesselrode insists on Russia keeping the whole of the territory of the grand duchy of Warsaw. Hardenberg insists on the whole of Saxony, including the city of Mainz. Hardenberg suggests the King of Saxony should be compensated with territories along the Rhine, which is strongly opposed by Castlereagh.
22 September 1814	Third meeting of the four great powers. They discuss Metternich's proposal from the first meeting. All agree except Castlereagh although he has no other choice but to comply. They unanimously agree to nominate Gentz as the secretary and minute-taker of the Congress.
23 September 1814	Talleyrand arrives in Vienna.
25 September 1814	The Tsar and Friedrich Wilhelm III. arrive in Vienna. They are received with one thousand cannon shots.
28 September 1814	The Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III and the Tsar secretly agree on an allocation of Polish territories. Russia promises Prussia to turn Saxony over to her administration. This will happen on 10 November.
30 September 1814	Talleyrand and Labrador (plenipotentiary from Spain) join the plenipotentiaries from the five powers. Talleyrand flatly rejected what the other powers had agreed upon so far on 18 September. He demands that France be treated like an equal member of the great powers. As a result, the other plenipotentiaries withdraw their original ideas.
01 October 1814	Welcome celebrations for all Sovereigns, plenipotentiaries and delegates in Vienna. Performance of Händel's <i>Samson</i> in the Winter Riding School in Vienna.
04 October 1814	Castlereagh hands over to the Tsar a memorandum in which England protests against the Tsar's territorial ambitions regarding Poland.
09 October 1814	<p>Hardenberg submits a statement in which he makes Prussian support against Russia acquiring Poland conditional on the Prussian annexation of Saxony and the provisional occupation of Saxony by Prussia.</p> <p>Castlereagh has a discussion with Hardenberg. Hardenberg tells Castlereagh that Prussia wants all of Saxony. Castlereagh has no problem with that.</p>
14 October 1814	Prime Minister Liverpool writes to Castlereagh that the less Britain has to do with Poland the better. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Vansittart, agrees with Liverpool.

	A commission regarding the affairs in Germany starts its work. Representatives from the five great powers are permanent members, representatives from Bavaria, Hanover and Wurttemberg are invited.
18 October 1814	Lavish victory celebrations in remembrance of the Battle of Nations (16-19 October 1813) and victory over Napoleon. Military parade with 14,000 soldiers in Vienna.
22 October 1814	Metternich talks to Hardenberg. He sets three conditions for Prussia to fulfil as a prerequisite for Austrian approval of the annexation of Saxony.
25 October 1814	Castlereagh writes to Wellington: "I wish to direct my main efforts to secure an equilibrium in Europe, to which object, as far as principle will permit, I wish to make all local points subordinate" (Ikenberry 2001: 90).
30 October 1814	Great powers meet to discuss the organisation of the Congress of Vienna.
10 November 1814	Russia hands Saxony over to Prussia. Prussia occupies Saxony. Russian soldiers declare that they act with support of Britain and Austria.
12 November 1814	The Swiss Committee is nominated.
14 November 1814	The Swiss Committee meets for the first time.
	The Tsar signs the ratification of the Treaty of Kiel. This ensured the survival of Denmark and paved the way for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Holstein.
29 November 1814	The sovereigns (and about 6,000 guests) attend Beethoven's musical academy in the Redoutensaal. He plays the 7th Symphony, <i>Wellington's Victory</i> as well as the cantata <i>Der glorreiche Augenblick</i> .
06 December 1814	Tsar Alexander throws a ball in the Razumovsky Palace (thirty-six-course dinner on twenty large tables). A malfunction in the recently installed heating system causes a fire and the whole palace burns down.
14 December 1814	The committee on freedom of navigation on the Rhine is created. It will meet for the first time in January 1815.
16 December 1814	Hardenberg publishes a defiant note in defence of Prussia taking Saxony. He argues that all the other powers had previously agreed to Prussia's demands (which is not entirely wrong). Tensions are further rising.
	The Committee on Diplomatic Precedence has its first sessions. Subsequent sessions take place on 24, 27 and 30 December.
23 December 1814	The Tsar celebrates his 35th birthday. It will be Beethoven's last public appearance on a piano.
	Liverpool writes to Wellington asking him to work on a rapprochement with France.
24 December 1814	The Statistical Committee meets for the first time. The sources for the Statistical Committee were poor and often contradictory. There was no time to carry out field work to get accurate numbers.
26 December 1814	Great Britain and the United States of America sign a Peace Treaty. UK troops become available for Europe in case of war.

31 December 1814	A Russian note is sent to the representatives of Austria, Prussia and Britain urging the sovereigns of Europe to recognise that Christian principles were the basis of their rule (cf. Holy Alliance on 25 September 1815).
1 January 1815	News reaches Vienna that the United States of America and Britain have signed peace. Everyone realised that the balance of power in Europe just shifted dramatically, not in the favour of Prussia.
2 January 1815	Castlereagh, Hardenberg, Metternich and Rasumowsky meet one final time trying to find a compromise on the Saxony issue. They are not successful. The members of the committee on freedom of navigation on the Rhine meet for the first time.
3 January 1815	Great Britain, France and Austria sign a secret military alliance against Prussia. Other states will join until the end of January.
5 January 1815	Castlereagh announces that the threat of war with Prussia is over.
7 January 1815	Tsar Alexander agrees in principle that Saxony must be divided. He lets Prussia know that Prussia had to yield. First official meeting of the five powers takes place. The second will take place on 9 January, the third on 12 January where Talleyrand attends for the first time. For many the congress had at last begun.
13 January 1815	Bavaria joins the alliance of Britain, France and Austria against Russia and Prussia. Hanover will join on 19 January, Holland on 23 January.
15 January 1815	Heavy snowfall in Vienna. Best time for a grand sleighing party of the monarchs and their plenipotentiaries.
16 January 1815	The eight powers discuss the issue of abolishing slavery for the first time. Portugal and Spain are strictly against it and argue that it was only a matter for those powers who possessed colonies with slaves.
22 January 1815	A treaty is signed between Britain and Portugal. Portugal promises to purchase no more slaves on the coast of Africa north of the Equator. In return Portugal does not have to pay back a loan over 600,000 Pounds granted to her by Britain.
1 February 1815	The Duke of Wellington arrives in Vienna.
2 February 1815	The Committee on freedom of navigation meets for the first time. The second session will take place on 8 February, the third on 20 February, the fourth on 23 February and the fifth on 24 February.
4 February 1815	Castlereagh suggests that a permanent committee should be established to deal with the abolition of slavery.
8 February 1815	Prussia, Russia, Austria, France and Britain sign a compromise regarding Saxony. Prussia receives parts of Saxony, some territories along the Rhine, parts of Swedish-Pomerania and Westphalia as well as one fortress along the river Elbe. The great powers agree on a communiqué condemning the slave trade.
10 February 1815	A first draft of the Final Act is presented by the great powers to the other powers. The minor powers disagree.

15 February 1815	Castlereagh leaves Vienna and travels back to London. Wellington takes over at Vienna.
26 February 1815	Napoleon leaves Portoferraio (Elba).
5 March 1815	The twelfth session of the Swiss Committee takes place. It solves most issues.
7 March 1815	Metternich reads about Napoleon's escape from Elba in a dispatch from the Austrian consul in Livorno.
	Representatives of the great powers and their monarchs meet to discuss Napoleon's escape from Elba.
	Napoleon enters Grenoble. That same day he was confronted by soldiers of the 5th of the Line who were sent to capture or kill Napoleon outside Laffrey. However, they switched sides and joined Napoleon.
8 March 1815	Napoleon enters Lyon amid delirious manifestations of joy.
9 March 1815	The great powers in Vienna are told that Napoleon just landed in Golfe-Juan (Côte d'Azur).
10 March 1815	News reaches Vienna that Napoleon did not land in Italy but in the south of France. This is a relief to Austria.
13 March 1815	The great powers meet and publish a joint statement regarding Napoleon's return. They unanimously agree that a restoration of Napoleon will not take place.
16 March 1815	Wilhelm I becomes the first King of the Netherlands.
	Napoleon reaches Avallon. Two regiments were sent to kill him but they switch sides and joined Napoleon.
17 March 1815	A commission organised by Wellington meets for the first time. Its members (England, Prussia, Russia and Austria) agree to re-activate the Treaty of Chaumont which established the quadruple alliance one year earlier (on 9 March 1814). The Tsar declares that Russian troops could not move without British money. Wellington assures the Tsar that money was no problem.
19 March 1815	The signatories of the Treaty of Paris agree on revised diplomatic rules, updating those from the 16th century.
20 March 1815	The Bank of Vienna cancels the credits for the French delegation in Vienna. Most of their members have to go back to Paris because of lacking financial resources.
	Early in the morning Napoleon arrives at the château of Fontainebleau. In the afternoon he travels to Paris.
25 March 1815	The commission from 17 March 1815 ends. The result is a treaty among its members where every sovereign contributes 150,000 men to establish a fighting force against Napoleon. A secret clause excludes England from this agreement, but England pays 30 Pounds Sterling for every soldier she should have contributed. Other European states join the treaty later (Hannover on 7 April, Portugal 8 April, Bavaria 15 April etc.)
29 March 1815	Wellington leaves Vienna to prepare for war against Napoleon. He leaves Cathcart back in Vienna in charge.

3 April 1815	The declaration from 9 March is discussed in the Lower House in London. They agree on preparations for war.
5 - 10 April 1815	One of the most violent volcano eruptions in the history of mankind occurs on the island of Sumbaway in today's Indonesia. Particles from the eruption stayed in the stratosphere for more than two years. Brown snow fell in Hungary in January 1816 and a serious deterioration of weather conditions followed. This considerably aggravated the already strained food supply of people across Europe (cf. <i>Bread or Blood</i> riots in England, grain riots in Augsburg and Munich, famine in Croatia etc.)
8 April 1815	The Tsar is informed that there is an alliance of Britain, Austria and France against Russia and Prussia. He bears the news with fortitude.
21 April 1815	A military commission is founded by the allies. The commission discusses primarily financial and political implications of a new campaign against Napoleon. It meets seven times; the last time on 24 May 1815.
1 May 1815	Austria submits a second draft of the Final Act to the other (smaller) powers.
18 May 1815	The King of Saxony signs an approval of the agreement of 8 February 1815. He has no other choice.
21 May 1815	The Tsar formally announces the creation of a kingdom of Poland.
22 May 1815	The King of Prussia promises his people that he will agree to a chamber representing the people of Prussia. He was persuaded by Chancellor Hardenberg to do so.
25 May 1815	The Tsar sets up his headquarters at Heilbronn. Diplomacy has moved back to the battlefield.
25 - 26 May 1815	The smaller powers are given the opportunity to share their opinion on the second draft of the Final Act from 1 May 1815.
26 May 1815	The Tsar and the King of Prussia leave Vienna and travel to their armies. One day later the Emperor of Austria joins them.
29 May 1815	A draft of the Final Act is presented to all delegations.
1 June 1815	A sub-commission is created to finalise every article of the Final Act.
4 June 1815	The Tsar arrives at his headquarters at Heilbronn. He meets Baroness Julie de Krüdener who told him that she was sent by God who wants the Tsar to undergo a process of purification. His encounter with Baroness de Krüdener is said to have had a strong influence on the idea of the Holy Alliance.
5 June 1815	Metternich shares with his colleagues an announcement by his Emperor that Austria will agree to the principles which have been negotiated so far. Prussia does the same.
9 June 1815	The Final Act of Vienna is ratified by Europe assembled in Congress. It is the first and only full meeting of the Congress of Vienna,
10 June 1815	The Final Act is signed and backdated to 8 June 1815.
11 June 1815	The official end of the Congress of Vienna. Diplomats, visitors and adventurers leave Vienna.

12 June 1815	Austria and Rome sign a treaty. All former Papal territory is restored under Rome's control.
	Secret treaty between Austria and Naples. Ferdinand I promises to introduce no changes into his government incompatible with the form used by Austria in governing Lombardy-Venetia.
16 June 1815	Napoleon attacks and defeats the Prussians under the command of Blücher at Ligny.
18 June 1815	Napoleon defeated at the Battle of Waterloo.
22 June 1815	Napoleon abdicates.
26 June 1815	The last state signs the Final Act of Vienna.
6 July 1815	The Prussians enter Paris.
8 July 1815	Ludwig XVIII returns to Paris occupied by the British and Prussians.
10 July 1815	The Tsar arrives in Paris.
11 July 1815	The Spanish representative Labrador leaves Vienna. He did not sign the Final Act out of protest. Spain signed the Final Act on 7 May 1817.
14 July 1815	Baroness de Krüdener arrives in Paris.
15 July 1815	Napoleon hands himself over to the British and goes aboard HMS <i>Bellerophon</i> .
	Hardenberg and Humboldt arrive in Paris.
28 July 1815	The announcement is made that Napoleon will be shipped to St Helena in the South Atlantic.
7 August 1815	Napoleon is shipped to St Helena aboard HMS <i>Northumberland</i> .
4 September 1815	Pope Pius VII, who did not sign the Final Act, says that he will accept the Final Act. At the same time, he says, he hopes for revisions of the Final Act to the benefit of the Church.
20 September 1815	Castlereagh confronts the French plenipotentiaries with the terms agreed by the allies.
21 September 1815	Talleyrand rejects the allies' terms. He argues that there had been no war between France and the other powers, only a war of the allied powers against Napoleon. He also argues that since Louis XVIII was their ally, they could not extort money from him. By their declaration of 13 March they had recognised him as an ally and branded Napoleon as an outlaw.
22 September 1815	The allies reply to Talleyrand's arguments by simply re-stating their terms from 20 September. King Louis XVIII suggests to Talleyrand to simply accept the terms proposed by the allies and to negotiate some concessions. Talleyrand refuses.
23 September 1815	Talleyrand tenders his resignation and resigns as Foreign Secretary of France. His successor will be the Duc de Richelieu.
25 September 1815	The treaty of the Holy Alliance is signed by Russia, Prussia and Austria.

26 September 1815	The Duc de Richelieu becomes head of the government of France.
5 November 1815	Four-power treaty creating the United States of the Ionian Islands, to be governed by a British High Commissioner under a constitution drawn up by the Ionian assembly.
19 November 1815	France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal, Saxony, Switzerland and other states joint the treaty of the Holy Alliance.
20 November 1815	Signing of the Second Peace of Paris and renewal of the Quadruple Alliance.
26 November 1815	Metternich and the Austrian Emperor leave Paris. They travel to Italy
28 December 1815	Castlereagh writes to the British Minister in Berlin. He writes that tensions between Austria and Russia are a problem for the alliance.
14 April 1816	Treaty of Munich. Bavaria returns Salzburg and other territories to Austria. In return Bavaria receives territorial compensations from Austria.
9 January 1817	The Duke of Wellington recommends to the Cabinet in London to agree to a reduction of 30,000 men of the Occupation Army in France.
18 June 1817	200 liberal minded and partly radical student fraternities meet in Jena.
18 October 1817	Wartburg Festival. German student fraternities celebrate the victory over Napoleon and the 300th anniversary of the Reformation. The plethora of student fraternities represent a contradictory mix of national, liberal, religious, romantic and reactionary ideas.
10 February 1818	A half-hearted attempt is made to assassinate the Duke of Wellington in Paris.
27 March 1818	Metternich writes a dispatch to the other great powers in which he argues for a small conference of only the great powers - nothing like Vienna 1815.
5 April 1818	Metternich writes a memorandum in which he insists that the upcoming congress at Aix-la-Chapelle be legally grounded in Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance and not in Article V of the Second Peace of Paris. He thereby denies the signatories of the Second Peace of Paris the right to attend the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle.
20 April 1818	A formal announcement is delivered to the mayor of Aix-la-Chapelle that the city had been chosen for a congress. The city begins to prepare.
26 May 1818	Prussia implements tariff laws, eliminating internal tariffs by a unified tariff system.
30 September 1818	Powers assemble at Aix-la-Chapelle. The monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia are present in person. Castlereagh and Wellington represent Britain. Richelieu attends on behalf of France, albeit France was not fully admitted to the conference and invited only to individual sessions.
3 October 1818	The powers, assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, agree to withdraw their (occupation) troops from France.
8 October 1818	The Tsar writes a memorandum in which he wants to create a collective security system in Europe. Britain flatly contradicts his zeal.

12 October 1818	The powers, assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, agree to maintain the Quadruple Alliance. France was not invited and the decision was kept secret in order not to offend France. However, the powers publicly invite France to join future conferences.
	Wellington and Gentz finish a joint protocol which will serve as foundation for discussing a concert of powers (<i>concert pacifique</i>) in Europe. They had been working on this protocol since 6 October 1818.
19 October 1818	German student fraternities become unified in the <i>Allgemeine Deutsche Burschenschaft</i> .
20 October 1818	Convention between Britain and the United States of America. Americans are not allowed to fish in British waters or to land on British territory (with some exceptions regarding Newfoundland and Labrador). Also, the border between Canada and the United States is defined.
15 November 1818	The great powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle publish a <i>Déclaration</i> in which they promise to solve emerging issues in international relations through meetings in which the only aim will be to maintain peace (<i>repos du monde</i>). They agree that the aim of all politics in Europe has to be the prevention of revolutions and anarchy through respecting international law.
19 November 1818	The four great powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle agree on a considerable debt relief for France as well as a respite in repayment of the remaining debts until July 1820.
22 November 1818	The final one of 46 official meetings takes place at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.
23 March 1819	August von Kotzebue, the image of an enemy for many radical liberals in Germany, is assassinated in Mannheim. Fear of assassination among many conservatives, including Friedrich von Gentz, a close advisor to Metternich, and rising tensions between liberal nationalists and conservatives in Germany are the important results of this murder.
1 August 1819	<i>Teplitzer Punktation</i> . Prussia and Austria agree on more state censorship of the press and university teaching in Germany.
2 August 1819	Antisemitic riots brake out in Würzburg. They are the beginning of the so-called Hep-Hep Riots and quickly spread to other cities like Bamberg, Bayreuth, Darmstadt, Hamburg and Heidelberg. They are the first anti-semitic riots in Europe since the Middle Ages.
1 January 1820	A military insurrection breaks out at Cadiz (Spain) under Colonel Quiroga and Colonel Riego. They want the constitution of 1812 re-instated.
29 January 1820	George III. dies. George IV. succeeds. The catastrophic relationship between George IV. and his wife Caroline of Brunswick keeps Britain busy.
13 February 1820	The Duc de Berri is killed in Paris by a Bonapartist. For France this is as shocking as the killing of August von Kotzebue was for Germany one year earlier.
3 March 1820	The Tsar is worried about the insurrection in Spain. Nesselrode sends a dispatch to the other powers arguing for interference in Spain. He also calls for a congress of the great powers to discuss the situation.
7 March 1820	The King of Spain is forced to proclaim the ultra-liberal constitution of 1812.

9 March 1820	The King of Spain is pressured by the mob to take the first of many oaths to the new constitution.
13 March 1820	Wellington sends a dispatch to Richelieu arguing that the powers need to stay neutral regarding the resurrection in Spain. He admits, however, that he is seriously shocked by it.
16 April 1820	In preparation for the important state paper of 5 May 1820 Wellington imparts his ideas to Castlereagh in a memorandum. He sees things purely from a military point-of-view (“it is a military revolution”) and argues that outside-interference is undesirable and quite impossible.
30 April 1820	Castlereagh sends a memorandum to his King. He has read and agreed with Wellington’s analysis but supplemented it with his own opinions. This memorandum will turn into the important state paper of 5 May 1820.
5 May 1820	British state paper clarifying London’s opinion on the alliance and interventionism: the allies have no automatic right to intervene in the affairs of other states, even in case of (liberal) revolutions; congress diplomacy is not the normal organ of diplomacy in Europe; differences between autocratic and constitutional states warrant different interests; the treaty system was solely made against France (see Webster 1924: 238). The state paper is not published until 1823.
2 July 1820	Revolution brakes out in Nola, southeast of Naples. The revolution threatens Austria’s predominance in Italy. Austria has not enough troops in Italy to react instantly.
26 July 1820	Metternich writes to the Bavarian Foreign Secretary (Aloys Graf Rechberg) explaining that Austria is the custodian of order in Italy, particularly vis-à-vis the revolution in Naples.
31 July 1820	Emperor Francis and his ministers decide that they want a military intervention in Naples.
18 October 1820	News of the revolution in Portugal reaches Brazil where the Portuguese King, John VI., lives in exile. John VI. hopes that the powers assembled at Troppau would restore him to his throne. Castlereagh makes clear that this will not be the case.
20 October 1820	The three continental monarchs meet at Troppau. France and Britain are represented by ambassadors.
24 October 1820	Spain ratifies a secession treaty with the United States regarding Florida. Florida now belongs to the United States.
6 November 1820	A compromise on how to deal with the revolution in Naples can be reached between the three Eastern Powers. Metternich proudly tells Castlereagh that he negotiated in Britain’s interests.
13 November 1820	British Ambassador Stewart arrives back at Troppau. He visited his pregnant wife in Vienna. During his absence Capo d’Istria and Metternich had ample time for secret discussions. The <i>Protocole préliminaire</i> followed six days later...
14 November 1820	News reaches Troppau of the mutiny of the Semyonovski Regiment in St Petersburg. The Tsar is shocked by the revolt and drawn closer to Metternich and his fervent quest to quell any liberal uprisings (esp. in Naples).

19 November 1820	Troppau Protocol (<i>Protocole préliminaire</i>): Austria, Russia and Prussia agree on possible interventionism in case of revolutions.
4 December 1820	Cabinet Memorandum sent to British Ambassador Stewart at the Congress of Troppau: London fears that the three Eastern Powers proclaim themselves a kind of <i>police</i> of Europe. London says they have no right to exclude states from the European community. This memorandum is a direct response to the <i>Protocole préliminaire</i> from 19 November 1820.
6 December 1820	Ferdinand receives is official invitation by Russia, Austria and Prussia to join the congress in Laibach.
8 December 1820	Dispatch by Austria, Russia and Prussia rejecting British disagreement with the Troppau Protocol. Castlereagh had previous sent a dispatch reiterating Britain's position from 5 May 1820.
8 January 1821	Tsar Alexander arrives at Laibach.
12 January 1821	Formal meetings at Laibach begin.
13 January 1821	Metternich and the Tsar reach complete agreement on all the major points of action to be taken concerning Naples.
15 January 1821	In London the <i>Morning Chronicle</i> publishes the content of the <i>Protocole préliminaire</i> from 19 November 1820.
19 January 1821	Dispatch by Castlereagh in which he disagrees with Austria, Russia and Prussia that a right for interventionism in case of revolutions can be derived from the Final Act of 1815. This is the first open break between Britain and the Holy Alliance.
6 February 1821	Austrian troops cross the river Po.
28 February 1821	The Congress of Laibach is formally concluded.
6 March 1821	Aleksandr Ipsilantis crosses the river Pruth between Bessarabia and Moldavia, the border between the Russian and Ottoman Empire. He has a small armed force and claims to be the advance guard of a liberating Russian army calling on Christians everywhere to rise. His enterprise will end as a total failure.
7 March 1821	Austrian army destroys the Neapolitan army at Rieti. Austrians suffer almost no casualties.
10 March 1821	Parts of the Piedmontese Army rise under one of its generals, Santorre de Santarosa, seize the fortress of Alessandria and call on King Victor Emmanuel to grant a constitution.
12 March 1821	The powers are informed that a revolution broke out in Piedmont. This was a severe shock for Austria.
23 March 1821	Austrian troops enter Naples.
9 April 1821	The Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, together with several of his Bishops, is hanged at the door of his cathedral.

10 April 1821	The Turks disperse Aleksandr Ipsilantis' rebel forces. Ipsilantis flees to Austria. He will die in exile seven years later at age 35.
25 April 1821	John VI, King of Portugal, leaves his exile in Brazil and sails back to Portugal.
5 May 1821	Napoleon Bonaparte dies on St Helena.
14 May 1821	Metternich sends a note to his ambassadors in Italy. He instructs them to convince the Italian Princess to agree to popular (not liberal!) reforms.
4 July 1821	News of Napoleon's death reaches London. When the Prince Regent is informed about the death of his "greatest enemy", he first believes his wife had passed away (Zamoyski 2007: 561).
20 October 1821	Castlereagh and King George IV meet Metternich in Hanover. Castlereagh and Metternich discuss Russo-Turkish affairs, trying to prevent a Russian military intervention in Turkey. They agree to meet again at a conference in Vienna.
25 July 1822	British Cabinet gives its approval for Lord Castlereagh to attend a conference in Vienna. Castlereagh plans to leave on 15 August.
12 August 1822	Lord Castlereagh commits suicide.
15 August 1822	Pedro I., first ruler of the Empire of Brazil, publishes a manifesto in which he declares Brazil's independence from Portugal.
17 August 1822	Wellington is chosen to represent Britain at a conference in Vienna. He intended to leave London on 17 August to travel to Vienna. However, he is sick and postpones his departure until 17 September.
12 September 1822	The three Eastern monarchs are waiting for Wellington in Vienna. They agree to wait a little longer but are also ready to continue traveling to Verona without Wellington.
13 September 1822	George Canning is appointed Secretary of State.
17 September 1822	Wellington leaves London and travels to Vienna.
29 September 1822	Wellington arrives in Vienna. The three Eastern sovereigns are packing their suitcases ready to re-locate to Verona. Wellington protests in vain against their leaving.
2 October 1822	The three Eastern sovereigns leave Vienna and travel to Verona.
3 October 1822	Instructions from Canning reach Wellington. Canning tells Wellington to follow the three sovereigns to Verona.
16 October 1822	Congress of Verona begins.
20 October 1822	First meeting of the Congress of Verona among the five great powers.
5 November 1822	Wellington, attending the Congress of Verona, writes to Canning that there was a feeling within the Continental <i>corps diplomatique</i> that Britain had separated

	herself from the Allies during the Naples issue and that this separation was not an inconvenience for the allies.
19 November 1822	Wellington sees the protocol of the Congress of Verona.
24 November 1822	Wellington declares at the Congress of Verona that Britain intends to <i>de facto</i> recognise the independence of some colonies in Latin America. He urges the other powers to do so, too. This idea is based on a suggestion by Castlereagh before his suicide. The other great powers are torn, only Russia flatly refuses the British idea.
30 November 1822	Wellington leaves Verona and travels back to England. He stops in Paris on his way home trying to mediate between France and Spain.
1 December 1822	French Cabinet discusses the results of the Congress of Verona.
24 December 1822	France declines British mediation.
25 December 1822	The French Foreign Minister Montmorency who advocated restraint towards Spain is compelled to resign.
27 January 1823	A Greek National Assembly issues a declaration of independence. But this did not result de facto in Greek independence.
6 April 1823	The French Army crosses the river Bidassoa into Spain and war begins. They reach Madrid with ridiculous ease. French troops will occupy parts of Spain until 1827.
September 1823	French troops advance towards Cadiz, a small harbour town in the south west of Spain. The harbour of Cadiz is of vital geo-strategic importance. Spanish ships on their way to the Americas used to sail from Seville down the river Guadalquivir into the Gulf of Cadiz. However, river siltation made the Guadalquivir unnavigable. Therefore, Cadiz became the new point of departure for Spanish (and now French) ships to the Americas. As a result, London is alarmed and warns France not to undertake any hostile attempts towards the American provinces.
October 1823	Tsar Alexander and Austrian Emperor Francis meet at Czernowitz. The Tsar convinces the Emperor to agree to an ambassadorial conference in St Petersburg in June 1824 to discuss the Greek issue.
9 October 1823	French Ambassador Prince de Polignac and British Foreign Secretary Canning meet for talks. The result will be the Polignac Memorandum where France and Britain pledge territorial non-aggrandizement and the renunciation of the use of force in dealing with Latin America.
2 December 1823	State of the Union Address by US President James Monroe. His speech will later be referred to as the “Monroe Doctrine” (authored by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams).

List of congresses and conferences 1814 – 1885

List of congresses and conferences beginning with the First Peace Treaty in Paris in 1814. Source: Hinsley F. (1962) <i>Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States</i> , Cambridge University Press, accessed online on Cambridge Core via Cambridge University Press (published online January 2010), page 214.		
<u>Congresses</u>	Date	Issue
Vienna/Paris	1814-15	Peace Treaty and Quadruple Alliance
Aix-la-Chapelle	1818	France
Troppau	1820	Revolutions; the Naples Revolution
Laibach	1821	Naples Revolution
Verona	1822	Italy, Spain, En. Question ¹⁸⁶
Paris	1856	Peace Treaty
Berlin	1878	En. Question
<u>Conferences</u>	Date	Issue
London	1830-2	Belgium
Rome	1831-2	Reform of Papal states
London	1838-9	Belgium
Vienna	1839	En. Question
London	1840-1	En. Question
London	1850-2	Schleswig-Holstein
Vienna	1853	En. Question
Vienna	1855	En. Question
Paris	1858	Principalities
Paris	1860-1	Syria
London	1864	Schleswig-Holstein
London	1867	Luxembourg
Paris	1869	Crete
London	1871	Black Sea
Constantinople	1876-7	Eastern Question
Madrid	1880	Morocco
Berlin	1884-5	Africa

Figure 6 List of congresses and conferences 1814 - 1885

¹⁸⁶ En Question = Eastern Question (concerning primarily the relationship with and stability of the Ottoman Empire on the European side of the Bosphorus).

Articles with references to Marx, Weber and Durkheim in IR academic journals

The two graphs below show the number of academic articles with references to Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim in academic journals in the discipline of IR.

According to Boston University Libraries as well as Scimago Journal & Country Rank these journals are, measured by Impact Factor, among the leading journals in IR. The search within those three journals was conducted via JSTOR (<https://www.jstor.org/>) on 13 January 2019 and 05 July 2022.




Figure 7 Number of academic articles with references to Marx, Weber and Durkheim in leading IR journals




Figure 8 Number of academic articles with references to Durkheim in leading IR journals




Figure 9 Number of academic articles with references to anomie in IR academic journals